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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court recently held in South Florida Water Man-
agement District. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians' that under section
301(a)2 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") a transfer of water, con-
taining pollutants, from one water body into another, by a pump,
may be an "addition" of pollutants into navigable waters from a
point source, thereby requiring a permit under section 402 of the
CWA.3 However, the Court's holdings in Miccosukee Tribe failed to
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law;
J.D. 1971, Yale Law School; B.S. 1968, Cornell University.
1. 124 S. Ct. 1537 (2004).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 13 11(a) (2000).
3. Id. § 1342. See infra notes 106-115 and accompanying text
(discussing section 301(a) of the CWA which requires a permit un-
der section 402 of the CWA, issued by the United States Environ-
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specify the exact circumstances where such a transfer of water re-
quires a section 402 permit and did not indicate how its definition of
addition" of pollutants should be interpreted in situations resulting in
the pollution of surface bodies of water but involving different ac-
tivities from those involved in the Miccosukee Tribe case.
4
In its Miccosukee Tribe decision, the Supreme Court defined the
"addition" of a pollutant by a point source, under section 301(a) of
the CWA, as a point source that conveys into a navigable body of
water pollutants generated or created by other persons,5 as well as a
point source that creates or generates the pollutants which it intro-
duces into a navigable body of water.6 This holding by the Supreme
Court does not indicate a point source is exempted from the re-
quirements of section 301(a), either where the point source is only
adding a small or de minimis amount of pollutants into a navigable
body of water or where the point source is discharging the pollutants
at or near the place where the point source removed those pollutants
from that same body of water.
Consequently, the Supreme Court in Miccosukee Tribe held sec-
tion 301(a) of the CWA requires a point source, pumping water con-
taining pollutants generated by other sources into a navigable body
of water, to have a permit under section 402 of the Clean Water
Act.7 The permit is required unless such a permit program would
violate section 101(g) of the CWA 8 by raising "the costs of water
distribution prohibitively" 9 or the point source is considered to be
pumping water from one part of a particular body of water into an-
other part of that same body of water.10 The Supreme Court indi-
cated in the Miccosukee Tribe decision, however, that EPA and the
states could control costs of complying with CWA section 402 per-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) or a state with an EPA-approved
permit program, for the addition from a point source of a pollutant,
other than dredged or fill material, into navigable waters of the
United States).
4. 124 S. Ct. 1537.
5. Id. at 1543.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g).
9. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1545.
10. Id.
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mit programs for water distribution and transfer programs. 1 The
Court suggested costs may be controlled by issuing general section
402 permits (for which a point source does not have to individually
apply), rather than individual section 402 permits (for which a per-
son has to apply individually). 12
The Supreme Court in Miccosukee Tribe discussed three different
theories asserted by the lower courts to determine if two bodies of
water, involved in a transfer of water from one to the other, are the
same (so that a CWA section 402 permit is not required for the trans-
fer). 13 The Supreme Court, however, remanded the case to the Dis-
trict Court to determine if the receiving body of water, into which a
point source pumped polluted water, is "meaningfully distinct" from
the body of water from which the point source draws the water it
pumps.' 4 In addition, in its Miccosukee Tribe decision, the Supreme
Court discussed the "unitary waters" approach advocated by the
United States under which a CWA section 402 permit would not be
required in order to discharge water "unaltered, into another naviga-
ble water body, ... [even] if one water body were polluted and the
other pristine, and the two would not otherwise mix."15 The Su-
preme Court, however, declined to decide whether the "unitary wa-
ters" approach should be adopted under the CWA, thereby leaving
the "unitary waters" approach to be considered by the District Court
upon remand. 16
Consequently, the Miccosukee Tribe decision requires lower fed-
eral courts to select a theory or test to determine if a transfer of pol-
luted water from one navigable body of water to another is a transfer
of water into the same water body, which does not require a CWA
section 402 permit under Miccosukee Tribe. In addition, Miccosukee
Tribe requires lower federal courts to determine if the pumping of
water from one water body into another water body can occur with-
out a CWA section 402 permit under the "unitary waters" approach.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1545-46. See infra notes 214-247 and accompanying
text for further discussion about the three alternatives theories as-
serted in the lower courts.
14. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1547.
15. Id. at 1543.
16. Id. at 1547; see also infra notes 248-261 and accompanying
text (discussing the "unitary waters" approach).
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Part II of this Article analyzes how section 301(a) of the CWA de-
fines the "addition" of a pollutant into navigable waters from a point
source and how section 301(a) requires EPA, the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and States to regulate such point
source additions of pollutants into navigable water.
Part III of this article, in analyzing the Supreme Court's Micco-
sukee Tribe decision, concludes that federal courts, in determining
whether two bodies of water are the same and whether a CWA sec-
tion 402 permit is required, should use either a biological/ ecosys-
tems characteristics test or a "but for/ causation" test, rather than a
hydrological connection test. 17 Part III of the article also concludes
that federal courts should reject the "unitary waters" approach advo-
cated by the United States in Miccosukee Tribe.8 In addition, Part
III concludes the EPA, the Corps, and States can reduce the costs
and complexities of complying with section 301(a) of the CWA by
issuing general permits under both sections 402 and 404 of the
CWA 9 for water distribution programs and other activities now sub-
ject to section 301(a) as a result of the Miccosukee Tribe decision.
Parts IV, V and VI of this article analyze how Miccosukee Tribe
affects other types of activities that cause pollutants to be introduced
into surface bodies of water. Part IV of the article analyzes lower
court decisions pre- Miccosukee Tribe that have held a CWA section
402 permit is not required for changes a dam causes to the quality of
water in the river downstream. Part IV concludes that the Micco-
sukee Tribe decision does not require a section 402 permit for dam-
induced changes in the water quality of a river downstream of the
dam, where the reservoir behind the dam and the river downstream
of the dam are considered parts of the same body of water and where
the dam's point source pipes or spillways conveying water from the
reservoirs do not create or generate pollutants. As discussed in Part
IV, this latter condition means, however, that a hydroelectric dam
requires a CWA section 402 permit, if the dam's turbines kill live
17. Infra notes 236-247 and accompanying text.
18. Infra notes 248-261 and accompanying text.
19. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). As discussed infra notes 87-105 and
accompanying text, section 301(a) of the CWA requires a permit
under section 404 of the CWA, issued either by the Corps or a state
with an EPA-approved permit program, for the addition from a point
source of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the United
States.
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fish that were in the dam's intake water and convey dead fish into
the river downstream of the dam.
Part V of this article analyzes lower federal court decisions issued
pre-Miccosukee Tribe, which held that re-deposits by a point source
of soil or vegetation back into the same wetland or other navigable
body of water, from which the soil or vegetation was removed, can
be the "addition" by a point source of dredged or fill material for
which a permit is required under section 404 of the CWA. Part V
concludes that these decisions remain valid under the Supreme
Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision.
On the other hand, Part VI of the article concludes that the Su-
preme Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision has implicitly overruled
lower federal court decisions, which held that neither section 301(a)
nor section 404 of the CWA apply to "incidental fallback" (the re-
deposit of small volumes of dredged material that is incidental to
excavation activity in navigable waters of the United States, where
such material falls back to substantially the same place as where the
initial removal occurred).
The Miccosukee Tribe decision is an important interpretation of the
CWA since section 301(a) requires a point source to have a permit,
if a particular activity is found to be the "addition" of pollutants from
a point source into navigable waters of the United States. These
permits, which are issued under section 402 or section 404, are often
individual permits for which a person must apply but in some cases
can be general permits for which an individual person does not have
to apply. Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the CWA in
the Miccosukee Tribe decision, water distribution programs are im-
portant examples of programs for which States or the EPA can is-
sue general section 402 permits, rather than individual permits.
Read as a whole, this article concludes general section 402 permits
can also be issued for other categories of point sources, and general
section 404 permits can be issued by the Corps or states to categories
of point sources engaged in re-deposit or incidental fallback of soil
or vegetation. This broad authority to issue general section 402 and
404 permits makes CWA administration less costly and compliance
less costly for a point source discharger of pollutants. Therefore, a
point source discharger regulated by section 301(a) of the CWA
would usually prefer to be required to obtain a general section 402 or
404 permit, rather than an individual section 402 or 404 permit.
Both individual and general CWA section 402 and 404 permits,
however, may require a point source discharger of pollutants to
comply with limitations on the discharge of pollutants. In some
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situations, a section 402 permit will direct a point source discharger
of pollutants to comply with effluent limitation requirements that
require use of expensive state-of-the-art, best available pollution
control technology. "The process of obtaining an [individual section
402] permit can be time consuming, and compliance with the result-
ing effluent limitations often requires significant capital expenditures
for treatment technologies. 2 °
In contrast, an activity introducing pollutants into navigable wa-
ters, which is not considered to be an "addition" of pollutants from a
point source, may only be regulated under the CWA (if at all) by a
state government nonpoint source (runoff) pollution control program
under section 319 of the CWA2 1 or by nonpoint source controls im-
posed by a state under section 303(d).22 Such nonpoint source pro-
grams and controls do not have to require nonpoint sources of pollu-
tion to obtain a CWA section 402 or 404 permit and may only re-
quire a category of nonpoint sources of water pollution to use "best
management practices and measures" 23 rather than comply with
more expensive effluent limitation requirements applicable to point
dischargers of pollutants.
II. POLLUTANT DISCHARGES REGULATED UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT
Section 301(a) of the CWA24 is the provision of the Act that makes
the interpretation of the term "addition of a pollutant" a key issue in
determining the application of the CWA's section 402 and 404 per-
mit requirements, effluent limitation requirements, and regulations.
20. Richard Davis and Brian Doster, South Florida Water Man-
agement District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians: Supreme Court
Considers Extending Clean Water Act Regulation, 35 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 91, 95 (Jan. 9, 2004).
21. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000).
22. Id. § 1313(d). See also Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We
There Yet? The Long Road Toward Water Quality-Based Regulation
Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. (ELI) 10391, 10399-
10401 (Aug. 1997) (discussing the control of nonpoint sources under
section 303(d)).
23. 33 U.S.C. 1329(b)(2)(A).
24. Id. § 1311(a).
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Section 301(a) provides: "Except as in compliance with this section
and sections 302, 306, 307, 318, 402 and 404 of this title, the dis-
charge of any pollutant by any person is unlawful. 25 The sections
cited in section 301(a) mandate permits for regulated discharges of
pollutants and compliance with limitations on effluent discharges 26
27to avoid liability under the CWA. Because section 301(a) imposes
a "zero discharge" of pollutants standard in the absence of a required
28 2permit and because section 301(a)'s prohibition is self-executing,29
a person who "discharges" any pollutant regulated by section 301(a)
must comply with these specified requirements to avoid various pen-
alties under the Act.
30
As discussed below in more detail, 31 sections 502(16)32 and
502(12) of the CWA33 define "discharge" and "discharge of a pollut-
25. Id.
26. Id. § 1317. These effluent limitations requirements are sec-
tions 301, 302, 306, and 307 and are discussed infra notes 118-129
and accompanying text.
27. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580,
582-83 (6th Cir. 1988).
28. Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 78 F.3d 1523, 1529 (lth Cir.
1996). In Hughey, however, the court recognized an exception from
this "zero discharge" standard when: (1) compliance with such a
standard is factually impossible; (2) no permit covering such dis-
charge exists; (3) the discharge was in good faith compliance with
local pollution control requirements that substantially "mirrored" the
state's proposed discharge standards; and (4) the discharges of pol-
lutants were minimal. Id. Hughey involved storm water discharges
from a subdivision that were not subject to any section 402 permit
requirements under the Act because EPA had delegated section 402
permit issuing authority to the state, but the state had only proposed
a general section 402 permit that would regulate such storm water
discharges.
29. United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d 1123, 1127 (3rd
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
30. The penalties that can be imposed upon a person who violates
section 301(a) are discussed infra notes 57-68 and accompanying
text.
31. See infra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16) (2000).
33. Id. § 1362(12).
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ant/ pollutants" as "[the] addition of any pollutant to navigable wa-
ters from any point source [or] . . . to the waters of the contiguous
zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or other
floating craft.",34 The CWA also defines the terms "pollutant,
' 35
"navigable waters," 36 "contiguous zone, ' 37 "ocean, ' 38 and "point
source." 39 A "discharge" does not have to be an intentional act;
40
because "compliance with the CWA is a matter of strict liability ....
a [person's] intentions to comply or a good-faith effort to do so does
not excuse a violation.'
Nonpoint sources of pollution (often referred to as "runoff' pollu-
tion), which encompass all water quality problems and pollution
originating from or caused by sources that are not "point sources,,,
42
are not subject to the permit requirements and limitations on effluent
discharges that section 301 (a) imposes upon point source discharges
of pollutants into navigable waters.4 3 Instead, nonpoint source pollu-
tion primarily is sought to be regulated under the CWA by nonpoint
source management programs adopted by states under section 319 of
the CWA.4 Section 319 seeks to control pollutant loadings from
nonpoint sources through "best management practices and meas-
ures."
4 5
34. Id.
35. Id. § 1362(6).
36. Id. § 1362(7).
37. Id. § 1362(9).
38. Id. § 1362(10).
39. Id. § 1362(14).
40. Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. O'Bannon, 189 F. Supp. 2d 893, 905
(N.D. Ind. 2002), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
361 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2004).
41. United States v. Gulf Park Water Co., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1056,
1059 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
42. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 166 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
43. League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Diversity
Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002).
44. 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2000).
45. Id. § 1329(b)(2)(A)-(D). Nonpoint sources of pollution may
also be regulated by a state under section 303(d), id. at § 1313(d), of
the CWA in order to achieve total maximum daily loads of pollutant
discharges established for a particular body of water to implement an
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As noted above, section 301(a) prescribes a "zero discharge" stan-
dard unless the section's requirements are met. Therefore, neither
section 301(a) nor any other provision of the CWA requires a "dis-
charge" of a "pollutant" from a point source to meet any minimum
threshold amount, by weight, volume or concentration, for section
46301(a) to apply. Section 301(a) does not require a point source
"discharge of a pollutant" to cause either "significant alteration in
water quality" in the body of water into which the pollutant is dis-
charged,47 or identifiable harm to that or any other water body, or to
fish, shellfish or other organisms, humans or the environment in or-
der for a discharge to be subject to section 301(a). Furthermore, the
CWA does not require that a point source discharge of pollutants
create a net increase in the level of pollution being introduced into
the receiving body of water.48
The CWA's definition of "person" includes individuals, corpora-
tions, and state and local governments, but not the United States and
agencies, departments, employees and agents of the United States.49
applicable water quality standard. See also Houck, supra note 22, at
10399-10401 for discussion of the control of nonpoint sources under
section 303(d).
46. Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 78 F.3d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir.
1996). (Section 301(a) imposes a "zero discharge" of pollutants
standard in the absence of a section 402 NPDES permit, although an
exemption from this "zero discharge standard is available in a certain
situation); Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.2d 1273, 1298 (1st Cir. 1996),
cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119 (1997) (stating in dictum that the defini-
tion of a "discharge of any pollutant", in section 502(12)(A), 33
U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A), of the CWA does not require an addition of
''some not insignificant amount of pollutants to the transferee water
body.")
47. Minnehaha Creek Watershed Dist. v. Hoffman, 597 F.2d 617,
626-27 (8th Cir. 1979).
48. Comm. to Save Mokelumne River v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist.,
13 F.3d 305, 309 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 873 (1994).
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5). This provision defines "person" to mean
"an individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, munici-
pality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any inter-
state body." Id. This definition's use of "means" excludes entities
that are not explicitly mentioned, such as the United States and its
agencies, departments, employees and agents. "State" is defined by
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Therefore, section 301(a) does not apply either to the United States
or to agencies, departments, employees or agents of the United
States.50 However, section 313(a) of the CWA 5provides:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the execu-
tive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal
Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or
facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which
may result, in the discharge or runoff of pollutants, and
each officer, agent, or employee thereof in the perform-
ance of his official duties, shall be subject to, and comply
with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions re-
specting the control and abatement of water pollution in
the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongov-
ernmental entity including the payment of reasonable
service charges.
52
Section 313(a) regulates the nonpoint source "runoff of pollut-
ants"53 from a federal facility as well as the point source "discharge
the CWA to mean "a State, the District of Columbia, the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa,
the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands," id. § 1362(3), while "municipality"
is defined by the CWA to mean "a city, town, borough, county, par-
ish, district, association, or other public body created by or pursuant
to State law and having jurisdiction over disposal of sewage, indus-
trial wastes, or other wastes, or an Indian tribe or an authorized In-
dian tribal organization, or a designated and approved management
agency under section 208 of this title." Id. § 1362(4). The CWA de-
fines "interstate agency" to mean "an agency of two or more states
established by or pursuant to an agreement or compact approved by
the Congress, or any other agency of two or more States, having sub-
stantial powers or duties pertaining to the control of pollution as de-
termined and approved by the Administrator [of the United States
Environmental Protection Agency]." Id. § 1362(2).
50. EPA v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 222 n.37
(1976).
51. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2000).
52. Id.
53. The CWA does not define "runoff," but one District Court has
held that "the term 'runoff ordinarily refers to the flow of excess
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of pollutants" from a federal facility. 54 The term "discharge of pol-
lutants" is defined in the same manner under both sections 301(a)
and 313 by interpretations of the CWA's definition of "discharge of
a pollutant" and definitions of the terms "pollutant," "point source,"
and "navigable waters;" therefore, courts often rely upon a case in-
terpreting "discharge of a pollutant" under one of the two sections
when interpreting that term under the other section.55 As is the case
with section 301(a), section 313(a) does not explicitly require that a
point source "discharge ... of pollutants" either meet any minimum
threshold amount by weight, volume or concentration or cause any
identifiable harm to water quality, humans or the environment.
Although section 313(a) makes federal agencies, departments, em-
ployees and agents subject both to procedural requirements (includ-
ing permit requirements) and to substantive effluent limitation re-
quirements of federal, state and local water pollution control laws to
the same extent as private persons, 56 they are not subject to the en-
forcement provisions of the CWA applied to a "person" who unlaw-
precipitation (such as rain or snow) into a stream [and] ... that the
rise and fall of the water level in [a] river because of fluctuations in
the discharge of [a] dammed stream could not be classified as runoff
of a pollutant within the meaning of the [Clean Water Act]." State
of Mo. ex rel. Ashcroft v. Dep't. of the Army, 672 F.2d 1297, 1304
(8th Cir. 1982). This article will not analyze how "runoff of pollut-
ants" should be defined under section 313.
54. Id.
55. E.g., Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (interpreting section 301(a)); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Con-
sumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 582 (6th Cir. 1988) (interpreting
section 301(a)); State of Mo. ex rel. Ashcroft v. Dep't of the Army,
672 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1982) (interpreting section 313); United
States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn. Water Quality Control
Bd., 717 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1983) (interpreting section 313), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984).
56. Tenn. Water Quality Control Bd., 717 F.2d at 997. The proce-
dural requirements with which a federal facility is required to com-
ply under section 313 can include the requirement for an NPDES
permit for the discharge of pollutants from a point source, but sec-
tion 313 does not require a federal facility to obtain an NPDES per-
mit from a state for pollution that "does not result from the discharge
of pollutants from a point source." Id. at 999-1000.
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fully discharges a pollutant from a point source in violation of sec-
tion 301(a). Under section 309 of the CWA,57 when a person vio-
lates section 301(a) by unlawfully discharging a pollutant, the fed-
eral government has a number of enforcement options; including,
EPA issuing a compliance order against the violator,58 the United
States filing a civil action in federal court seeking appropriate equi-
table relief,59 EPA assessing administrative civil penalties, 6 and the
United States filing suit against the violator in a federal district court
seeking assessment of civil penalties 6' or imposition of criminal pun-
ishment.62 Civil liability for violation of section 301(a) of the CWA
is strict and not dependent upon proof of negligence or knowledge
the act is illegal.
63
In addition, a "person .. .having an interest which is or may be
adversely affected"'64 can file a citizen suit under section 50565
against a person alleged to be in violation of section 301(a), to seek
appropriate injunctive relief and appropriate civil penalties under
section 309(d) of the CWA. 66 Since states and local governments
are a "person" under the CWA, a state or local government meeting
the section 505 "adversely affected" standing to sue requirement can
bring a citizen suit against another "person" who is allegedly in vio-
lation of section 301(a).
Because the CWA's definition of "person" does not include either
the federal government or agencies, departments, employees or
agents of the federal government, the United States' enforcement
options under section 309 are not available against a federal agency,
department, employee or agent that violates section 313 of the CWA.
However, section 313's requirements can be enforced in a suit seek-
ing injunctive relief brought against a federal administrative agency
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000).
58. Id. § 1319(a)(1)-(3).
59. Id. § 1319(b).
60. Id. § 1319(g).
61. Id. § 1319(d).
62. Id. § 1319(c).
63. Kelly v. EPA, 203 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2000).
64. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(g) (2000).
65. Id. § 1365.
66. Id. §§ 1365(a)(1)(ii)(A), (f)(1).
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under the Administrative Procedure Act 67 by "a person ... adversely• ,68
affected or aggrieved by [the challenged] agency action....
As noted earlier, by defining "discharge" "when used without
qualification [to include] a discharge of a pollutant, and a discharge
of pollutants, ' 69 the CWA makes section 301(a)'s prohibition of
unlawful discharges of pollutants applicable only to "point sources"
that "discharge" pollutants. It defines the term "discharge of a pol-
lutant" and the term "discharge of pollutants" to each mean: "(A)
any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point
source, (B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the con-
tiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel
or other floating craft.",
70
67. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000).
68. Id. § 702.
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(16) (2000).
70. Id. § 1362(12). The CWA defines "navigable waters" to mean
"the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." Id. §
1362(7). "Territorial seas" is defined by the CWA to mean "the belt
of the seas measured from the line of ordinary low water mark along
that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea
and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters, and extend-
ing seaward a distance of three miles." Id. § 1362(8). "Contiguous
zone" is defined by the CWA to mean "the entire zone established or
to be established by the United States under article 24 of the Con-
vention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone," id. §
1362(9), while "ocean" is defined by the CWA to mean "any portion
of the high seas beyond the contiguous zone." Id. § 1362(10). EPA
regulations defining "waters of the United States" under the CWA
are at 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.2, 230.3(s), and Corps regulations defining
"navigable waters" for purposes of section 404 of the CWA are at 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(a).
"Navigable waters" under the CWA include a surface body of
freshwater "navigable in fact" because it is used, has been used in
the past, or is susceptible of being used, in its ordinary condition, as
a route for waterborne interstate or foreign commercial trade or
travel. United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698, 709 (4th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1874 (2004).
In addition, a majority of courts of appeals also hold that
"navigable waters" under the CWA include the entire tributary sys-
tem of a navigable in fact body of water (all of the streams whose
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waters eventually flow into that "navigable in fact" body of water).
Id.; Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526, 533
(9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447, 452-53 (6th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1875 (2004); United States v.
TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762, 765 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Tex.
Pipe Line Co., 611 F.2d 345, 347 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1325 (6th Cir. 1974).
The Fifth Circuit has held, however, that "navigable waters" under
the CWA only include bodies of water that actually are navigable
(in fact) or are adjacent to an open body of navigable water. Rice v.
Harken Explor. Co., 250 F.3d 264, 269-70 (5th Cir. 2001).
"Navigable waters" under the CWA include human-made
ditches and canals that are tributaries of "navigable in fact" waters,
United States v. Eidson, 108 F.3d 1336, 1342 (1 1th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 522 U.S. 899, 1004 (1997), and tributaries that only have
water flowing in them intermittently during significant rainfall (such
as normally dry drainage ditches and arroyos). Id.
"Navigable waters" ("waters of the United States") under the
CWA also include freshwater "wetlands" (defined by Corps and
EPA regulations as lands "inundated or saturated by surface or
ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and
that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegeta-
tion typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions." 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(b) (Corps); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (EPA)) that are adja-
cent to other navigable waters (other than other wetlands), 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(7) (Corps); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (EPA); see United States v.
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 124 (1985), but not
to non-navigable in fact, isolated, intrastate freshwater wetlands that
are habitat for migratory waterfowl. Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159
(2001) [hereinafter SWANCC] The Fifth Circuit has interpreted the
SWANCC decision as limiting the definition of "navigable waters"
under the CWA to bodies of water that are actually navigable or are
adjacent to an open body of navigable water, Rice v. Harken Explor.
Co., 250 F.3d 264, 269-70 (5th Cir. 2001), while most other courts
have interpreted SWANCC only as holding that "navigable waters"
under the CWA do not include an isolated water body with no hy-
drological connection to a navigable in fact body of water. United
States v. Rapanos, 376 F.3d 629, 642 (6th Cir. 2004).
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The CWA, although providing no definition of "addition," does
define the term "point source" to mean "any discernible, confined
and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged," ex-
cluding "agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from
irrigated agriculture." 71 Section 301(a), therefore, only applies to an
"addition" of pollutants from a discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance (a "point source") into navigable waters, or into the con-
tiguous zone or the ocean (except from a vessel or other floating
craft).
An apparent majority of federal courts hold that "navigable
waters" under the CWA include groundwater that is hydrologically
connected to a navigable surface body of water. Williams Pipe Line
Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1320 (S.D. Iowa 1997);
Washington Wilderness Coalition v. Hecla Mining Corp., 870 F.
Supp. 983, 990 (E.D. Wash. 1994); Sierra Club v. Colorado Ref.
Co., 838 F. Supp. 1428, 1434 (D. Colo. 1993); McClellan Ecological
Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 1195-96 (E.D.
Cal. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 807 (1995); New York v. United States, 620
F. Supp. 374, 381 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Friends of the Coast Fork v.
Turner, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22083 *7 (D. Ore. 1996). Federal
courts, however, hold that "navigable waters" under the CWA do not
include isolated, non-tributary groundwater that has no hydrologic
connection to surface navigable waters, Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554
F.2d 1310, 1311-12 (5th Cir. 1977); and a substantial minority of
federal courts hold that "navigable waters" under the CWA also does
not include groundwater even if it is hydrologically connected to
navigable surface waters. Vill. of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton
Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 966 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 930 (1994); Town of Norfolk v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 968 F.2d 1438, 1451 (1st Cir. 1992); Umatilla Water Quality
Protective Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith Frozen Foods, Inc., 962 F. Supp.
1312, 1314 (D. Or. 1997); Kelley v. United States, 618 F. Supp.
1103, 1106-07 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).
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72As discussed later, the Supreme Court held in Miccosukee Tribe
that the CWA's definition of "point source". "makes plain that a
point source need not be the original source of the pollutant; it need
only convey the pollutant to 'navigable waters' .... 73 On the other
hand, for purposes of section 301(a), an "addition" of pollutants to a
navigable body of water from a point source "do[es] not have to in-
volve the introduction of material brought in from somewhere
else."74 There can be an "addition" of a pollutant into a navigable
body of water under section 301(a) "without an addition of material.
• . , at least when an activity transforms some material from a non-
pollutant into a pollutant," such as when soil and plant matter are
removed from a wetland (that is a navigable body of water under the
Act) and re-deposited into that same wetland.75
The Act also does not explicitly require that discharged pollutants
be dissolved or suspended in the waters of the navigable body of
water into which the pollutants have been added. The plain language
of section 301(a) makes its requirements applicable to a discharge or
addition of pollutants into a navigable water body when the dis-
charged pollutants settle to the bottom of the navigable body of wa-
ter into which the pollutants were added or carried by currents (in-
72. Infra notes 176-200 and accompanying text.
73. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct.
1537, 1543 (2004).
74. Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
261 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd per curiam by equally di-
vided court, 123 S. Ct. 599 (2002).
75. United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000),
mot. to reconsider denied, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. de-
nied, 124 S. Ct. 1874 (2004); see also infra notes 412-38 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of "Re-deposits" of dredged and
excavated materials.
As discussed infra notes 201-47 and accompanying text, Mic-
cosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. 1537, 1545 (2004), held that a NPDES
permit is not required in order for a point source to pump water con-
taining pollutants from one part of a navigable body of water to an-
other part of that same navigable body of water, when the point
source does not introduce any pollutants into that transferred water
and the transferred water is not diverted for any intervening use after
being withdrawn from that body of water prior to being pumped
back into the source body of water.
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stead of the discharged pollutants dissolving or becoming suspended
in the waters of a navigable body of water). Although the Clean Wa-
ter Act does not explicitly state section 301(a) requirements apply to
a point source addition of pollutants to a navigable body of water
that settle into the bottom sediment of that water body, a number of
provisions of the CWA address pollutants in sediments on the bot-
toms of navigable bodies of water, 76 implicitly indicating that Con-
gress intended that the CWA's regulatory programs (including sec-
tion 301(a)) should apply to point source discharges of pollutants
that settle on the bottoms of navigable bodies of water.
Although the CWA defines both "pollutants" and "pollution,"
these two terms are defined differently, with "pollutant" defined by
the CWA to mean "dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue,
sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemicals wastes, bio-
logical materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand,
cellar dirt and industrial, municipal and agricultural waste dis-
charged into water," subject to some exclusions.77 Although this
76. Section 115, 33 U.S.C. § 1265 (2000), of the CWA directs the
EPA Administrator, acting through the Secretary of Army, to enter
into contracts for the removal and appropriate disposal of "in-place
pollutants," "with emphasis on toxic pollutants in harbors and navi-
gable waterways" ("in-place pollutants" presumably are pollutants
that have settled to the bottom of a navigable body of water and are
in the sediment on the bottom of a navigable body of water). Section
116, id. § 1266, authorized the EPA Administrator to enter into con-
tracts and other agreements with the State of New York for a project
"to demonstrate methods for the selective removal of polychlori-
nated biphenyls contaminating bottom sediments of the Hudson
River" and the appropriate treatment and disposal of such removed
sediments. Section 304(a)(1)(C), id. § 1314(a)(1)(C), directs the
EPA Administrator to develop and publish "information on ... rates
of organic and inorganic sedimentation for varying types of receiv-
ing waters," as part of published water quality criteria.
77. Id. § 1362(6). The CWA excludes, from the definition of "pol-
lutant:"
(A) sewage from vessels or a discharge incidental to the
normal operation of a vessel of the Armed Forces
within the meaning of section 312 of this title; or (B)
water, gas, or other material which is injected into a
well to facilitate production of oil or gas, or water de-
18 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
definition's "restrictive phrasing," that defines "pollutant" "with a
list of specific items," is not "all-inclusive," 78 the courts have inter-
preted the CWA's definition of "pollutants" "to encompass sub-
stances not specifically enumerated but subsumed under the broad
generic terms such as 'chemical waste' and 'solid waste'," 79 and
Congress has given EPA reasonable discretion to define what is a
"pollutant" (and what is a "point source") under the CWA.80
The CWA, however, defines "pollution" differently than "pollut-
ant," as "the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical,
physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water." 81  The
CWA's definition of "pollution" is broader than the CWA's defini-
tion of "pollutants;" with the exception of "heat" (which can cause
the temperature of a body of water to increase), the CWA's defini-
tion of "pollutant" requires some tangible type of material or sub-
stance to be placed into a body of water (as opposed to simply caus-
ing a change in water conditions).82 Consequently, the "alteration of
the chemical, physical, biological, [or] radiological" characteristics
of a body of water, such as by changing the amount of dissolved
oxygen present in a body of water, can satisfy the CWA's definition
of "pollution ' 83 even though the alteration does not result from any
tangible material being placed into the body of water. "Although
alterations in the properties of water are 'pollution' under the
broader definition ..., all alterations do not fit the narrower defini-
rived in association with oil or gas production and
disposed of in a well, if the well used either to facili-
tate production or for disposal purposes is approved
by the authority of the State in which the well is lo-
cated, and if such State determines that such injection
or disposal will not result in the degradation of
ground or surface water resources.
Id.
78. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 172-73 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
79. Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. New York, 751 F. Supp.
1088, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aff'd, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991).
80. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 173-74.
81. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2000).
82. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 171.
83. Id. at 165.
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tion of 'pollutants'. ..,84 Under the CWA, therefore, an "addition"
of pollutants to a body of water by a point source does not necessar-
ily occur when the point source causes "pollution" of the body of
water, although a court may define "pollutant" under the Act in a
manner that is consistent with the CWA's definition of pollution."
85
Although section 301(a) generally makes it unlawful for a point
source to add pollutants to a navigable body of water, certain permits
may supersede the general rule. Sections 318, 402, and 404 of the
CWA provide for the issuance of permits authorizing lawful dis-
charges of pollutants from point sources into navigable waters that
otherwise would be unlawful under section 301(a). Section 318 au-
thorizes the EPA Administrator to permit "the discharge of a specific
pollutant or pollutants under controlled conditions associated with an
approved aquaculture project under Federal or State supervision pur-
suant to section 402 of this title."
8 6
Section 404 authorizes the Corps or a state with an EPA Adminis-
trator-approved permit program,87 to issue a permit "for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at speci-
fied disposal sites.' 8 8 A section 404 permit often is an individual
84. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn. Water Qual-
ity Control Bd., 717 F.2d 992, 999 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 937 (1984).
85. N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Explor. and Dev. Co., 73
F.3d 1155, 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2003).
86. 33 U.S.C § 1328(a). This article will not discuss further per-
mits under section 318 and 402 for aquaculture projects.
87. Id. § 1344(g); 40 C.F.R. § 233.50 (2003). The Corps' issu-
ance of individual and general permits under sections 404(a) and
section 404(e) is suspended for activities with respect to which a
permit may be issued by a state that has been delegated the authority
to issue section 404 permits. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(h)(2)(A), (3) (2000).
Only Michigan and New Jersey have been authorized by EPA to
administer state section 404 permit programs.
88. Id. §§ 1344(a), (h). The Corps and EPA have issued regula-
tions defining "fill material" as any material (other than trash or gar-
bage) placed in waters of the United States where the material has
the effect of replacing any portion of a water of the United States
with dry land or changing the bottom elevation of any portion of a
water of the United States, 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(e)(1) (2003) (Corps),
40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2003) (EPA), and "dredged material" as "mate-
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permit for which a person must apply, although section 404(e) 89 au-
thorizes the Corps to issue general permits (for which an individual
would not have to apply9°), on a state, regional, or nationwide basis,
for any category of activities involving discharges of dredged or fill
materials that the Corps finds are similar in nature and will cause,
both separately and cumulatively, only minimal adverse effects on
the environment. 91 A state with an approved section 404 permit pro-
rial that is excavated or dredged from waters of the United States."
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(c) (Corps), 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (EPA). "Dredging"
for purposes of this regulation can include hydraulic dredging as
well as mechanized means of dredging. Greenfield Mills, Inc. v.
O'Bannon, 189 F. Supp. 2d 893, 905, 906 (N.D. Ind. 2002), aff'd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 361 F.3d 934 (7th Cir.
2004). The Corps and EPA also have issued regulations that define
"discharge of fill material," 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(f) (Corps), 40 C.F.R.
§ 232.2 (EPA) and "discharge of dredged material," 33 C.F.R. §
323.2(d)(1) (Corps), 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (EPA). See also infra notes
446-511 and accompanying text for discussion of the agencies' defi-
nition of "discharge of dredged material."
The Corps does not issue section 404 permits for its own civil
works projects and navigation maintenance and improvement activi-
ties. 33 C.F.R. § 336.1(a).
Section 404(f)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1), provides that the
discharge of dredged or fill materials from a number of activities,
including certain farming, silviculture, and ranching activities, "is
not prohibited or otherwise subject to regulation" under sections 404,
301(a) or 402 of the CWA (except for effluent standards or prohibi-
tions under section 307), except as provided under the "recapture"
provision of section 404(f)(2), id. § 1344(f)(2). Section 404(f)(2)
provides that "[a]ny discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters incidental to any activity having as its purpose
bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was
not previously subject, where the flow or circulation of navigable
waters may be impaired or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall
be required to have a permit under section 404 of the CWA." Id.
89. Id. § 1344(e).
90. Oh. Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732,
759 (S.D. W.Va. 2003).
91. In accordance with the Corps' regulations for establishing
general permits, 33 C.F.R. § 330 (2003), the Corps has issued forty-
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gram can also issue general section 404 permits92 and can assume
administration and enforcement of a general permit issued by the
Corps under section 404(e) with respect to activities in such state to
which such general permit applies. 93 The Corps may sometimes deny
an application for an individual section 404 permit, particularly
when an application seeks a section 404 permit authorizing the dis-
charge of dredged or fill materials into protected wetlands.
four section 404 nationwide general permits (NWPs). 67 Fed. Reg.
2020 (Jan. 15, 2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 6692 (2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 8579
(Feb. 25, 2002). These nationwide general permits are published
only in the Federal Register and are not published in the Code of
Federal Regulations. Some of the NWPs are limited to discharges
that do not cause the loss of more than a half-acre of protected wa-
ters. 67 Fed. Reg. at 2020, 2021, 2023.
These nationwide general permits are subject to General Con-
ditions, 67 Fed. Reg. 2089-94 (Jan. 15, 2004), that require an activity
authorized under a general permit to minimize adverse impacts on
the aquatic environment. General Condition 19, 67 Fed. Reg. at
2092-93.
In accordance with 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(e), certain section 404
nationwide general permits (for discharges that will result in the loss
of more than one-tenth of an acre of protected waters, 67 Fed. Reg.
at 2021) require a person to give pre-construction notice [hereinafter
PCN] (in compliance with General Condition 13, 67 Fed. Reg. at
2090-92) to a Corps District Engineer prior to undertaking an activ-
ity that is authorized by a section 404 general permit. NWPs for
activities requiring a PCN generally require compensatory mitigation
to offset the adverse impacts of the permitted discharges. General
Condition 19(c), 67 Fed. Reg. at 2092-93. After receiving a PCN, a
District Engineer can add special conditions to a nationwide general
permit (NWP) to ensure that the permitted discharges only will have
minimal adverse impacts on the aquatic environment, or may exer-
cise discretionary authority to require that a person apply for an in-
dividual section 404 permit for a proposed discharge that will result
in more than minimal adverse effects on the aquatic environment.
General Condition 13, 67 Fed. Reg. at 2090.
The Corps also may issue section 404 regional general per-
mits. 33 C.F.R. § 330.1(c) (2003).
92. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1) (2000).
93. Id. § 1344(h)(5).
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The Corps can issue a section 404 permit when it finds, after
weighing the costs and benefits of granting or denying the permit
application, the public interest will be served by issuing the permit.
94
However, section 404(b)(1) 95 requires that the specification of each
disposal site for the discharge of dredged or fill material under a sec-
tion 404 permit shall occur through the application of guidelines de-
veloped by the EPA Administrator in conjunction with the Corps.96
EPA's section 404(b)(1) guidelines 97 prohibit, except as authorized
under section 404(b)(2),98 the issuance of an individual section 404
permit "if there is a practicable alternative to the proposed discharge
which would have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosystem, so
long as the alternative does not have other significant adverse envi-
ronmental consequences." 99 EPA's section 404(b)(1) guidelines also
mandate, except as provided under section 404(b)(2), that no indi-
vidual section 404 permit for the discharge of dredged or fill mate-
rial shall issue unless "appropriate and practicable steps have been
taken, which will minimize potential adverse impacts of the dis-
charge on the aquatic ecosystem."100 To comply with this mitigation
requirement, a section 404 individual permit holder must comply
94. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4.
95. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1).
96. In any case where EPA's section 404(b)(1) guidelines would
prohibit the specification of a disposal site, the specification of a
disposal site for the discharge of dredged or fill material under a sec-
tion 404 permit shall occur "through the application additionally of
the economic impact of the site on navigation and anchorage." Id. §
1344(b)(2).
97. 40 C.F.R. § 230.
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (b)(2).
99. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a); 33 C.F.R. §§ 320.4(a)(1), (b)(4).
Unless clearly demonstrated otherwise, where the activity associated
with a discharge proposed for a protected wetland or other special
aquatic site is not "water dependent" (requiring access or proximity
to or siting within a special aquatic site to fulfill its basic purpose),
practicable alternatives not involving special aquatic sites are pre-
sumed to be available and all practicable alternatives to the proposed
discharge, which do not involve a discharge into a special aquatic
site, are presumed to have less adverse impact on the aquatic ecosys-
tem. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a)(3).
100. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d).
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with compensatory mitigation requirements when wetlands will be
adversely affected by a discharge of dredged or fill materials.'
1
Although the Corps' general section 404 permits are not subject to
these requirements governing individual section 404 permits, the
Corps' General Conditions' 02 for Section 404 Nationwide General
Permits (NWPs) require an activity authorized under an NWP to
minimize adverse impacts on the aquatic environment and require
some activities authorized by NWPs to provide compensatory miti-
gation for adverse impacts to wetlands, streams, and open waters.
In order for the Corps to issue either an individual or a general sec-
tion 404 permit, the state in which the discharge will occur must cer-
tify (or waive its right to certify), in accordance with section 401(a)
of the CWA, 10 3 that the discharge authorized by the section 404
permit will comply with the state's water quality standards.'0 4 In
addition, the EPA Administrator can prohibit the specification of any
defined area as a disposal site for the discharge of dredged or fill
material if she determines "that the discharge of such materials into
such an area will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal
water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning
and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational areas."' 0 5
101. 55 Fed. Reg. 9211, 9212 (1990) (Memorandum of Agreement
Between the EPA and the Dep't. of the Army Concerning the De-
termination of Mitigation Under the Clean Water Act Section
404(b)(1) Guidelines). In the case of a section 404 permit to fill in
wetlands, compensatory mitigation requires the restoration of previ-
ously damaged wetlands or the creation of new wetlands, to off-set
the harm to wetlands destroyed or damaged by the activities author-
ized by the section 404 permit. Id.
102. 67 Fed. Reg. 2089-94 (2002).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2000).
104. Section 401(a) certification requirements apply to both indi-
vidual and general section 404 permits. United States v. Marathon
Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 1989). Section 401(a)(1), 33
U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1), directs that no individual or general section 404
permit shall be granted if section 401 certification has been denied
by the state. Id. at 101.
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). This authority essentially gives the EPA
Administrator the authority to veto both individual and general sec-
tion 404 permits issued by the Corps or a state. The EPA Adminis-
trator can also veto the issuance of either an individual or general
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Except as provided in sections 318 and 404 of the CWA, section
402 of the Act'0 6 authorizes the EPA Administrator, or a state with
either a full or partial permit program approved by the EPA Admin-
istrator, 1°7 to "issue a permit for the discharge of any pollutant, or
combination of pollutants, notwithstanding section 301(a)," upon
certain conditions (including compliance with technology-based or
water-quality based effluent limitation requirements) being satis-
fied. 1°8 These section 402 permits are referred to as NPDES (Na-
tional Pollution Discharge Elimination System) permits. A section
402 NPDES permit usually is an individual permit for which a per-
son must apply, although EPA regulations' °9 authorize EPA Re-
gional Administrators and directors of state section 402 NPDES
permit programs to issue general NPDES permits (for which a per-
son does not have to apply l 0 ) for a category of point sources within
section 404 permit proposed to be issued by a state with an approved
section 404 permit program, when the EPA Administrator finds that
issuance of the permit would be "outside the requirements of...
section [404] . . . ." Id. § 1344(j). If the state does not revise a per-
mit, which the EPA Administrator has vetoed, to meet the EPA Ad-
ministrator's objections, the Corps can issue the permit under section
404 either as an individual permit or as a general permit.
106. Id. § 1342.
107. Id. §§ 1342(b)-(f), (n). EPA has delegated either full or partial
authority to 45 states to issue section 402 NPDES permits. EPA's
authority to issue section 402 NPDES permits is suspended in a state
that has been delegated the authority to issue section 402 NPDES
permits. Id. § 1342(c)(1). See also William L. Andreen, Water
Quality Today - Has the Clean Water Act Been a Success?, 55 ALA.
L. REV. 537, 540 n.16 (2004).
108. Id. §§ 1342(a)-(b). EPA and the states are prohibited from
requiring section 402 NPDES permits "for discharges composed
entirely of return flows from irrigated agriculture," id. § 1342(1)(1),
and for certain "discharges of storm water runoff from mining opera-
tions or oil and gas exploration, production, processing or treatment
operations or transmission facilities .... ." Id. § 1342(l)(2).
109. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.28, 123.25 (2003).
110. Oh. Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732,
759 (S.D. W.Va. 2003).
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a specified geographic area. 1 " Unlike applications for individual
section 404 permits (which sometimes are denied), applications for
individual section 402 NPDES permits usually are granted, subject
to the applicant complying with specified permit conditions (which
may include costly effluent limitation requirements).
In order for EPA to issue either an individual or a general section
402 NPDES permit, the state in which the discharge will occur must
certify (or waive its right to certify), in accordance with section
401(a) of the CWA, 12 the discharge authorized by the NPDES per-
mit will comply with the state's water quality standards. 113 The EPA
Administrator has the authority under section 402(d)l 14 to veto a sec-
tion 402 NPDES permit proposed to be issued by a state that has
been delegated authority to issue NPDES permits, when the permit
would be outside the guidelines and requirements of the CWA. Sub-
sequent to the veto, the EPA has the authority to issue the permit in
accordance with the guidelines and requirements of the CWA if the
state does not properly revise the permit to meet EPA's objections.
Neither EPA nor a state has the authority to exempt from the sec-
tion 402 NPDES permit requirement discharges otherwise subject to
the requirements of sections 301(a) and 402 of the Act.1 5 Similarly,
because Congress' intent under section 402 is to require a permit "in
any situation of pollution from point sources"'1 16 and because "[o]nly
Congress may amend the CWA to create exemptions from regula-
tion,"'1 17 neither the Corps nor a state has the authority to exempt a
"discharge of dredged or fill material" from the section 404 permit
requirement.
I 11. See infra notes 264-79 and accompanying text for a more
comprehensive discussion on General NPDES permits.
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2000).
113. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 279 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th
Cir. 2002). Section 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1), directs that
no individual or general permit shall be granted if the section 40 1(a)
certification has been denied by the state. United States v. Marathon
Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 1989).
114. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d).
115. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d. 1369, 1382
(D.C. Cir. 1977); N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Explor. and Dev.
Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003).
116. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1383.
117. N. Plains Res. Council, 325 F.3d at 1164.
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In addition to requiring a permit to make lawful a point source ad-
dition of pollutants to a navigable body of water, section 301(a) of
the CWA also requires a point source discharge of pollutants to
comply with effluent limitation and pretreatment requirements pre-
scribed in sections 301, 302, 306 and 307 of the Act. These sections
require specified point sources, discharging pollutants (other than
dredged or fill materials, whose discharges are regulated differently
through section 404 permits 18) into navigable waters, to comply
with specified effluent limitation or pretreatment requirements or
regulations. Section 301119 requires publicly owned treatment
works, in existence and operating in 1972 when Congress enacted
the CWA, and other existing point sources discharging pollutants
into publicly owned treatment works or into navigable waters, to
comply with technology-based effluent limitation or pretreatment
requirements and regulations promulgated by the EPA Administra-
tor. The EPA Administrator is authorized by section 302 of the
CWA120 to establish effluent limitations for particular point sources
that are stricter than those required under section 301 when neces-
sary to attain or maintain "that water quality in a specific portion of
the navigable waters which shall assure protection of public health,
public water supplies, agricultural and industrial uses, and the pro-
tection and propagation of a balanced population of shellfish, fish
and wildlife, and allow recreational activities in and on the water." 12
1
Section 306 of the CWA 122 requires a new point source 123 to comply
118. Point source discharges of dredged or fill material that are
required to have a section 404 permit are subject to Corps and EPA
guidelines that seek to minimize adverse impacts upon the aquatic
ecosystem and that require compensatory mitigation to offset harm
to wetlands that occur under a section 404 permit. Supra notes 97-
102 and accompanying text.
119. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000).
120. See id. § 1312.
121. Id. § 1312(a).
122. See id. § 1316.
123. A "new source" is defined by the CWA to mean "any source,
the construction of which is commenced after the publication of pro-
posed regulations prescribing a standard of performance under this
section [section 306, 33 U.S.C. § 1316] which will be applicable to
such source, if such standard is thereafter promulgated in accordance
with ... section [306]." Id. § 1316(a)(2).
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with a technology-based standard of performance promulgated by
the EPA Administrator for that category of sources. Under section
304(b)(2) of the CWA, 12 4 the EPA Administrator is required to
promulgate effluent limitation requirements for categories of point
sources discharging toxic pollutants that require application of the
best technology economically achievable; the Administrator, how-
ever, is permitted under section 307(a)(2) 125 to establish more strin-
gent requirements for the discharge of a toxic pollutant (including a
prohibition) to provide an "ample margin of safety"1 26 (presumably
to aquatic organisms and to the health of human beings). The EPA
Administrator is required by section 307(b) 127 to promulgate regula-
tions establishing pretreatment standards for categories of point
sources introducing pollutants into publicly owned treatment works,
"to prevent the discharge of any pollutant through treatment works..
• which are publicly owned, which pollutant interferes with, passes
through, or otherwise is incompatible with such works."' 28 These
technology and water-quality based effluent limitation requirements,
which are included in section 402 NPDES permits issued by EPA
and the states, "may be in the form of numeric effluent limitations or
in the form of BMPs [Best Management Practices] or other non-
numeric effluent limitations and standards."' 12
9
124. See id. § 1314(b)(2).
125. See id. § 1317(a)(2).
126. Id. § 1317(a)(4).
127. See id. § 1317(b).
128. Id.
129. 68 Fed. Reg. 7184-85 (Feb. 12, 2003). Examples of best
management practices effluent limitation requirements are EPA's
best management practices and procedures, for land application of
manure and for nutrient management plans, for CAFOs (large con-
centrated animal feeding operations). 40 CFR §§ 122.42(e), 412.4
(2003).
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III. PUMPING POLLUTED WATER FROM ONE WATER BODY To
ANOTHER: SOUTH FLORIDA WATER MANAGEMENT DisTRICTV.
MIccosuKEE TRIBE
In South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee
Tribe,130 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the NPDES permit re-
quirement of section 301(a) of the CWA applies to a point source
which conveys into a navigable water body pollutants originating
and added to the water elsewhere. 131 In Miccosukee Tribe the Su-
preme Court rejected the argument that section 301(a) NPDES per-
mit requirements apply only to a point source adding to a navigable
water body pollutants that originate at that point source.1 32 The
Court also held in Miccosukee Tribe, however, that the section
301(a) NPDES permit requirement does not apply to a point source
merely pumping water, containing pollutants, back into the same
navigable body of water from which the polluted water discharge
was taken.133 But, the Supreme Court remanded the case for deter-
mination of whether the definition of the "same navigable body of
water" for purposes of this principle should be determined on the
basis of hydrological connections of the source and receiving bodies
of water, differing biological or ecosystem characteristics of the re-
spective bodies of water, or whether the transfer of water would oc-
cur naturally.' 34 As part of the remand order, the Supreme Court in
Miccosukee Tribe also ordered the lower courts to consider the "uni-
tary waters" approach advocated by the United States in the case.
Under the "unitary waters" approach, the pumping of water contain-
ing pollutants from one navigable body of water to another navigable
body of water would not be subject to section 301(a) requirements if
the point source pumping the polluted water did not alter the water
being pumped from one navigable body of water to another. 13
5
At issue in the Miccosukee Tribe case was the S-9 pump facility
operated by the South Florida Water Management District ("Water
130. 124 S. Ct. 1537 (2004).
131. Id. at 1542-43.
132. See id. at 1543.
133. Id. at 1545.
134. See infra notes 201-47 and accompanying text.
135. See Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1543-44; see also infra
notes 248-61 for a discussion of the court's treatment of unitary wa-
ters.
[VOL. XVI
2004] S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST. v. MICCOSUKEE TRIBE 29
District") "that transfers water from a canal into a reservoir a short
distance away."' 36 Water is pumped westward by the S-9 pump sta-
tion from the C-Il canal to the WCA-3 reservoir. The water is
pumped to the reservoir to prevent flooding of the populated western
portion of Broward County drained by the canal, 137 "to conserve
fresh water that might otherwise flow directly to the ocean, and to
preserve wetlands habitat [in the reservoir, which is a "remnant" of
the original South Florida Everglades]."' 38 The canal and reservoir
are separated by two levees that prevent or slow the flow of water in
the reservoir back east to the water in the canal. 139 "The combined
effect of [the two levees, the] C-Il [canal] and [the] S-9 [pump sta-
tion] is artificially to separate the C-11 basin from [the] WCA-3
[reservoir]; left to nature, the two areas would be a single wetland
covered in an undifferentiated body of surface and ground water
flowing slowly southward."'140 The pump facility, canal, and reser-
voir are part of the Central and South Florida Flood Control Project
constructed by the United States Army Corps of Engineers and oper-
ated by the Water District to further several purposes, including,
flood protection, water conservation, and drainage in the area be-
tween south Florida's coastal hills and the Everglades. 141
The water in the canal pumped into the reservoir contains elevated
levels of phosphorous, which is found in fertilizers used by farmers
in the basin drained by the canal.142 The water in the canal pumped
into the reservoir alters the balance of the reservoir's "ecosystem
(which is naturally low in phosphorous) and stimulates the growth of
algae and plants foreign to the Everglades ecosystem.'
143
The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians and the Friends of the Ever-
glades (a non-profit organization) (hereinafter both are referred to
collectively as "the Tribe") filed a citizen suit against the District
under section 505 of the CWA, 44 in which they claimed that the
pumping facility is required by section 301(a) of the Act to obtain an
136. Id. at 1540.
137. See id. at 1546.
138. Id. at 1540.
139. See id. at 1541.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 1540.
142. Id. at 1541.
143. Id.
144. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).
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NPDES permit for the water it pumps from the canal into the reser-
voir because the pumped water contained phosphorous (a pollutant
regulated under the CWA).145 The District Court, agreeing with this
argument, granted summary judgment in favor of the Tribe, reason-
ing:
In this case an addition of pollutants exists because un-
disputedly water containing pollutants is being dis-
charged through [the pumping station] from [the canal]
waters into the Everglades, both of which are separate
bodies of United States water with ... different quality
levels. They are two separate bodies of water because the
transfer of water or its contents from [the canal] into the
Everglades would not occur naturally. 1
46
A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the summary judgment of the District Court, but
vacated the District court's issuance of an injunction prohibiting the
Water District from operating the S-9 pump station without an
NPDES permit.
147
The Court of Appeals first stated, "[n]o party disputes that the S-9
pump station and, in particular, the pipes from which water is re-
leased constitute a point source or that the water released by the sta-
tion contains pollutants. ' 48 The court noted that the parties agreed
both the canal and reservoir constitute navigable waters within the
meaning of the CWA.
14 9
145. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1542.
146. Id. (citing App. To Pet. For Cert. 28a-29a).
147. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.,
280 F.3d 1364 (11th Cir. 2002). The panel held that an injunction
stopping the operation of the S-9 pump station until it obtained a
NPDES permit should not issue because that would result in "[t]he
flooding of western Broward County and the resulting displacement
of the residents there [which] do far outweigh the continued addition
of low levels of phosphorous to [the reservoir] without a NPDES
permit." Id. at 1370-71. The panel held that instead "the district
court should order the Water District to obtain a NPDES permit
within some reasonable period." Id. at 1371.
148. Id. at 1367.
149. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit panel stated, however, the parties "mainly
dispute one legal issue: whether the pumping of the already polluted
water constitutes an addition of pollutants to navigable waters from a
point source." 150 The Water District argued "that no addition of pol-
lutants from a point source can occur unless a point source adds pol-
lutants to navigable waters from the outside world"'151 (the "outside
world" excludes another body of navigable waters152). In support of
this argument, the Water District relied upon several appellate deci-
sions,153 which held that changes in water quality caused by hydroe-
lectric dams are not the addition of pollutants from a point source
requiring an NPDES permit under section 301(a) of the CWA. 15 4
The Eleventh Circuit panel described these decisions as "in es-
sence" 155 giving deference, under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,156 to an EPA position that under the
CWA "[an] addition [of pollutants] from a point source occurs only
if the point source itself physically introduces a pollutant into water
from the outside world.",157 However, after noting "[i]nterpretations
contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines . . . do not warrant Chevron-style deference"'158 and a
Second Circuit panel conclusion that EPA's position relied upon in
the dam cases was based on policy statements and consistent litiga-
tion positions not entitled to Chevron deference,1 59 the panel con-
cluded that "[w]e know of no instance in which the EPA has ex-
tended its policy on dams and dam-induced water-quality changes to
facilities like the S-9 pump station. The EPA is no party to this case;
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 1368.
153. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Powers Co., 862 F.2d 580
(6th Cir. 1988).
154. See infra notes 280-411 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion in more depth of these decisions and other similar decisions.
155. Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1367 n.4.
156. 467 U.S. 837 (1983).
157. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 175.
158. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
159. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of
New York, 273 F.3d 481,490 (2d Cir. 2001).
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we can ascertain no EPA position applicable to S-9 to which to give
any deference, much less Chevron deference."
160
The Eleventh Circuit panel then reasoned, "in determining whether
pollutants are being added to navigable waters for purposes of the
CWA, the receiving body of water is the relevant body of navigable
water.' 161 After concluding pollutants were being added to the res-
ervoir, the Court of Appeals stated an addition of pollutants to navi-
gable waters must be "from a point source" in order for an NPDES
permit to be required under the CWA. 16 2 The panel stated, therefore,
to determine under the CWA whether an addition of pollutants is
from a "point source:"
the relevant inquiry is whether -- but for the point source
-- the pollutants would have been added to the receiving
body of water, (For pollutants to be from a point source,
the point source does not necessarily have to be the
source or origin of pollutants. "From a point source" can
also indicate the "agent or instrumentality" or the "cause
or reason" by which pollutants are added to navigable
waters." We conclude that this interpretation of "from" is
most apt; from = by). We, therefore, conclude that an
addition from a point source occurs if a point source is
the cause-in-fact of the release of pollutants into naviga-
ble waters.
When a point source changes the natural flow of a body of water
which contains pollutants and causes that water to flow into another
distinct body of navigable water into which it would not have other-
wise flowed, that point source is the cause-in-fact of the discharge of
pollutants.163
160. Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1367 n.4. The panel also rejected the
argument that under Chevron it should defer to the decision by the
Florida Department of Environmental Protection that operation of
the S-9 pump station does not require a NPDES permit under the
Clean Water Act, on the ground that "[a] state agency's interpreta-
tion of federal law is generally not entitled to deference by the
courts." Id. at 1368 n.4, (citing GTE S. Inc. v. Morrison, 199 F.3d
733, 745 (4th Cir. 1999)).
161. Id. at 1368.
162. Id.
163. Id. (footnotes omitted). The Eleventh Circuit panel stated, id.
at 1368 n.7, that its conclusion "is consistent with the views of' Du-
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Because the Eleventh Circuit panel "believed that the water in the
C-Il canal would not flow into WCA-3 [the reservoir] without the
operation of the S-9 pump station,"' 164 the panel held "an addition of
pollutants from a point source occur[ed]. ' ' 65 The Eleventh Circuit
panel reasoned:
[n]either party disputes that, without the operation of the
S-9 pump station, the polluted waters from the C-II ca-
nal would not normally flow [west] into the WCA-3A
[reservoir]. (Both the C-11 [Canal] Basin and the [reser-
voir] were part of the historical Everglades. Before con-
struction of the C- Il Canal, the Levees and the S-9 pump
station, the surface and ground waters on both sides of
the Levees intermingled. But for man's intervention,
these waters would essentially be a single body of water.
Since the completion of the [two] levees, water does not
flow from the C-11 Canal into [the reservoir). Man has
made the two bodies of water two separate and distinct
bodies of water. The Water District argues that the his-
bois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S.
1119 (1997), and Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited,
Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001). In Dubois, a
panel of the First Circuit held that the piping of water from the pol-
luted East Branch for commercial use in snowmaking equipment,
and its proposed release into the uphill (and therefore upstream)
Loon Lake, constituted an addition of pollutants from a point source
into Loon Lake that required a NPDES permit under the Clean Wa-
ter Act, because the transfer of water from the East Branch to Loon
Lake would not occur naturally. 102 F.3d at 1297. Catskill Moun-
tains held that an addition of pollutants from a point source occurs
when there is a release of water from a reservoir, used to supply
drinking water to New York City, into a creek that flows into a dif-
ferent reservoir, where water in the reservoir would not flow natu-
rally into the creek. The Eleventh Circuit panel stated that "[b]oth
courts emphasized that the two bodies of water were separate and
that pollutants would not enter the second body except for the point
sources." Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1368 n.7.
164. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct.
1537 (2004).
165. Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1369.
34 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
torical hydrological connectedness of these two bodies of
water (1) precludes a finding that the [reservoir] and the
C-Il Canal are two distinct bodies of water, and (2) pre-
cludes a finding that the operation of the S-9 [pump sta-
tion] changes the "natural" flow of water between these
two bodies. In the context of the circumstances of this
case, we reject the Water District's argument). The S-9
pump station, therefore is the cause-in-fact of the addition
of pollutants to the [reservoir]. We, therefore, conclude
that the release of water caused by the S-9 pump station's
operation constitutes an addition of pollutants from a
point source.'
66
In her opinion for the Court, Justice O'Connor interpreted the trial
court and the Court of Appeals as having based their holdings upon
"the predicate determination that the canal and reservoir are two dis-
tinct water bodies"' 67 for purposes of the requirements of section
301(a) of the CWA. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Micco-
sukee Tribe only on the question of whether under section 301(a) of
the CWA the section 402 NPDES permit requirement applies to a
point source that pumps water containing pollutants already in the
water (not created or added by the point source). 168
The Miccosukee Tribe case attracted a lot of attention throughout
the nation, particularly in western states. Western water appropria-
tors feared that an NPDES permit requirement under the CWA in
western states "on water control or similar structures would result in
an encroachment by the federal government into an area traditionally
reserved to the states, that of water management and flow." 169 Inter-
est groups concerned about the issues raised by the Miccosukee
Tribe case included: farmers, who often obtain water for agricultural
operations from agricultural irrigation districts through inter-basin
transfers of water; governmental and private water utilities; and sup-
pliers that obtain public water supplies through inter-basin transfers
166. Id.
167. See Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1540.
168. See id. The question presented in the District's petition for
certiorari is set forth in the Court's opinion. Id. at 1543.
169. Lisa A. Kirchner, Trends and Insights; Miccosukee - Evalu-
ating the Scope of CWA Point Source Pennitting, 18 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T 65, 66 (Spring 2004).
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of water.1 70 Western water appropriators were concerned that an
NPDES permit requirement for "the transfer of water between basins
or sub-basins could constrain 'the ability to move water to the place
of need, for example from high mountain run-off areas to dry low-
lying urban corridors'," and "could be used as leverage to ensure
water deliveries downstream (i.e., to more junior water rights hold-
ers), thereby compromising long-standing western water appropria-
tion laws and requirements.''
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Miccosukee Tribe, in addition to an-
swering the precise question on which the Court granted certiorari,172
addressed whether the particular canal and reservoir involved in the
Miccosukee Tribe are distinct navigable water bodies for purposes of
the NPDES permit requirement under section 301(a) of the CWA
and the legal issue raised by the United States Government's "uni-
tary water" approach to application of section 301(a) of the CWA. 173
The Supreme Court, however, did not decide these latter two issues
for which certiorari had not been explicitly granted. Instead, the
Court vacated and remanded "for further development of the factual
record as to the accuracy of that determination [that the canal and
reservoir are two distinct water bodies]"' 174 and for the District Court
170. The constituencies that are concerned about the issues raised
by the Miccosukee Tribe case, and the impacts that the decision may
have upon these constituencies, are discussed in Davis and Doster,
supra note 20, at 91, 96-97.
171. Kirchner, supra note 169, at 66, 67.
172. 124 S. Ct. at 1543.
173. Under this "unitary waters" approach, a section NPDES per-
mit would not be required under section 301(a) "when water from
one navigable water body is discharged, unaltered, into another
navigable water body. That would be true even if one water body
were polluted and the other pristine, and the two would not other-
wise mix." Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1543. See also infra
notes 248-61 and accompanying text analyzing the "unitary waters"
approach. Dubois v. USDA., 102 F.3d 1273, 1296-97 (1st Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1119 (1997), rejected the unitary wa-
ters theory in a case involving the proposed transfer of water from a
stream to an upstream lake into which the stream does not flow natu-
rally.
174. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1540.
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to consider the United States government's "unitary waters" ap-
proach to application of section 301(a). 175
Addressing first the question for which certiorari was granted, Jus-
tice O'Connor held that section 301(a) of the CWA makes the sec-
tion 402 NPDES permit requirement applicable to a point source
conveying pollutants, that originated elsewhere and that were not
generated by the point source, into a navigable water body. 7 6 Jus-
175. Id. at 1547.
Justice Scalia concurred with Parts I and II-A of Justice O'Connor's
opinion for the Court, "which [held] that a point source is not ex-
empt from the NPDES permit requirement merely because it does
not itself add pollutants to the water it pumps." Id. He dissented,
however, from the Court's decision in Part 11-C to vacate the judg-
ment below for reconsideration of the issue of whether the canal and
reservoir are distinct bodies of water and from Part 11-B in which the
Court "invite[s] consideration of yet another legal theory," on the
grounds that "[n]either of those actions is taken in response to the
question presented." Id. Justice Scalia argued that the Court of Ap-
peals' "disposition of the question presented" should be affirmed
"without reaching other issues." Id. Justice Scalia also argued that
the Court of Appeals below in fact had addressed and rejected the
"unitary waters" approach and that he saw "no point in directing the
Court of Appeals to consider an argument it has already rejected."
Id. He also argued that the Court acted improperly in Part II-C of its
opinion in holding "that summary judgment was precluded by the
possibility that if the pumping station were shut down, flooding in
the [canal] basin might ultimately cause pollutants to flow from [the
canal to the reservoir]," because that argument had not previously
been made by the parties. Id.; See also infra notes 224-34 and ac-
companying text.
176. Id. at 1543. This holding in Miccosukee Tribe implicitly over-
rules the holding in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351,
1377 (4th Cir. 1976), that an "addition" of pollutants does not occur
under section 301(a) of the CWA when an industrial plant's point
source conveys back into a navigable body of water pollutants that
were in the plant's intake water (that are present naturally or as a
result of discharges from other industrial plants). Appalachian
Power also held that EPA has no authority under the CWA to require
an industrial point source to remove pollutants that enter an indus-
trial plant through the plant's intake stream. 545 F.2d at 1377 As
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tice O'Connor, however, did not discuss whether effluent limitation
requirements imposed upon such a point source under section 301(a)
can require such a point source to remove from its discharges pollut-
ants that the point source did not generate or create. Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Miccosukee Tribe, however, referred both to
effluent limitation requirements and to the section 402 NPDES per-
mit requirement imposed upon point source dischargers by section
301(a). 177 The opinion also referred 178 (in the part addressing the
"unitary waters approach") to EPA "intake credit" regulations79 that
usually only permit an NPDES permit to exempt a point source dis-
charger from technology-based effluent limitations or standards for
pollutants in the discharger's intake water when the discharger
"demonstrates that the intake water is drawn from the same body of
water into which the discharge is made."' 80 Consequently, her first
discussed infra notes 179-80 and 259-61 and accompanying text,
EPA "intake credit" regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.45(g),
123.25(a)(16) (2003), now provide that upon request of a point
source discharger, technology-based effluent limitation requirements
in the discharger's NPDES permit "shall be adjusted to reflect a
credit for pollutants in the discharger's intake water," but only to the
extent necessary to meet the applicable limitation or standards, 40 C.
F. R. § 122.45(g), and usually only when the discharger's intake
water is drawn from the same water body into which the discharge is
made (although this latter requirement may be waived if no envi-
ronmental degradation will result). 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(g)(4).
177. 124 S. Ct. at 1541.
178. Id. at 1544.
179. 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(g)(4). 40 C.F.R. § 123.25(a)(16) makes
this regulation applicable to NPDES permits issued by states with an
approved state NPDES permit program.
180. See infra notes 259-61 and accompanying text for Justice
O'Connor's discussion of this regulation in the "unitary waters" part
of her opinion. In that part of her opinion she did not discuss
whether these EPA "intake credit" regulations are valid under the
CWA. EPA's "intake credit" regulations provide that an EPA Re-
gional Administrator or a state Director of a state NPDES permit
program may waive the requirement that the intake water must be
drawn from the same water body into which the discharge is made, if
she finds no environmental degradation will result. Id. Justice
O'Connor's Miccosukee Tribe opinion did not mention this provi-
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holding in Miccosukee Tribe implicitly requires a point source con-
veying pollutants generated by other persons or sources to obtain an
NPDES permit that may require compliance with effluent limitation
requirements, mandating the point source to remove some or all of
these conveyed pollutants from its discharges, unless the point
source is exempted from technology-based effluent requirements
under EPA's "intake credit" regulations.
A significant consequence of this first holding in Miccosukee Tribe
is:
pollutants already in jurisdictional waters will become the
responsibility of any entity, public or private, that trans-
fers them into a new watershed. Thus, nonpoint source
runoff, air-deposited pollutants, pollutants emanating
from sediment or introduced through the expression of
groundwater--even pollutants that previously have been
lawfully discharged into upstream waters--all of these
pollutants will become the responsibility of a downstream
"re-discharger." 181
Because this holding in Miccosukee Tribe "extends the reach of the
CWA to activities and industries historically exempt from regulation
under that statute,"' 82 the holding has been criticized as "dis-
rupt[ting] the traditional allocation of responsibilities for pollution
control . . . [that have] rested on the facility that creates the waste
and first introduces it into waters of the United States."'
' 83
Justice O'Connor based this holding upon the definition of a "point
source" in section 502(14) 184 as a "discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance."185 She emphasized that the "definition makes plain
that a point source need not be the original source of the pollutant; it
need only convey the pollutant to 'navigable waters' . . . Tellingly,
the examples of 'point sources' listed by the Act include pipes,
ditches, tunnels, and conduits, objects that do not themselves gener-
sion of the regulations in her discussion of EPA's "intake credit"
regulations.
181. Davis and Doster, supra note 20, at 92.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 91.
184. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).
185. Miccosukee Tribe v. S. Fla. Waste Mgmt. Dist., 124 S. Ct.
1537, 1543 (2004) (emphasis in original).
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ate pollutants but merely transport them.' ' 86 Justice O'Connor also
supported her holding on one of the "primary" goals of the Act - "to
impose NPDES permitting requirements on municipal wastewater
treatment plants [which] treat and discharge pollutants added to wa-
ter by others.' 187 Justice O'Connor concluded that the definition of
"discharge of a pollutant" in section 502(12) of the CWA 188 "in-
cludes within its reach point sources that do not themselves generate
pollutants. ' 89 In this part of her opinion, Justice O'Connor did not
mention the EPA that "addition from a point source occurs only if
the point source itself physically introduces a pollutant into the water
from the outside world" 19° position that was followed by several
appellate courts in cases litigated in the 1980's,191 but the Eleventh
Circuit panel declined to follow in the Miccosukee Tribe case.
192
This holding in Miccosukee Tribe should be interpreted as implic-
itly also holding that section 301(a) applies to a point source that
generates or creates pollutants that it conveys or transports to a navi-
gable body of water through a discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance. This follows from Justice O'Connor's statement that "a
point source need not be the original source of the pollutant" 93 and
her statement that the examples of point sources listed in the CWA's
definition of "point source" include "objects that do not themselves
generate pollutants but merely transport them."'1
94
186. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)).
187. Id. at 1543.
188. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).
189. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1543.
190. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
191. Id. at 175; Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862
F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988). These decisions are discussed infra
notes 305-411 and accompanying text.
192. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. 280
F.3d 1364, at 1368 (11th Cir. 2002). See also, supra notes 153-63
and accompanying text for a discussion of this part of the Court of
Appeals decision.
193. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1543. (implying that section
301(a) clearly regulates a point source that is the original source of
pollutants it adds to a navigable body of water).
194. Id.
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This holding in Miccosukee Tribe should not be interpreted, how-
ever, as requiring an NPDES permit for a point source that merely
conveys or transfers "clear" water (water not containing CWA "pol-
lutants"). "Clear" water is not within the Act's definition of "pollut-
ant,"' 95 although in some cases water can be a "pollutant" under the
CWA when it is "industrial waste" (without regard to whether "pol-
lutants" are suspended or dissolved in that water). 196
In holding that the CWA's definition of a "discharge of a pollut-
ant" includes both point sources that do not themselves generate pol-
lutants and point sources that do themselves generate pollutants, Jus-
tice O'Connor did not state that a discharge had to meet a minimum
threshold (by weight, concentration or volume), 197 cause any identi-
fiable harm to the receiving body of water or the environment,198 or
result in the discharged pollutants being moved any minimum dis-
tance from the location where the point source obtained or created
the discharged pollutants. 1
99
195. Orleans Audubon Soc'y v. Lee, 742 F.2d 901, 910 (5th Cir.
1984); Bettis v. Town of Ontario, 800 F. Supp. 1113, 1119
(W.D.N.Y. 1992).
196. N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Explor. and Dev. Co., 325
F.3d 1155, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2003) (unaltered groundwater pumped
from underground aquifers during extraction of methane gas, which
is "an unwanted byproduct of the extraction process," held to be "in-
dustrial waste" that is a "pollutant" under the Clean Water Act); Si-
erra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546,
568 (5th Cir. 1996) (water "produced" during the extraction of oil
and gas held to be an "industrial waste" that is a "pollutant" under
the Act).
197. Supra note 46 and accompanying text discuss lower federal
court holdings that a "discharge of a pollutant" under the Act does
not have to meet any minimum threshold amount (by weight, con-
centration or volume).
198. Supra note 47 and accompanying text discuss lower federal
court holdings that section 301(a) does not require a point source
discharge of pollutants to cause any identifiable harm to the receiv-
ing body of water or to the environment.
199. This issue has been addressed in cases before lower federal
courts in cases involving "re-deposits" and "incidental fallback" into
a wetland of material excavated or dredged from that same wetland
or navigable body of water. See infra notes 412-511 and accompany-
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Justice O'Connor's holding, specifically, that section 301(a) re-
quirements apply to a point source that conveys or transports pollut-
ants originating elsewhere, encompasses both point sources (such as
a pumping facility) that transport or convey water containing pollut-
ants added by other persons elsewhere, as well as point sources that
treat and remove pollutants added by others elsewhere (but convey
some pollutants that originated elsewhere into a navigable body of
water). This holding also applies to a point source (such as a fac-
tory's wastewater discharge pipe that conveys pollutants into a navi-
gable body of water) that conveys pollutants generated, and possibly
also treated, within the factory to which the discharge pipe is con-
nected into a navigable body of water. But in this type of situation,
only the factory's wastewater discharge pipe, not the entire factory,
would be considered the "point source" of the pollutants discharged
by the pipe into a navigable water body, because only the pipe would
be "a discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance' within the
CWA's definition of a "point source.', 200 In this type of case, the
factory's wastewater discharge pipe would be discharging pollutants
that originated elsewhere (within the factory to which the discharge
pipe is connected) rather than from or in the point source.
In a second holding in Miccosukee Tribe, Justice O'Connor found
that no "addition" of pollutants to navigable waters occurs within the
meaning of section 301(a) of the CWA where water (containing pol-
lutants) is pumped from one water body into another water body that
is not "meaningfully distinct." 2° 1 She held, therefore, if the S-9
pump station only pumps water from one part of a water body into
another part of the same water body, no section 402 NPDES permit
is required.20 2 Furthermore, although Justice O'Connor did not so
ing text for discussion of these "re-deposit" and "incidental fallback"
cases.
200. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of
New York, 273 F.3d 481, 493 (2d Cir. 2001) ("... the term 'point
source,' ... does not necessarily refer to the place where the pollutant
was created but rather refers only [to] the proximate source from
which the pollutant is directly introduced to the destination water
body. A pipe from a factory draining effluent into a navigable water
is a point source, but the factory itself is not.") (dictum).
201. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct.
1537, 1545 & 1547 (2004).
202. Id.
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state, such an intra-water body transfer of water also would not be
subject to any effluent limitation requirements under section 301(a)
because such a transfer of water is not an "addition" of pollutants to
the receiving body of water that would make section 301(a) applica-
ble.
This second holding addressed only the issue of pumping or trans-
fer of water (containing dissolved or suspended pollutants) from one
part of a navigable body of water into another part of that same wa-
ter body. It did not address the issue of the application of sections
301(a) and 402 of the CWA to the introduction of soil or vegetation,
excavated or dredged from the surface of a protected wetland or the
bottom of a navigable body of water, back into that protected wet-
land or navigable body of water. As discussed below, 20 3 Justice
O'Connor's reasoning in support of this second holding indicates
that this holding does not apply to the introduction into a wetland or
other navigable body of water of sediment or other materials exca-
vated from the surface of that same wetland or from the bottom of
the same body of water.
This second holding also should not be applicable either where wa-
ter withdrawn from a water body is diverted for agricultural, indus-
trial or commercial use prior to being pumped back into that same
water body, or where water withdrawn from a water body is pumped
into another navigable body of water prior to being pumped back
into the body of water from which the water was withdrawn. Al-
though this second holding does not explicitly require that water be
pumped directly from one part of a water body to another part of that
same water body, without transfer to a facility for any intervening
industrial, commercial or agricultural use of that water before it is
pumped back into that same water body, such a direct pumping re-
quirement (with no intervening uses of the pumped water permitted)
should be implied from the Court's use of the word "pumping"
(rather than "transfers" or "conveys") in its holding that "pumping
water from one [part] into another [part of the same water body]
cannot constitute an 'addition' of pollutants."
2°4
Such a direct pumping requirement also may be implied from the
"pot of soup" scenario upon which this holding is based. Justice
O'Connor based this second holding upon the argument that "'[ijf
one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot, and pours
203. Infra notes 211-213 and accompanying text.
204. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1545.
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it back into the pot, one has not "added" soup or anything else to the
pot'.",°5 Under this scenario, if soup is ladled out of the pot into a
bowl, from which some soup is eaten, and then later some or all of
the soup in that bowl is spooned back into the pot (contrary to rec-
ognized sanitary practices!), one probably is considered to have
"added" something to the pot (even if there are no bacteria or germs
in the left-over, partially eaten soup in the bowl that is returned to
the pot of soup). A situation where water is diverted from a river to
flow through turbines in an electric power-generating facility and
back into the river may present a close case as to whether the water
being pumped is within Miccosukee Tribe's second holding because
it is being directly transferred or instead is being diverted for an in-
tervening use that makes Miccosukee Tribe's second holding inap-
plicable. In such situations, however, the transferred water should
be considered to be within Miccosukee Tribe's second holding be-
cause the transferred water is being directly transferred from one part
of a navigable water body to another part of that same navigable wa-
ter body; the transferred water is being "pumped" from one part of
the water body to another part of that same water body even though
the transferred water is providing a commercial service while being
transferred.
Miccosukee Tribe's second holding does not explicitly state the
pumped water transferred must be unaltered (in the sense that the
point source transferring the water must not introduce pollutants into
the water that is pumped from one part of a navigable body of water
into another part of the same water body), but such a requirement is
implicit in this second holding. If the point source pump does add
pollutants to the transferred water there clearly would be an "addi-
tion" of pollutants to the navigable body of water receiving the trans-
ferred water, for which a section 402 NPDES permit is required.2 °6
Consequently, if a point source (such as a turbine) generates or cre-
ate pollutants (such as by killing live fish in the water flowing
through the turbines), an NPDES permit would be required for the
205. Id.
206. A requirement that water being pumped from one water body
to another water body not be altered (by the introduction of pollut-
ants into that transferred water) is part of the "unitary waters" ap-
proach advocated by the United States in Miccosukee Tribe. Id. at
1543; see also infra notes 249-53 and accompanying text discussing
this "unaltered" requirement of the "unitary waters" approach.
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point source because it creates or generates pollutants which are then
discharged/ added into a navigable body of water.2 °7 Miccosukee
Tribe's second holding would not exempt from the NPDES permit
requirement a point source that generates or creates pollutants and
adds those pollutants into water that is withdrawn from one part of a
navigable water body and then is pumped back into another part of
that same water body.
In addition, Miccosukee Tribe's second holding should not apply
when water pumped from a source navigable body of water is trans-
ferred to and temporarily stored in a reservoir (or other storage facil-
ity) that is a navigable body of water and then is pumped or released
back into the same navigable body of water from which the water
was withdrawn (possibly after first flowing through turbines or other
208
equipment or facilities). In such a situation, the transfer of water
should be segmented into two separate transfers; the first being from
the source to the reservoir and the second being from the reservoir
back to the source. If the source body of water and the reservoir are
considered parts of the same body of water for purposes of Micco-
sukee Tribe's second holding, no NPDES permit would be required
under the second holding for either of these two water transfers
(unless the flow of water through turbines or other equipment either
generates or creates pollutants or is considered an intervening indus-
trial or commercial use that makes Miccosukee Tribe's second hold-
ing inapplicable), because each of the two transfers would be con-
sidered the pumping of water from one part of a navigable body of
water to another part of the same navigable body of water. But if the
source and reservoir are not considered parts of the same navigable
body of water for purposes of the second holding, an NPDES permit
would be required for each of the two water transfers under Micco-
sukee Tribe's first holding - unless the "unitary waters" approach is
207. Infra notes 388-411 and accompanying text.
208. Such a situation existed in Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers
Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988), which dealt with a pumped
storage electric generating facility that pumped water containing live
fish from Lake Michigan into a reservoir located above the facility
and then released water from the reservoir to flow through turbines
and then back into Lake Michigan, with the water released into the
lake containing a substantial number of dead fish and other aquatic
organisms. See infra notes 388-411 and accompanying text.
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adopted by the federal courts and such a situation is held to be a
transfer permitted under the "unitary waters" approach. 0 9
Therefore, the first and second holdings in Miccosukee Tribe make
section 301(a) of the CWA applicable to an industrial facility's point
source addition to a navigable body of water of pollutants that are in
water withdrawn by that plant from that same navigable water body
in the plant's intake water stream. In such a situation, if an industrial
plant's intake water stream contains pollutants (that occur naturally
or as a result of discharges from other point sources or from runoff
from nonpoint sources) and that plant, after using that water in its
operations, then conveys those pollutants through a discharge pipe (a
point source) back into that same navigable body of water, the plant
may be required by section 301(a) of the CWA to obtain an NPDES
permit and to comply with EPA effluent limitation requirements,
which may require the point source to treat its discharged wastewater
to remove or treat some or all of those pollutants in the plant's intake
water. 2 ° In addition, if an industrial plant withdraws water contain-
ing pollutants from one navigable water body and then through a
point source conveys those pollutants into another distinct navigable
body of water, the plant will be required by Miccosukee Tribe's first
holding to obtain an NPDES permit for this point source addition of
pollutants and to comply with CWA effluent limitation requirements
that may require the discharger to remove from its discharges some
or all of the pollutants that were added by other persons or sources
(unless exempted from doing so by EPA's "intake credit" regula-
tions).
In support of this second holding, Justice O'Connor only reasoned
in Miccosukee Tribe that "'[I]f one takes a ladle of soup from a pot,
lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into the pot, one has not
'added' soup or anything else to the pot'.,,211 She provided no addi-
209. Infra notes 248-61 and accompanying text discussing the
"unitary waters" approach.
210. As discussed supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text,
EPA's "input credit" regulations may exempt such a point source
from removing from its discharge some or all of the pollutants that
were in the discharger's intake water.
211. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1545, quoting Catskill Moun-
tains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. New York, 273 F.3d 481,
492 (2d Cir. 2001). Justice O'Connor omitted the last part of this
quoted sentence in which the Second Circuit referred to in a paren-
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tional reasoning based upon either the language of any provisions of
the CWA or the goals and purposes of the CWA.
This reasoning only refers to a situation where a person uses a la-
dle to re-deposit into a pot liquid from the pot of soup (that may have
solid material dissolved or suspended in the soup). This reasoning
does not refer to a situation where a person uses a ladle to re-deposit
into a pot both liquid soup and solid materials that had been resting
on the bottom of the pot of soup. In the latter type of situation, the
solid material that was scooped from the bottom of the pot by the
ladle may wind up resting in a different part of the pot than before it
was removed and re-deposited and may wind up on top or beneath
other material after the re-deposit.
Therefore, Justice O'Connor's pot-of-soup example in support of
her second holding should be viewed as only referring to the specific
situation involved in the Miccosukee Tribe case - a situation where
only water (containing dissolved or suspended pollutants) is re-
moved from a body of water and is re-deposited into another part of
that same body of water. This second holding of Miccosukee Tribe
should not be viewed as also applying to a situation where sediment
or materials excavated from the bottom of a navigable body of water
are placed into that body of water at the same location or a nearby
location, because in such a case, pollutants not already dissolved or
suspended in that body of water are being added into that body of
water. Section 301(a) applies to a point source addition of pollutants
into a body of water even if those discharged pollutants settle back
onto the bottom of that body of water from which they were dredged
or excavated, 212 at least in part because the re-deposit of dredged or
excavated materials may cause toxic pollutants that previously had
been covered by sediment to become exposed to aquatic organisms
or to humans. 2
1Z
Although the parties in Miccosukee Tribe did not dispute the
Court's second holding, they disagreed as to whether, for purposes
thetical: "beyond, perhaps, a de minimis quantity of airborne dust
that fell into the ladle." Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d at 492.
212. Supra note 76 and accompanying text.
213. Infra notes 425-29 and accompanying text. This latter type of
situation, involving the addition into a navigable body of water of
material excavated or dredged from the bottom of that navigable
body of water, is analyzed infra notes 412-511 and accompanying
text.
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of this second holding in the case, the C-II canal and the WCA-3
reservoir are parts of a single water body or are separate and distinct
water bodies. The Miccosukee Tribe argued that the canal and res-
ervoir are separate and distinct bodies of water because they have
"differing 'biological or ecosystem characteristics', ' '214 while the
Water District argued that the canal and reservoir are parts of the
same water body because of "the close hydrological connections
between the two.' ' 2 " The United States agreed the canal and reser-
voir are two parts of the same water body because they have a hy-
216drological connection.
Justice O'Connor stated, however, that the District Court in Micco-
sukee Tribe had utilized yet a third legal theory ("that neither party
defends" 217) to determine if the canal and reservoir are parts of a
single water body. The District Court granted summary judgment
to the Tribe on the ground that the canal and reservoir are distinct
water bodies "'because the transfer of water or its contents from [the
canal] into the Everglades would not occur naturally'." 218 As dis-
219
cussed earlier, under this approach a court examines natural hy-
drologic conditions to determine if "but for the point source ... the
pollutants would have been added to the receiving body of water.,
220
Under this lower court approach, "[w]hen a point source changes the
natural flow of a body of water which contains pollutants and causes
that water to flow into another distinct body of water into which it
would not have otherwise flowed, that point source is the [but for]
cause-in-fact of the discharge of pollutants" 221 - and the receiving
body of water is considered to be separate and distinct from the body
of water from which the water is withdrawn.
The Water District's hydrologic connection test and the lower
court's "but for cause-in-fact" test both rely upon existing, natural
214. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1546.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1545.
217. Id. at 1546.
218. Id. at 1546 (citing App. To Pet. For Cert. 28a). "The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit endorsed this test." Id. at 1546
(citing Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist.,
280 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11th Cir. 2002)).
219. Supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
220. Miccosukee, 280 F.3d. at 1368.
221. Id.
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hydrologic conditions; under the Water District's test a downstream
body of water from which water is pumped to an upstream water
body that has a hydrologic connection to that water body would not
be considered a water body that is separate and distinct from the re-
ceiving body of water, even though water from that downstream wa-
ter body would not naturally flow to the upstream (uphill) receiving
water body.
In support of its argument that the canal and reservoir are two parts
of a single water body, the Water District relied in part upon the
facts that "water flows easily between ground and surface waters" in
this Everglades area; 1) "Everglades soil is extremely porous;" 2) the
canal and reservoir "share a common underlying aquifer;" and, 3)
the levees separating the canal and reservoir "continually leak, al-
lowing water to escape from [the reservoir]. 222 Justice O'Connor
commented that "[t]his means not only that any boundary between
[the canal and reservoir] is indistinct, but also that there is some sig-
nificant mingling of the two waters; the record reveals that even
without use of the S-9 pump station, water travels as both seepage
and groundwater flow between the [reservoir] and the [canal] ba-
sin. '22
3
Justice O'Connor declined, however, to determine if the District
Court applied the correct legal standard to determine if the canal and
reservoir are distinct water bodies, on the grounds that "the District
Court applied its test prematurely" because summary judgment was
not appropriate since "some factual issues remain unresolved. 224
Although Justice O'Connor found that the District Court correctly
characterized the flow of water through the pumping station as non-
natural, she noted that if the pumping station was shut down, the area
222. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1546. Earlier in her opinion,
Justice O'Connor had stated that the two levees separating the canal
and reservoir only slow, but do not prevent, return flow of water
pumped into the reservoir back into the canal. Id. at 1541.
223. Id. at 1546. O'Connor stated earlier in the opinion that "[tihe
combined effect of [the two levees, the] C-11 [canal], and [the] S-9
[pump station] is artificially to separate the C-11 basin from [the]
WCA-3 [reservoir]; left to nature, the two areas would be a single
wetland covered in an undifferentiated body of surface and ground
water flowing slowly southward." Id. at 1541.
224. Id.
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drained by [the canal] would flood quickly. ' 225 She reasoned "[t]hat
flooding might mean that [the canal] would no longer be a 'distinct
body of water'," 226 but part of a larger water body encompassing
both the reservoir and the canal; and "also might call into question
the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that [the pumping station] is the
cause in fact of phosphorous addition to [the reservoir]. 2 27
Justice O'Connor found in Miccosukee Tribe that "[n]othing in the
record suggests that the District Court considered these issues when
it granted summary judgment" 228 and therefore concluded "that fur-
ther development of the record is necessary to resolve the dispute
over the validity of the distinction between [the canal and the reser-
voir]., 229 Dissenting in part, Justice Scalia argued, however, that the
Court should not have held in Part 1-C of its opinion 'that summary
judgment was precluded by the possibility that, if the pumping sta-
tion were shut down, flooding in the [canal] basin might ultimately
cause pollutants to flow from [the canal to the reservoir];" to his
knowledge, that argument had not previously been made by any of
the parties.23° Justice Scalia asserted the Water District had argued
the reservoir and canal "were historically part of the same ecosystem
and that they remain hydrologically related .... but that is quite dif-
ferent from arguing that absent [the pumping station], pollutants
would flow from [the canal to the reservoir] (a journey that, at the
moment, is uphill).''231 Justice Scalia asserted that "[n]othing re-
quires a district court to speculate sua sponte about possibilities even
the parties have not contemplated," so he argued that the judgment
below should have been affirmed "as to the question presented, leav-
ing the [United States] Government's unitary-waters theory to be
considered in another case.,
232
Although Justice O'Connor did not specify which legal theory the
District Court should apply, she stated that "it is possible" that the
District Court, after reviewing the full record, "will conclude that
[the canal and the reservoir] are not meaningfully distinct water bod-
225. Id.
226. Id. (quoting Miccosukee, 280 F.3d at 1368).
227. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1546.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1547.
230. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
231. Id.
232. Id.
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ies" and that "[i]f it does so, then the ... pump station will not need
an NPDES permit." 233 She also stated that the United States "Gov-
emment's broader 'unitary waters' argument is open to the District
[Court] on remand." 234
These statements by Justice O'Connor, which follow her earlier
statement that the flooding of the area drained by the canal basin
(that would occur if the pump station was shut down) "might mean"
that the canal and reservoir are not distinct water bodies, might be
interpreted as implying that the hydrologic connection test advocated
by the South Florida Water Management District and the United
States should be applied by the lower courts in deciding this issue -
even though, in some situations discussed below, the hydrologic
connection test does not further any explicit goals or purposes of the
CWA.
The hydrologic connection test may be a proper test for determin-
ing if two navigable bodies of water are part of one single body of
water in a situation involving the pumping of water containing pol-
lutants from an upstream water body into a downstream body of wa-
ter to which it is naturally hydrologically connected. The reason for
this position is that in the absence of the transfer of the water caused
by the point source, water transferred from the upstream water
probably eventually would have flowed naturally into the down-
stream body of water as a result of natural hydrological conditions.
The hydrologic connection test also is appropriate for the factual
situation that Justice O'Connor suggested was the true situation in
the Miccosukee Tribe case - where without human intervention,
natural flooding and inundation would cause two bodies of water
created by that human intervention to become one single body of
water.
The hydrologic connection test, however, should not be used to de-
termine that two navigable water bodies are parts of the same navi-
gable body of water when water that contains pollutants is pumped
from a downstream water body into a less-polluted upstream water
body (where the transfer of water is against the natural hydrologic
flow of water).236 In this latter type of situation, the hydrologic con-
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1546.
236. Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273, 1298 (1st Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 521 U.S. 1119 (1997) (rejecting the hydrologic connection
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nection test would allow transfers of water containing pollutants into
a pristine body of water without either a permit or compliance with
effluent limitation requirements. The hydrologic connection test
also should not be used to determine that two navigable bodies of
water are parts of the same navigable body of water when water con-
taining pollutants is being transferred from a human-made navigable
body of water into a natural navigable body of water through man-
made pipes or spillways, where there is no natural hydrologic flow
of water from the human-made source body of water into the receiv-
ing body of water. 37
The use of the hydrologic connection test to exempt a transfer of
water between two water bodies from the NPDES permit require-
ment in these two types of situations would be contrary to a number
of the goals of the CWA. These include, the goals of eliminating
"the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters . .. by 1985, ' ' 239
prohibiting "the discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts,"2 39
restoring and maintaining "the chemical, physical and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters, ' 24° and achieving by July 1, 1983,
"an interim goal of water quality, which provides for the protection
and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife.",
24 1
On the other hand, in situations involving transfer of water from a
heavily-polluted body of water into a less-polluted body of water or
from a man-made navigable body of water to a natural navigable
body of water, a determination that an NPDES permit is required for
a transfer of water is appropriate where the two bodies of water are
test in such a situation and holding that such a transfer of water was
an "addition" of pollutants to a navigable body of water that required
an NPDES permit under the CWA).
237. An example of such a situation is the pump storage electricity
generating facility involved in Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers
Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988), which pumps water
through pipes from a natural navigable lake uphill into a man-made
reservoir and then releases water from the reservoir to flow through
the pipes and turbines, back into that lake. See infra notes 388-411
and accompanying text for discussion of the application of the
NPDES permit requirement to this type of facility.
238. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(2000).
239. Id. § 1251(a)(3).
240. Id. § 1251(a).
241. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
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distinct under the "but for cause-in-fact" test (a test which has been
followed by the First Circuit242 and the Second Circuit 243 as well as
by the Eleventh Circuit in the Miccosukee Tribe case). Requiring an
NPDES permit in these situations is consistent with the goals of the
CWA to eliminate "the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters... by 1985, 244 and to prohibit "the discharge of toxic pollut-
ants in toxic amounts.,
245
In these types of situations, however, where the hydrologic con-
nection test should not be used, a determination that an NPDES
permit is required for either type of water transfer under the "bio-
logical/ecosystem" test (because the two water bodies are biologi-
cally or ecologically distinct), is also consistent with the goals of the
CWA "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological
integrity of the Nation's waters ' '246 and to achieve, by July 1, 1983,
"an interim goal of water quality which provides for the protection
and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife. 247
Although Justice O'Connor in her opinion for the Court in Micco-
sukee Tribe did not decide whether the United States' "unitary wa-
ters" approach should be followed by the lower courts, her opinion
did discuss the reasoning supporting this approach and how this ap-
proach might interface with other provisions of the CWA. She noted
that the United States' reasoning in support of its "unitary waters"
approach is that because section 301(a) of the CWA and the CWA's
definition 248 of "discharge of a pollutant/pollutants" require "NPDES
permits only when there is an addition of a pollutant 'to navigable
waters', such permits are not required when water from one naviga-
ble water body is discharged, unaltered, into another navigable water
body. That would be true even if one water body were polluted and
the other pristine and the two would not otherwise mix.'24 9
242. Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
521 U.S. 1119 (1997).
243. Catskill Mountain Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of
New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001).
244. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (2000).
245. Id. § 1251(a)(3).
246. Id. § 1251(a).
247. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
248. Id. § 1362(12).
249. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct.
1537, 1543.
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Justice O'Connor did not define "unaltered" and did not discuss
whether the "unitary waters" approach would permit transfer of
withdrawn water to a facility for intervening commercial, industrial
or agricultural uses before the water is returned to a navigable water
body. However, "unaltered" should be interpreted to mean that the
point source transferring polluted waters from one navigable water
body to another must not itself add or introduce any "pollutants" into
that transferred water. Transferred water apparently should be con-
sidered "unaltered" even if the point source transferring water from
one water body to another caused "pollution" of the transferred wa-
ter without adding "pollutants" to the destination water body, be-
cause causing "pollution" in a water body does not necessarily con-
stitute "addition" of "pollutants" to that water body. 50
In addition, transferred water should be considered "unaltered" for
purposes of the "unitary waters" approach if the point source does
not itself introduce pollutants into the transferred water, even though
the point source transferring the water is part of a facility that has
caused the addition of pollutants to the transferred water. This ap-
proach follows from the fact that "... the term 'point source,' ...
does not necessarily refer to the place where the pollutant was cre-
ated but rather refers only [to] the proximate source from which the
pollutant is directly introduced to the destination water body.' 25' An
example of such a situation is when water is released from a reser-
voir behind a storage dam into a river downstream of the dam
through a point source pipe or spillway. The water released from the
reservoir into a downstream river may contain some pollutants (such
as minerals, nutrients, and heat) not in the upstream river water, be-
cause the pollutants are added to the water in the reservoir as a result
252of the upstream river water being backed up behind the reservoir.
In such a situation the reservoir behind the storage dam, not the point
source pipe or spillway conveying water from the reservoir to the
downstream river, has caused the alteration of the water in the up-
stream river by causing pollutants to be added to water collected be-
hind the reservoir. If the "unitary waters" approach is adopted, the
focus in such a situation should be upon alteration of the water in the
250. Supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
251. Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of
New York, 273 F.2d 481, 493 (2d Cir. 2001) (dictum).
252. See infra notes 286-304 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of such dam-induced water quality changes.
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reservoir caused by the point source pipe or spillway (rather than
alteration of water quality caused by the nonpoint source reservoir
and dam). Under this interpretation of the "unitary waters" ap-
proach, an NPDES permit would not be required for such a storage
dam,2 3 even though the storage dam and its reservoir would be alter-
ing the water in the upstream river as a result of the reservoir behind
the dam causing the "addition" of pollutants to the water in the up-
stream river, before the dam's pipes or spillways release reservoir
water into the downstream river.
Justice O'Connor explained that the United States further contends
in support of the "unitary waters" approach:
that the absence of the word "any" prior to the phrase
"navigable waters" in § 1362(12) signals Congress' un-
derstanding that NPDES permits would not be required
for pollution caused by the engineered transfer of one
"navigable water" into another. It argues that Congress
intended that such pollution instead would be addressed
through local nonpoint source pollution programs. Sec-
tion 1314(f)(2)(F), which concerns nonpoint sources, di-
rects the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to give
States information on the evaluation and control of "pol-
lution resulting from ... changes in the movement, flow,
or circulation of any navigable waters or ground waters,
including changes caused by the construction of dams,
levees, channels, causeways, or flow diversion facili-
ties., 254
Justice O'Connor pointed out, however, section 1314(f)(2)(F)
"does not explicitly exempt nonpoint sources from the NPDES pro-
gram if they also fall within the 'point source' definition 255 and that
several provisions of the Act governing the NPDES permit program
"might be read to suggest a view contrary to the unitary waters ap-
proach.256
253. See infra notes 354-58 and accompanying text for an analysis
of this issue.
254. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1544.
255. Id. See infra notes 324-33 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the relevance of Section 1314(f)(2)(F) to changes in water
quality conditions caused by dams.
256. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1544.
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For example, under the Act, a State may set individualized ambient
water quality standards by taking into consideration "the designated
uses of the navigable waters involved." 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A).
These water quality standards, in turn, directly affect local NPDES
permits; if standard permit conditions fail to achieve the water qual-
ity goals for a given water body, the State must determine the total
pollutant load that the water body can sustain and then allocate that
load among the permit-holders who discharge to the water body.
§1313(d). This approach suggests that the Act protects individual
water bodies as well as the "waters of the United States" as a
whole.2
57
Justice O'Connor also noted that the "unitary waters" approach ar-
guably was based upon "deference to a longstanding EPA view that
the process of 'transporting, impounding, and releasing navigable
waters' cannot constitute an 'addition' of pollutants to ' "the waters
of the United States,.' . .. but she noted that the United States did not
identify any EPA administrative documents in which EPA espouses
this position and several former EPA officials argued in an amicus
brief that EPA once reached the opposite conclusion. 8
In addition, Justice O'Connor stated that the "unitary waters" ap-
proach also could conflict with EPA's current NPDES regulations.
As an example, she noted the EPA "intake credit" regulation259 "al-
lows an industrial water user to obtain an 'intake credit' for pollut-
ants present in water that it withdraws from navigable waters." The
regulation excuses the user from having to remove pollutants present
in the water before it was withdrawn - but "'only if the discharger
demonstrates that the intake water is drawn from the same body of
water into which the discharge is made."'' 260 Justice O'Connor did
not state whether this EPA "intake credit" regulation was valid under
the CWA, but she stated, "[t]he NPDES program thus appears to
257. Id.
258. Id. Justice O'Connor noted that this amicus brief cited in In re
Riverside Irrigation Dist., 1975 WL 23864 (Off. Gen. Couns., June
27, 1975), which concluded that irrigation ditches that discharge into
navigable waters require NPDES permits, even if they themselves
qualify as navigable waters. Id. at 1544.
259. 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(g)(4) (2003).
260. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1544, quoting 40 C.F.R. §
122.45(g)(4). See also supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text
discussing these EPA "intake credit" regulations.
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address the movement of pollutants among water bodies, at least at
,,261times.
Although Justice O'Connor did not decide in Miccosukee Tribe
whether the "unitary waters" approach is valid under the CWA, her
discussion of this issue in her opinion in the case indicates that lower
courts should reject the approach because it allows water containing
pollutants to be added to unpolluted or less-polluted bodies of water
without being subject to any regulatory controls under the CWA. As
discussed below, however, she suggested the states and EPA do not
need to require an individual NPDES permit under the CWA for an
engineered transfer of water from one water body to another distinct
water body, but instead can regulate such transfers of water under
the CWA through general NPDES permits.
If the "unitary waters" approach is not adopted by the federal
courts, Miccosukee Tribe's second holding would not require an
NPDES permit for a transfer of water from one part of a water body
to another part of that same water body, where there is no interven-
ing commercial or industrial use of the withdrawn intake water and
where the point source discharging the withdrawn water back into
the source water body does not introduce pollutants into the dis-
charged water. If these two conditions are not met, however, Micco-
sukee Tribe's first holding would require a point source, which con-
veys water containing pollutants into a navigable body of water, to
obtain a section 402 NPDES permit and to comply with effluent
limitation requirements that might require removal or treatment of
pollutants, added by other persons or sources, in the withdrawn wa-
ter.
In the part of her opinion addressing the "unitary waters" ap-
proach, Justice O'Connor also referenced arguments that section
101(g) of the CWA,262 which provides that "[ilt is the policy of
Congress that the authority of each State to allocate quantities of
water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abrogated or
otherwise impaired" by the CWA, would be violated by requiring an
NPDES permit to transfer water from one water body to another.
She suggested that section 101(g) might be violated if an NPDES
permit requirement for water transfers raised the costs of water dis-
tribution in western states "prohibitively" by requiring an NPDES
permit for "every engineered diversion of one navigable water into
261. Id.
262. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000).
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another" and by mandating expensive treatment of the diverted water
for many of these diversions to meet the receiving water body's wa-
263ter quality criteria.
Justice O'Connor noted, however, "it may be that such permitting
authority is necessary to protect water quality, and that the States or
EPA could control regulatory costs by issuing a general permit to
point sources associated with water distribution programs." 64 Justice
O'Connor did not cite any section of the CWA as providing author-
ity to EPA or the states to issue a general NPDES permit (rather than
the typical individual NPDES permit 265) to water distribution pro-
grams or to any other category of point sources. She did, however,
cite two EPA regulations266 which authorize an EPA Regional Ad-
ministrator, or a state director of a state NPDES permit program (for
a state to which EPA has delegated authority to issue NPDES per-
mits under the Act), in the exercise of discretion, to issue a general
permit for one or more categories or subcategories of point source
dischargers of pollutants, except those covered by individual per-
mits, within a specified geographic area corresponding to existing
geographic or political boundaries. In order for an EPA Regional
Administrator or state director to issue a general NPDES permit to a
category or subcategory of point source dischargers, the sources
263. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1544 -45.
264. Id. at 1545 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.28, 123.25 (2003)). Jus-
tice O'Connor noted that general permits authorize "discharges from
a category of point sources within a specified geographic area" and
that in some cases, entities covered by a general permit "need take
no further action to achieve compliance with the NPDES [general
permit] besides adhering to the permit condition. [40 CFR §
122.28(b)(2)(v) (2003)]." Id. at 1545. She also noted the State of
Pennsylvania, "the one State that has interpreted the Act to cover
interbasin water transfers," issues general permits to cover interbasin
water transfers. Id. (emphasis in original).
265. Justice O'Connor noted in Miccosukee Tribe that "[a]n appli-
cant for an individual NPDES permit must provide information
about, among other things, the point source itself, the nature of the
pollutants to be discharged, and any water treatment system that will
be used. General permits greatly reduce that administrative burden
by authorizing discharges from a category of point sources within a
specified geographical area." 124 S. Ct. at 1545.
266. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.28, 123.25.
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within the category or subcategory must: involve the same or sub-
stantially similar types of operation; discharge the same types of
waste or engage in the same types of sludge use or disposal prac-
tices; require the same effluent limitations, operating conditions, or
standards for sludge use or disposal; require the use of similar moni-
toring; and be more appropriately controlled under a general permit
267than under individual permits. There are no provisions in these
general permit regulations indicating that the effluent limitations,
operating conditions or standards that are imposed upon point
sources under a general permit can be less rigorous than the effluent
limitation requirements that would be imposed upon those point
sources under individual NPDES permits.
These EPA general NPDES permit regulations state that unless
otherwise specified in a general permit, a discharger seeking cover-
age under a general NPDES permit must submit, to the EPA Re-
gional Administrator or state director that created the general permit,
written notice of its intent to be covered by the general permit.
2 68
These EPA general permit regulations also provide that an EPA Re-
gional Administrator or a state director may require a person seeking
to discharge pollutants under the authorization of a general permit to
obtain an individual NPDES permit.
Neither section 402269 (the provision of the CWA regulating the
NPDES permit program) nor any other provision of the Act explic-
itly authorizes EPA or the states to issue general NPDES permits,
although section 402(p)(3)(B)(i) 27° authorizes "[p]ermits for dis-
charges from municipal storm sewers [to] be issued on a system or
jurisdiction-wide basis .. .." EPA, however, may have the authority
to issue its general NPDES permit regulations under section 501(a)
of the CWA,271 which provides that "[t]he [EPA] Administrator is
authorized to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out
his functions under this chapter." In 1977, a panel of the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held that area or general permits are al-
lowed under section 402 because "area-wide regulation is one well-
267. 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2).
268. Id. § 122.28(b)(2).
269. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000).
270. Id. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(i).
271. Id. § 1361(a).
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established means of coping with administrative exigency." 272 Nei-
ther this panel nor any other court, however, has explicitly held that
EPA's general NPDES permit regulations cited in Miccosukee Tribe
are valid regulations under the CWA.
Section 404(e) of the CWA273 explicitly authorizes the Corps to:
issue general [section 404] permits on a State, regional,
or nationwide basis for any category of activities involv-
ing discharges of dredged or fill material, if the [Corps]
determines that the activities in such category are similar
in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental
effects when performed separately, and will have only
minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.
These criteria for issuance of a general section 404 permit are simi-
lar, but not identical, to the criteria for issuance of a general section
402 permit under EPA's regulations.
Although Justice O'Connor's Miccosukee Tribe decision does not
indicate if the states or EPA can establish general section 402
NPDES permit programs for categories of point sources other than
water distribution programs, the EPA general permit regulations
cited by Justice O'Connor authorize a general NPDES permit for any
category or subcategory of point source discharges for which a gen-
eral permit is found to be appropriate under the regulation's speci-
fied criteria. Justice O'Connor implied general NPDES permits
could be established by a state or EPA for other categories of point
sources by stating that general permits "authoriz[e] discharges from
a category of point sources within a specified geographical area.
274
If this statement is interpreted as giving states and EPA broad au-
thority to establish general section 402 NPDES permits for various
categories of point sources (at least when findings of appropriateness
272. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1381
(D.C. Cir. 1977). In support of this principle, the court referred to
the Supreme Court's approval of area pricing for natural gas produc-
ers in the Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968), and
the Supreme Court's approval, Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967), of the use, under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, of administrative search warrants on an area basis.
273. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e). See supra notes 89-93 and accompany-
ing text for discussion of Corps of Engineers general section 404
permits.
274. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1545 n.
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under the regulation's specified criteria are made), a state or an EPA
Regional Administrator may decide to issue general rather than indi-
vidual section 402 NPDES permits for other categories of point
sources, such as storage dams (with respect to pollutants released
into rivers downstream of a dam)275 and pumped storage electricity-
generating facilities.276 In addition, the Corps or a state may decide
to issue general section 404 permits for certain categories of activi-
ties that cause "re-deposits" or "incidental fallback" of soil and vege-
tation back into the same wetland or other navigable body of water
from which those materials were removed during excavation or
dredging activities.
277
EPA's position is that both technology-based and water-quality
based effluent limitation requirements included in NPDES permits
may be in the form of specific Best Management Practices (BMPs)
or other non-numeric effluents limitations and standards (rather than
in the form of numeric effluent limitations).278 Because of this posi-
tion, EPA or a state can issue a general NPDES permit that requires
the point sources regulated under the general permit to follow certain
prescribed best management practices (such as specified methods of
operation) that may be less expensive than numeric effluent limita-
tion regulations (that often require the installation and operation of
expensive equipment to remove or treat pollutants in discharges).279
275. See infra notes 280-87 and accompanying text for discussion
of regulation of discharges from these types of facilities.
276. See infra notes 388-411 and accompanying text for discussion
of regulation of discharges from these types of facilities.
277. See infra notes 412-511 and accompanying text for discussion
of regulation of discharges from these types of activities.
278. 68 Fed. Reg. 7184-85 (Feb. 12, 2003) (EPA policy statement
in preamble to regulation). Courts agree that section 402 NPDES
permits do not have to impose numerical effluent limitation require-
ments and that when numerical effluent limitations are infeasible,
EPA may issue NPDES permits that "proscribe industry practices"
or contain "conditions designed to reduce the level of effluent dis-
charges to acceptable levels." Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
279. For example, a general permit for certain dams might require
the regulated dams to follow certain operational practices in order to
reduce the amounts of minerals, nutrients, sediment and heat re-
leased into a downstream river from the reservoir behind a dam.
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IV. CHANGES IN WATER QUALITY CAUSED BY DAMS
The first holding of the Supreme Court's Miccosukee Tribe deci-
sion has modified previous decisions280 by courts of appeals that
have held that changes to the quality of a navigable river down-
281stream of a storage dam, caused by the dam, are not point source
"additions" of pollutants to navigable water bodies that require an
NPDES permit under the CWA. Storage dams, however, may be
excused from the NPDES permit requirement either under Micco-
sukee Tribe's second holding (an NPDES permit is not required to
transfer water from one part of a navigable body of water to another
part of that same water body) or under the "unitary waters" approach
(if it is adopted by the federal courts) when a point source pipe,
spillway or turbine in a dam conveys water from the reservoir behind
the dam to a river or stream downstream of the dam. If these excep-
tions do not apply and a section 402 NPDES permit is required for
the release of pollutants into a river downstream of a dam from a
point source in a storage dam, EPA or a state may issue an NPDES
general permit for that category of dams in a specified geographic
area. EPA's "intake credit" regulation282 also may excuse such point
sources from having to remove pollutants that are present in the
dam's reservoir water before that water is conveyed to a downstream
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 163, 164 (D.C. Cir.
1982) discusses such types of operational practices. See infra notes
286-304 and accompanying text for discussion of the types of pollut-
ant discharges caused by dams.
280. State of Mo. ex rel. Ashcroft v. Dep't. of Army, 672 F.2d
1287 (8th Cir. 1982); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156
(D.C. Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn.
Water Quality Control Bd., 717 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 466 U.S. 937 (1984); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers
Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
281. The term 'storage dam" is used to refer to a dam that backs up
water flowing in an upstream river, forming a reservoir of water be-
hind the dam, with some of the water in the reservoir released into
the river downstream of the dam through pipes or spillways (often
after flowing through turbines that generate electricity if a storage
dam is a hydroelectric power dam).
282. 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(g)(4) (2003). See supra notes 178-80,
259-61 and accompanying text.
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river or stream. If EPA's "intake credit" regulation does not excuse
such releases from effluent limitation requirements, such a general
permit only may have to require compliance with best management
practices effluent limitation requirements (rather than numerical ef-
fluent limitations).
Although this section of this article focuses primarily upon pollut-
ants released from storage dams and pumped storage facilities,283 the
quality of water in surface bodies of water also can be adversely af-
fected by dams that divert water from its natural course 284 and by
impoundment dams that collect surface runoff of pollutants in a res-
ervoir behind the dam.285
Storage dams can change both the quality of water that is backed
up in the reservoir behind the dam as well as the quality of water in a
river or stream downstream of the dam. The water quality changes
caused by a particular storage dam are "highly site-specific" and
dependent upon particular circumstances at a dam.21 Such "dam-
caused pollution is unique because its severity depends partly on
whether other sources have polluted the upstream river.' 287 In gen-
eral, storage dams can cause water quality problems in reservoirs or
downstream rivers or streams due to low dissolved oxygen, dis-
solved minerals and nutrients, water temperature changes, sediment
release, and supersaturation.
288
283. At a typical pump storage facility, water from a lake or other
navigable body of water is pumped uphill to a reservoir and then
later released to flow through tunnels and turbines that generate elec-
tricity, before the water is returned to the same navigable body of
water. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580,
581-82 (6th Cir. 1988).
284. Such a diversion dam may divert water to a hydroelectric
power plant, as was the case of the dam at issue in Tennessee Water
Quality Control Board., 717 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1983).
285. Comm. to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util.
Dist., 13 F.3d 305 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 873 (1994).
286. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 182 (D.C. Cir.
1982). "Dams therefore may not be amenable to the nationally uni-
form controls contemplated by § 402...." Id. at 177 n.62. The Gor-
such opinion includes a detailed discussion of the different types of
water quality changes that a reservoir dam may cause. Id. at 161-64.
287. Id. at 182.
288. Id. at 161.
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"Only large storage dams have low dissolved oxygen problems,
and then only during warmer months and only when water is re-
leased from the lower part of the reservoir., 289  During warm
months, a deep reservoir will "stratify into a cold, dense lower layer"
(called the "hypolimnion") and "a warmer, lighter upper layer"
290(called the "eplimnion"). In "'fall turnover, ... the two layers
break up and the reservoir returns to full aeration." 291 The oxygen
level in the upper eplimnion layer will be good because its water is
aerated by wind mixing and because photosynthesis produces oxy-
292gen. But, the cold, dense lower hypolimnion level of water
backed up in the reservoir will be low in dissolved oxygen, because
it "is too deep to be aerated by wind action and light levels are too
low to support photosynthesis. 293 The rate of oxygen depletion is
dependent primarily on the volume of water in the hypolimnion (the
more water, the more oxygen is available for decomposition), its
temperature (decomposition occurs more slowly in cold water and
colder water also contains more oxygen), and the quantity of organic
matter it contains (the more organic matter, the greater the oxygen
demands for decomposition). 294
If the lower hypolimnion layer of water in a reservoir behind a
dam becomes totally depleted of oxygen, a number of minerals (in-
cluding iron and manganese) and plant nutrients (including phos-
phates), which are soluble in anaerobic (zero-oxygen) water, leach
into the hypolimnion water layer in the reservoir from bottom
muds.
295
As a result, water released from a reservoir dam may be low in dis-
solved oxygen and high in concentrations of these minerals and nu-
296trients downstream of the dam. Fish cannot survive in oxygen de-
pleted water, and water low in oxygen has little ability to break
down organic matter and other pollutants. 297 High concentrations of
minerals and nutrients released into a downstream river from a res-
289. Id. at 162.
290. Id.
291. Id. (footnote omitted).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 163.
296. Id. at 161, 163.
297. Id. at 161.
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ervoir "can harm fish, make the water unpalatable for drinking, and
foster undesirable plant growth. 298
As noted earlier, during warm months the water in a deep reservoir
behind a storage dam will stratify into a cold, dense lower layer [the
"hypolimnion"] and a warmer, lighter upper layer [the
44 299
"eplimnion]. Consequently, depending on from which layer of the
storage dam water is released the storage dam may release water that
is colder or warmer than the water in the upstream river that backs
up in the dam's reservoir, causing harm to fish in the downstream
river.300
A large reservoir also may cause sediment in the backed-up reser-
voir water to settle to the bottom of the reservoir, resulting in water
released from the dam having less sediment than upstream water.
30
'
Fluctuations in the flow of water from a storage dam, however, can
cause erosion of soil downstream of the dam, restoring sediment
loading in the water. 302 Finally, water plunging at high velocity
from a reservoir dam can become supersaturated (having higher than
normal oxygen concentration), which can be harmful to fish.3 03
A pumped storage facility can cause a different type of water qual-
ity problem by discharging large numbers of dead fish into a naviga-
ble water body. During the operation of a pumped storage facility,
large numbers of live fish in the facility's intake water, which is
pumped uphill from a navigable water body into a reservoir, are
killed when water in the reservoir flows through the facility's tur-
bines. This results in a substantial amount of dead fish and other
dead aquatic organisms, which flowed through the facility's turbines,
being released into a navigable water body (often the same water
304body from which the facility's intake water is drawn).
298. Id. at 163. There are several mechanical methods of aeration
and de-stratifying that can be utilized by a storage dam to prevent
release from a reservoir of oxygen-depleted water and dissolved
minerals and nutrients. Id. at 162, 163.
299. Id. at 162.
300. Id. at 163.
301. Id. at 163-64.
302. Id. at 164.
303. Id.
304. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Co., 862 F.2d 580, 582
(6th Cir. 1988).
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In decisions issued prior to the Supreme Court's 1984 Chevron
30 5
decision (which specifies the deference courts must give to an inter-
pretation of a federal statute by a federal administrative agency),
courts of appeals in four cases 30 6 deferred to EPA's position that
storage dams and pumped storage facilities do not require an NPDES
permit under the CWA for dam-induced water quality changes. In-
stead, the storage dams and pumped storage facilities could be regu-
lated under state-developed area-wide waste treatment management
plans pursuant to section 208 of the CWA.
307 30 8
These cases, however, did not "categorically exempt all dams from
the discharge requirements of the CWA.' ,309 An impoundment dam
that collects acid mine drainage (surface runoff pollutants collected
or channeled into a reservoir behind the dam) and then releases these
pollutants into a downstream river through the dam's point source
spillway or discharge valve, has been held subject to the NPDES
permit requirement for point source discharges of pollutants. 310 In
addition, EPA requires NPDES permits for the discharge of grease,
oil, or trash through the outlet works of a storage dam.
311
305. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
306. State of Mo. ex reL Ashcroft, 672 F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1982);
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn. Water Quality
Control Bd., 717 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
937 (1984); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d
580 (6th Cir. 1988).
307. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2000).
308. As a result of amendments to the Clean Water Act enacted in
1987, states are now required to regulate nonpoint source pollution
primarily under state nonpoint source management programs
adopted under section 319, 33 U.S.C. § 1329, that seek to reduce
pollutant loadings resulting from nonpoint source pollution through
the use of best management practices and measures. Id. §
1329(b)(2)(A)-(D).
309. Comm. to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util.
Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 873
(1994).
310. Id.
311. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165 n.22.
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The most in-depth analysis of EPA's position with respect to dam-
induced water quality changes occurred in Judge Patricia Wald's
1982 decision in National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch.3 12 This
opinion, which deals generally with changes in water quality caused
throughout the United States by all storage dams, addressed only the
issue of whether an NPDES permit is required for water-quality
changes in a river downstream of a storage dam, induced by the stor-
age dam's release, from a point source pipe or spillway, of water in
the reservoir behind the dam into the downstream river.313
In Gorsuch, Judge Wald deferred to and upheld EPA's position
that a dam does not require an NPDES permit for adverse changes it
causes to the quality of water in the reservoir behind the dam and in
river water downstream. EPA's position is that dam-induced water
quality changes are to be regulated instead under state-developed
area-wide waste management plans pursuant to section 208 of the
CWA.314 Judge Wald upheld this EPA position on the grounds it was
a reasonable interpretation of the CWA and "not inconsistent with
congressional intent.,
315
In addition, several courts of appeals 316 have held water quality
changes caused by a dam owned and operated by the federal gov-
ernment are not the "discharge or runoff' of pollutants subject to
regulation under section 313 of the CWA317 (water pollution caused
by federal government facilities is regulated under section 313 of the
CWA rather than by section 301(a) of the Act318).319 One court held
312. 693 F.2d 156.
313. Judge Wald in Gorsuch did not address the issue of whether
an NPDES permit is required for changes in the water quality in the
reservoir behind a storage dam because the parties in Gorsuch
agreed "that water quality problems that occur within a reservoir
(e.g., dissolved minerals) are nonpoint [source] pollution, for lack of
a point source." Id. at 174.
314. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (2000).
315. 693 F.2d at 161, 183.
316. United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn. Water Qual-
ity Control Bd., 717 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
937 (1984). State of Mo. ex rel Ashcroft v. Dep't of the Army, 672
F.2d 1297 (8th Cir. 1982).
317. 33 U.S.C. § 1323.
318. Id. § 1311(a).
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that the District Court did not err in finding alleged soil erosion
caused below a hydroelectric storage dam (as a result of fluctuations
in the flowage of water from the power plant) and the reduction of
oxygen (as a result of water turbulence at the dam), constituted nei-
ther the "discharge" nor "runoff' of pollutants within the meaning of
section 313 and therefore, the federal dam was not subject to state
water quality laws.320 Another court followed the Gorsuch decision
and held that a state NPDES permit is not required for changes in the
physical and chemical properties of small quantities of water that
seep through a federal dam that diverts water from its natural course
(rather than impounding water), on the grounds that the court should
defer to EPA's reasonable interpretation of the CWA as not requir-
ing an NPDES permit for such dam-induced water quality
changes.
321
Judge Wald in Gorsuch noted the parties in the case agreed that a
storage dam's reservoir and the river downstream are "navigable
waters" under the CWA.322 The parties also agreed that pipes or
spillways through which water flows from a reservoir through a dam
into a downstream river "clearly fall within" the CWA's definition
of a "point source."
323
The parties in Gorsuch further agreed that "water quality problems
that occur within a reservoir (e.g., dissolved minerals) are nonpoint
[source] pollution, for lack of a point source," 324 a position legally
correct because the changes to the quality of water in a reservoir be-
hind a storage dam do not result from the introduction of pollutants
from a "discernible, confined and discrete conveyance" (a "point
source"). Furthermore, classifying water quality changes in a stor-
age dam's reservoir as nonpoint source pollution is consistent with
section 304(f)(2)(F) of the CWA, 325 which directs the EPA Adminis-
trator to issue information including:
319. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text for analysis of
Section 313.
320. State of Mo. ex rel. Ashcroft, 672 F.2d at 1304.
321. Tenn. Water Quality Control Bd., 717 F.2d at 999-1000.
322. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d. at 156, 165 (D.C.
Cir. 1982).
323. Id. at 165 n.22.
324. Id. at 174.
325. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(f)(2)(F) (2000).
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(1) guidelines for identifying and evaluating the nature
and extent of nonpoint sources of pollutants, and (2)
processes, procedures, and methods to control pollution
resulting from--(F) changes in the movement, flow, or
circulation of any navigable waters or ground waters, in-
cluding changes caused by the construction of dams, lev-
ees, channels, causeways, or flow diversion facilities.
326
In her opinion for the Court in Miccosukee Tribe, Justice
O'Connor stated that section 304(f)(2)(F) is "concem[ed with] non-
point sources" and "that § [304(f)(2)(F)] does not explicitly exempt
nonpoint pollution sources from the NPDES program if they also
fall within the 'point source' definition.
'
"
327
Judge Wald noted in Gorsuch that in the District Court EPA had
argued section 304(f)(2)(F) "was totally irrelevant," but that EPA
had argued to the Court of Appeals that this provision "demonstrates
Congressional intent that some dam-caused water quality changes
should be treated as nonpoint source pollution. ' 328 Judge Wald
added that even if EPA counsel has "rethought its legal argu-
ment,''329 EPA documents suggested EPA's position is that section
304(f)(2)(F)
[R]eflects congressional understanding that some dam-
induced water quality problems are nonpoint source pol-
lution (thus it would be improper to treat all dam-induced
water problems as point source pollution), but does not
indicate which dam-caused problems are nonpoint pollu-
tion (thus, the section does not preclude a finding that any
particular pollution problem involves a point source of
pollutants).330
She also added that even if EPA counsel had rethought its legal ar-
gument;
EPA has never changed its basic position that dams gen-
erally do not require NPDES permits. Thus, any incon-
sistency in EPA's statutory argument would at most be
cause not to defer to the agency on the narrow question
of the relevance of § 304(f)(2)(F), not reason to withdraw
326. Id.
327. 124 S. Ct. 1537, 1544 (2004).
328. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 168.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 168 n.36.
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deference to EPA on its underlying position concerning
dams."'
Although section 304(f)(2)(F) does not explicitly state that non-
point source pollution occurs when a storage dam causes the condi-
tion of the water in the reservoir behind the dam to change when the
water in the river upstream of the storage dam is backed up or its
flow is slowed by the dam, section 304(f)(2)(F) should be interpreted
as categorizing changes in the quality of water in a reservoir behind
a dam, caused by "changes in the movement, flow, or circulation" of
a navigable river upstream of a dam resulting from the construction
of the dam, as nonpoint source pollution. This interpretation follows
from section 304(f)(1)'s explicit reference to nonpoint source pollu-
tion, which implies that the various types of pollutants listed in sec-
tion 304(f)(2) (including changes in the movement, flow, or circula-
tion of navigable waters caused by dams) are considered by Con-
gress to be types of nonpoint source pollution. This interpretation of
section 304(f)(2) is further supported by the fact sections
304(f)(1)(A), (B), and (C)332 explicitly refer to "runoff' (a term often
used synonymously with nonpoint source pollution).
On the other hand, although section 304(f)(2) supports classifica-
tion of water quality changes in a storage dam's reservoir as non-
point source pollution, section 304(f)(2) should not be interpreted as
also classifying all changes in the water quality in a river down-
stream of a storage dam as nonpoint source pollution. This interpre-
tation of section 304(f)(2)(F) follows from Justice O'Connor's
statement in Miccosukee Tribe that section 304(f)(2)(F) "does not
explicitly exempt nonpoint pollution sources from the NPDES pro-
gram if they also fall within the 'point source' definition." 333 This
indicates section 301(a) should apply to downstream water quality
changes caused by "additions" of pollutants to downstream rivers
from a dam's point source pipes or spillways.
A ruling that a discharge of "pollutants" from a dam's pipes or
spillways into a river downstream of the dam is an addition of pol-
lutants into a navigable body of water from a point source subject to
section 301(a) of the CWA is also consistent with the principle that
"EPA may not exempt from NPDES permit requirements that which
331. Id. at 168.
332. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(f)(2)(A), (B), (C) (2000).
333. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
124 S. Ct. 1537, 1544 (2004).
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clearly meets the statutory definition of a point source by 'defining'
it as a nonpoint source." 334 However, as discussed below, 335 changes
in downstream water quality caused by low dissolved oxygen, cold,
and supersaturation are not "pollutants" under the CWA. Those
types of water quality changes do not require an NPDES permit be-
cause they do not result from pollutants being added to the down-
stream river from a point source.
Judge Wald noted in Gorsuch that EPA also supported its position,
that dam-induced water quality changes in the water in a river down-
stream of a dam do not require an NPDES permit, upon the grounds
that a "point source must introduce the pollutant into navigable wa-
ter from the outside world" in order for there to be an "addition" of a
pollutant into navigable waters from a point source that requires an
NPDES permit. 336 In contrast, a "dam-caused pollution merely
passes through the dam from one part of a navigable body water (the
reservoir) into another (the downstream river)., 337 The National
Wildlife Federation argued
[H]owever, that the statutorily necessary "addition ...
from a point source" occurs when (1) a dam causes pol-
lutants to enter the reservoir and (2) the polluted water
subsequently passes through the dam-the point
source-into the formerly unpolluted river below. EPA
responds that addition from a point source occurs only if
the point source itself physically introduces a pollutant
into water from the outside world. In its view, the point
or nonpoint character of pollution is established when the
pollutant first enters navigable water, and does not
change when the polluted water later passes through the
dam from one body of navigable water (the reservoir) to
another (the downstream river). As for supersaturation,
which does not exist in the reservoir, EPA argues that it
occurs downstream, after the water is released from the
dam.338
334. League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity
Project v. Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181, 1190 (9th Cir. 2002).
335. Infra notes 359-67 and accompanying text.
336. See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 156.
337. Id. at 165.
338. Id. at 174-75.
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EPA also argued in Gorsuch that under the CWA "any addition
must occur 'from' a point source and not merely through a point
source," 339 although Judge Wald noted 340 this EPA argument is
inconsistent with several EPA regulations 34 which classify as point
sources several structures that "merely pass through" pollutants from
land to navigable water. 342 Judge Wald, however, accepted this EPA
position that an "addition" of a pollutant only occurs when a point
source introduces a pollutant into navigable water from the outside
world, on the grounds it was not "manifestly unreasonable." 343 This
EPA "outside world" position, however, was rejected by the United
States Supreme Court's first holding in the Miccosukee Tribe case,
344
after the Court of Appeals below in Miccosukee Tribe indicated this
EPA position was not entitled to deference under the Chevron doc-
trine because it was only contained in policy statements and litiga-
tion positions.345
A release, into a river downstream from a storage dam through a
storage dam's point source pipe or spillway of water, from a reser-
voir containing pollutants is subject to Miccosukee Tribe's first hold-
ing, requiring an NPDES permit for a point source that transports
water, already containing pollutants, into a navigable body of water.
Such a point source release of water from a storage dam's reservoir
legally is indistinguishable from the situation in Miccosukee Tribe,
because the point source S-9 pump station in Miccosukee Tribe that
transfers water containing pollutants from the C-II canal into the
WCA-3 reservoir (with the C-11 canal and the WCA-3 reservoir
separated by levees), factually is almost the same as a point source
339. Id. at 175 n.58.
340. Id.
341. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2003) (defining "discharge of a pollutant"
to include "surface runoff which is collected or channeled by man);
40 C.F.R. § 122.26 (treating storm sewers as point sources).
342. 693 F.2d at 175 n.58.
343. Id. at 175.
344. 124 S. Ct. at 1543. See supra notes 176-200 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of this Supreme Court holding.
345. Miccosukee Tribe of Indian v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 280
F.3d 1364, 1367 n.4. See supra notes 150-160 and accompanying
text for discussion of this Court of Appeals holding in Miccosukee
Tribe.
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pipe or spillway in a storage dam that conveys water from the reser-
voir behind the dam to the river downstream from the dam.
Gorsuch's exemption of dam-induced downstream water quality
changes from the NPDES permit requirement, however, may be con-
sistent with the second holding of the Supreme Court in Miccosukee
Tribe. Under this second holding, an NPDES permit is not required
in order for a point source to transfer water from one part of a navi-
gable water body to another part of that same water body, if no pol-
lutants are added to that transferred water by the point source and if
the water body into which water is transferred is part of the same
water body from which the water is removed.346
Although a storage dam does change the quality of the upstream
river's water by causing heat (or cold) and dissolved minerals and
nutrients to be added to the river water that backs up in the reservoir
behind the dam, these changes in the quality of water in the reservoir
are caused by the nonpoint source dam, not by a "point source. '" 347
Furthermore, low dissolved oxygen and supersaturation are not "pol-
lutants' under the CWA348 and increased sediment in a river down-
stream of a storage dam is caused by downstream river water
"'scouring the downstream channel', 349 not by the point source that
releases reservoir water into the downstream river.
Consequently, if the point source pipe or spillway that releases wa-
ter in a storage dam's reservoir into the river downstream of the dam
does not create or generate any pollutants that are added to the water
flowing through the point source into the river downstream of the
dam, the release by a point source in a storage dam of reservoir wa-
ter from a storage dam should not require an NPDES permit under
the second holding in Miccosukee Tribe, where the reservoir behind
the dam and the river downstream of that dam are considered to be
parts of the same navigable body of water. But, if water in a reser-
voir behind a storage dam flows through turbines that kill live fish in
the water, which are then discharged into a river downstream of the
dam, an NPDES permit is required for the discharge of these dead
fish. Even if the reservoir and downstream river are considered part
of the same water body, the point source turbines would be creating
346. 124 S. Ct. at 1543. See supra notes 201-47 and accompanying
text for discussion of this second holding.
347. See supra notes 324-33 and accompanying text.
348. See infra notes 359-64 and accompanying text.
349. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 164.
[VOL. XVI
2004] S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST. v. MICCOSUKEE TRIBE 73
or generating pollutants and adding them into the downstream
river.350
Under the hydrologic connection test, 35 the reservoir behind a
storage dam and the river downstream from the dam would be con-
sidered part of the same navigable body of water, because water
from the reservoir flows through the dam into the downstream reser-
voir. The reservoir and downstream river would also be considered
parts of the same navigable body of water under the "but for" causa-
tion test;352 without the storage dam the water in the reservoir (which
is water that is backed up from the upstream river) would naturally
flow from the upstream river into the downstream river (since a stor-
age dam merely slows the natural flow of water from the upstream
river into the downstream river). The determination of whether a
reservoir and downstream river are parts of the same navigable body
of water under a biological/ecosystems test353 probably requires a
case-by-case analysis of the water quality, fish and other aquatic or-
ganisms in the reservoir compared to the downstream river.
Even if a storage dam is not exempted from the NPDES permit re-
quirement under Miccosukee Tribe's second holding, a storage dam
would be excused from the NPDES permit requirement under the
"unitary waters" approach 354 if the storage dam is considered to
transfer water "unaltered" from the reservoir behind the dam to the
river downstream of the dam3 55 (assuming the unitary waters ap-
proach is adopted by the federal courts). As noted above, if water in
a dam's reservoir containing live fish passes through turbines that
kill some or all of the fish and then convey these dead fish to the
river downstream of the dam, the dam's turbines would have altered
the transferred water by adding pollutants (the dead fish) to the
transferred water. But because the focus for purposes of defining
350. See infra notes 388-411 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 214-41 and accompanying text for discussion
of the hydrologic connection test.
352. See supra notes 161-66, 217-21, 242-45 and accompanying
text for discussion of the but for causation test.
353. See supra notes 214, 246-47 and accompanying text for dis-
cussion of the biological/ecosystems test.
354. See supra notes 248-61 and accompanying text for discussion
of the "unitary waters" approach.
355. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist v. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct
1537, 1543 (2004).
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"unaltered" should be upon the effects of a storage dam's point
source pipes or spillways that release water from the dam's reservoir
into the downstream river, 356 a dam's pipes or spillways otherwise
should be found to transfer reservoir water "unaltered" to the down-
stream river because a storage dam's pipes and spillways do not add
any pollutants to the reservoir water before the water is released into
the downstream river.357 The focus in defining "unaltered" under the
"unitary waters" approach should not be upon the effects upon the
water in the upstream river caused by the reservoir and storage dam
(from which the dam's spillways and pipes receive the water re-
leased into the downstream river), because these effects are caused
by nonpoint sources, not by the dam's point source pipes and spill-
ways.3
58
Judge Wald in Gorsuch also relied upon EPA's position that dam-
induced water quality changes do not require an NPDES permit be-
cause dam-induced water quality changes such as low-dissolved
oxygen, cold, and supersaturation, although within the definition of
"pollution" under section 502(19) of the CWA,359 are not within the
"narrower" definition of "pollutants" under section 502(6).360 She
noted that EPA's "quite plausible" "policy-oriented explanation" for
the CWA's distinction between "pollutant" and "pollution" is "that
Congress purposely limited the NPDES permit program to certain
well-recognized pollutants and left control of other water-altering
substances or conditions to the states under § 208.,,361 Although this
theory supports EPA's decision not to require an NPDES permit for
low-dissolved oxygen, cold, and supersaturation in a downstream
river caused by a storage dam, it does not provide grounds for not
356. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
357. Although a dam's spillway or pipe may cause water released
from the dam to become supersaturated with oxygen, Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1982), such super-
saturation, although constituting "pollution" under the Clean Water
Act, is not the addition of "pollutants" to the released water. Supra
note 348 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
359. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2000).
360. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 165. See supra notes 77-85 and accom-
panying text for discussion of the differences between the CWA's
definition of "pollution" and the CWA's definition of "pollutants."
361. Id. at 172.
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requiring an NPDES permit for the introduction of pollutants (such
as dissolved minerals and nutrients and heat) into a downstream river
from a storage dam's point source pipe or spillway.
Judge Wald did not mention dissolved minerals, nutrients, or
sediment that storage dams may cause to be added to a downstream
river, although she did note the definition of "pollutant" in section
502(6) of the CWA3 62 "primarily lists substances" and that heat is
the only water condition explicitly listed as a "pollutant" under the
CWA.3 63 Although Judge Wald noted the CWA's definition of "pol-
lutant" defines the term "with a list of specific items" that is not "all-
inclusive" and "all-encompassing as 'pollution,"' 364 she indicated
EPA is "entrusted ... with at least some discretion over which 'pol-
lutants' and sources of pollution were to be regulated under the
NPDES program., 365 Judge Wald did not explicitly discuss whether
EPA reasonably had concluded dam-induced dissolved minerals and
nutrients and downstream sediment loading are not within the defini-
tion of "pollutant" section 502(6) under the CWA. However, be-
cause courts interpret "pollutant" under the CWA "to encompass
substances not specifically enumerated but subsumed under the
broad generic terms such as 'chemical wastes' and 'solid waste', 366
dissolved minerals, nutrients, and sediment probably would be found
to be "pollutants" under the CWA. Dissolved minerals in a dam's
reservoir might be considered a "pollutant" because they are a form
of "rock" or are chemical, agricultural, or industrial waste. 367 Nutri-
ents may be classified as "pollutant(s)" -- chemical, agricultural, or
362. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
363. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 171.
364. Id. at 173.
365. Id.
366. Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. New York, 751 F. Supp.
1088, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), aft'd, 940 F.2d 649 (2dCir. 1991).
367. The minerals and nutrients found in the mud at the bottom of a
dam's reservoir, which may leach into the reservoir's water, may be
chemical, agricultural or industrial wastes that originated from up-
stream runoff (nonpoint sources) or point sources. "Industrial
waste" for purposes of the Act's definition of "pollutant" has been
defined broadly as "any useless byproduct derived from the com-
mercial production and sale of goods and services." N. Plains Res.
Council v. Fidelity Explor. and Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th
Cir. 2003).
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industrial waste. Sediment might be considered a "pollutant" be-
cause it is "rock" or "sand." In any case, "heat" is clearly a "pollut-
ant" under the CWA. Therefore, the EPA's policy of not requiring
an NPDES permit for dam-induced water quality changes cannot be
upheld simply on the grounds that all dam-induced water quality
changes in rivers downstream of dams are not "pollutants" under the
CWA.
Although Judge Wald in Gorsuch also deferred to EPA's position
with respect to NPDES permits for dam-induced water quality
changes, at least in part because of a number of policy considera-
tions (involving, as discussed below, administrative difficulty in
requiring EPA and states to regulate dam-induced water quality
changes under the NPDES permit program, as well as costs of com-
plying with NPDES permit and effluent limitation requirements), the
Supreme Court ignored similar policy considerations in Miccosukee
Tribe when deciding whether point sources involved in water distri-
bution programs require an NPDES permit.369 One of the policy
considerations mentioned in Gorsuch is the large number of dams
that might have to be regulated on a site-specific basis under the
NPDES permit program. EPA noted that there might be two million
dams for which an NPDES permit might have to be issued, although
Judge Wald in Gorsuch stated the "number of dams that would re-
quire permits is probably no more than the 50,000 'large' dams in
the country, and quite possibly only the 3,000 or so dams that are
large enough to generate significant amounts of electricity" - a
"manageable number even if it turns out impractical to issue cate-
,,370gorical permits. In Miccosukee Tribe, Justice O'Connor noted
similar concerns that the Court's holding might require "thousands"
of new NPDES permits that "might require expensive treatment to
meet water quality criteria ... and therefore raise the costs of water
368. 693 F.2d at 170 (Judge Wald found that although the EPA
"did give primary emphasis to the policy implications of the point
source-nonpoint source choice" when it reconsidered its position in
1974 and 1978, she held that "we must conclude that its interpreta-
tion does in fact merit full deference on the basis of agency exper-
tise"). Id.
369. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct.
1537, 1544-45 (2004).
370. See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 182.
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distribution prohibitively," 371 but she pointed out that states and the
EPA may be able to "control regulatory costs by issuing general
[categorical] permits to point sources associated with water distribu-
tion programs.
372
With respect to the impracticability of issuing categorical (general)
permits, Judge Wald noted in Gorsuch that "dam-caused pollution is
unique because its severity depends partly on whether other sources
have polluted the upstream river.'373 Furthermore, she stated that
water-quality changes caused by dams "may not be amenable to the
nationally uniform controls contemplated by § 402 because pollution
problems are highly site-specific." 374 She stated, "[t]he NPDES
permit program, however, requires the EPA to issue nationally uni-
form standards, and thus would not allow the agency to take full ac-
count of the interrelationship between dam-caused pollution and
other pollution sources." 375 In Miccosukee Tribe, Justice O'Connor
did not discuss this issue of whether all point sources, even those
regulated under a general NPDES permit, must be regulated by na-
tionally uniform, categorical effluent limitations. Justice O'Connor,
however, noted in Miccosukee Tribe that general NPDES permits
may be issued for "a category of point sources within a specified
geographic area,''376 which might have different effluent limitation
requirements for different categories of point sources and for differ-
ent geographical areas.
Miccosukee Tribe does not authorize either federal courts or the
EPA to exempt storage dams from the NPDES permit requirement
simply because an NPDES general permit for a category of dams
that causes water quality changes would be required to impose either
nationally uniform or regionally uniform control requirements upon
that category of dams. Even if a regional general NPDES permit for
dam-induced water quality changes must include nationally uniform,
categorical pollution control requirements, general permit effluent
371. 124 S. Ct. at 1544, 1545.
372. Id. at 1545.
373. 693 F.2d at 182.
374. Id. at 177 n.62. Subsequently, Judge Wald further discussed
the "highly site-specific" "severity of dam-caused pollution" and the
difficulty EPA would have in establishing best available technology
effluent limitations for each category or class of dams. Id. at 182-83.
375. Id. at 182.
376. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct. at 1545 n. *
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limitation requirements can be tailored differently for each category
of dams and can be specific Best Management Practices or other
non-numeric effluent limitations or standards. 377 Judge Wald in
Gorsuch identified various methods of operation storage dams can
utilize to prevent dams from causing changes in water quality in
downstream rivers. 378 These methods of operation might be found to
be Best Management Practices or operating conditions and standards
that can be incorporated into general NPDES permits for dams with-
out making compliance with such permits too expensive or compli-
cated.
Another EPA concern Judge Wald noted in Gorsuch is that "dams
are a major component of state water management, providing irriga-
tion, drinking water, flood protection, etc... ,379 so that a NPDES
permit program for dam-induced water quality changes might violate
Congress' policy in section 101(g)380 of the CWA "that the authority
of each State to allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction
shall not be superseded, abrogated, or otherwise impaired by this
[Act]." Judge Wald stated that "[i]n light of these complexities,
which the NPDES program was not designed to handle, it may well
be that state area-wide water quality plans are the better regulatory
tool.''381 Justice O'Connor, however, considered section 101(g) in
Miccosukee Tribe and suggested that although it might preclude ap-
plication of the NPDES permit requirement to water distribution
programs if it "raise[d] the costs of water distribution prohibitively,"
"it may be that such permitting authority is necessary to protect wa-
ter quality, and that the States or EPA could control regulatory costs
by issuing general permits to point sources associated with water
distribution programs." 382 Section 101(g), therefore, should not pre-
clude application of the NPDES permit requirement to dams that are
components of state water distribution programs under general per-
mit requirements that do not impose "prohibitively costly" expenses
upon regulated dams.
377. See 68 Fed. Reg. 7184-85 (Feb. 12, 2003).
378. See id. at 162, 163, 164.
379. See id.
380. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g) (2000).
381. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 182.
382. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct.
1537, 1545 (2004).
[VOL. XVI
2004] S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST v. MICCOSUKEE TRIBE 79
Judge Wald concluded in Gorsuch, a decision decided prior to the
Supreme Court's 1984 Chevron decision, 383 that the courts should
defer to the EPA's position that dam-induced water quality changes
do not require a NPDES permit under the CWA because the EPA's
interpretation "is reasonable, not inconsistent with congressional
intent, and entitled to great deference."
384
Although Judge Wald's decision in Gorsuch follows the basic
standards of Chevron by stating a court must uphold an agency's
reasonable interpretation of a federal statute, 385 a court under Chev-
ron only defers to an agency's interpretation of a statute found to be
silent or ambiguous with respect to its application in a particular
386situation. If a court finds Congress' intent with respect to how a
statute is to be applied in a particular situation is clear from the stat-
ute's text and legislative history, the court is required by Chevron to
follow Congress' clear intent rather than the agency's interpreta-
tion.387
In her opinion for the court in Miccosukee Tribe, Justice O'Connor
did not find any ambiguity in how section 301(a) of the CWA ap-
plies to point sources that convey pollutants not generated by the
point source and to point sources that transfer water from one part of
a navigable water body to another part of that same water body. Jus-
tice O'Connor in Miccosukee Tribe, therefore, did not refer to, let
alone defer to, the EPA's "outside world" position in reaching these
holdings in Miccosukee Tribe. Because the EPA's "outside world'
position to which Judge Wald deferred in Gorsuch has been over-
ruled by Miccosukee Tribe, conveyances of "pollutants" from a point
source in a dam only can be exempted from the CWA's NPDES
permit requirement when either Miccosukee Tribe's second holding
is applicable or if the "unitary waters" approach is adopted by the
federal courts.
The Supreme Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision also modified
National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co.,388 which
held that the discharge of dead fish into a navigable body of water by
383. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
384. 693 F.2d at 183.
385. See id. at 171.
386. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
387. See id. at 842-43.
388. 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988).
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a pumped storage facility389 is not an "addition" of pollutants to a
navigable body of water that requires a NPDES permit under section
301(a) of the CWA, even though the fish were alive in the water
which the facility pumped from that same navigable body of water
into the facility's reservoir. The pump storage facility involved in
the Consumers Power Co. case pumps water from Lake Michigan,
containing live fish and other aquatic organisms, into a reservoir lo-
cated above a building housing the facility's reversible pumps/ tur-
bines. Water is released from the reservoir (which the Court of Ap-
peals found to be navigable waters and waters of the United States
under the CWA390) to generate electricity, by flowing through the
turbines. After the reservoir water flows through the turbines, it is
released back into Lake Michigan, with a substantial number of the
fish and other aquatic organisms in the intake water being returned
dead into Lake Michigan.
The Court of Appeals held in Consumers Power Co. that the intro-
duction of dead fish and other organisms into Lake Michigan, in the
water flowing through the facility's turbines, was not an "addition"
of pollutants to a navigable body of water within the meaning of sec-
tion 301(a) of the CWA that requires a NPDES permit. The court
based this holding in part upon EPA's position that an "addition" of
pollutants cannot occur under section 301(a) of the CWA unless a
point source physically introduces a pollutant into navigable waters
from the outside world, a position to which the court held it must
defer because it was a reasonable interpretation of the CWA.392 The
court reasoned that fish are a "pollutant" under section 502(6) of the
Act393 because they are "biological materials," both when living and
when dead,394 so the water withdrawn from Lake Michigan already
contains pollutants (live fish) and the facility's turbines do not intro-
duce any pollutants into Lake Michigan when they kill the fish and
return dead fish to Lake Michigan.
A panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated (in dic-
tum) however, that although parts of dead fish (fish skin, scales,
389. See supra notes 283, 304 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the characteristics of a pump storage facility.
390. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 862 F.2d at 589.
391. See id. at 581-82.
392. See id. at 584.
393. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000).
394. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n., 862 F.2d at 583, 585.
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bones and entrails) are "biological materials" within the CWA's
definition of "pollutants" (because they are waste materials or prod-
ucts that result from or have been transformed by human or indus-
trial activity or processes), live shell fish, their shells and the natural
chemicals and particulate biological matter emitted from them, are
not "biological materials" that are within the definition of "pollut-
ants" under the CWA.395 Under this Ninth Circuit approach, live
fish in a pumped storage facility's intake water are not a "pollutant"
under the CWA, but whole bodies of dead fish and parts of dead fish
discharged from the facility's turbines would be "pollutants" under
the CWA. This Ninth Circuit approach is preferable to the Consum-
ers Power Co. approach because the Ninth Circuit's approach im-
plicitly follows the principle "that there could be an addition of a
pollutant without an addition of material .... at least when an activ-
ity transforms some material [live fish] from a nonpollutant into a
pollutant [dead fish ("biological materials")] .'396 Under this Ninth
Circuit approach, an NPDES permit is required under Miccosukee
Tribe's first holding in order for the facility's turbines to convey
dead fish into a navigable body of water from which the fish were
withdrawn alive in the facility's intake water, because the killing of
fish by the facility's turbines generates or creates pollutants.
But, the dead fish do not constitute a "pollutant" under the CWA
simply because they add "pollution" to the water returned to Lake
Michigan. Although dead fish have a biological oxygen demand that
is "man-made or man-induced alteration of the ... physical ...
[and] biological ... integrity of the water" within the meaning of
the definition of "pollution" under section 502(19) of the CWA,3 97
biological oxygen demand is not listed as a "pollutant" under section
502(6) of the CWA. Consequently, killing live fish should not be
considered to introduce or create new pollutants within intake water
simply because the killing of fish adds biological oxygen demand to
the water.
395. Ass'n to Protect Hammersley v. Taylor Res., Inc., 299 F.3d
1007, 1017 (9th Cir. 2002); see N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity
Explor. Dev. Co., 325 F.2d 1155, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2003).
396. United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 335 (4th Cir. 2000),
denial of mot. to reconsider aff'd, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1874 (2004).
397. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2000).
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The holding in Consumers Power Co., that no NPDES permit is
required for the release of dead fish from a pumped storage facility's
turbines into Lake Michigan, should be considered to no longer be in
effect, since EPA's "outside world" position, upon which Consum-
ers Power Co. relied, has been invalidated by the Supreme Court's
398first holding in the Miccosukee Tribe case. Miccosukee Tribe's
first holding requires an NPDES permit for the pumped storage facil-
ity's release of dead fish from its point source turbines into Lake
Michigan if the dead fish are "pollutants" within the meaning of the
CWA. As noted above, both Consumers Power Co. and the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals agree dead fish are a "pollutant" under the
CWA because dead fish are "biological materials" within the mean-
ing of section 502(12) of the CWA.399 Consequently, the release of
dead fish from the facility's point source turbines into Lake Michi-
gan would require an NPDES permit under Miccosukee Tribe's first
holding even if the facility's pumps/turbines are not considered to
create or generate these pollutants when the turbines kill fish (which
would be the case if live fish in the reservoir and in the facility's
intake water are considered "pollutants").
The releases of dead fish from the pumped storage facility's point
source turbines into Lake Michigan may be exempt from the NPDES
permit requirement either under Miccosukee Tribe's second holding
(that an NPDES permit is not required to pump water from one part
of a navigable body of water into another part of the same water
400body), or under the "unitary waters" approach discussed in Micco-
sukee Tribe (if the "unitary waters" approach is adopted by the fed-
eral courts). 40 1 The releases of dead fish would be exempt from the
NPDES permit requirement under either of these two doctrines only
if the killing of fish by the facility's turbines is not considered to be
generation or creation of pollutants introduced into the water flowing
398. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe, 124 S. Ct.
1537, 1543 (2004). See supra notes 176-200 and accompanying text
for further discussion of this holding.
399. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
400. 124 S. Ct. at 1545; See also supra notes 201-47 and accompa-
nying text.
401. 124 S. Ct. at 1543-45; See also supra notes 248-61 and ac-
companying text (analyzing the "unitary waters" approach).
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through the turbines and released into Lake Michigan.4 °2 As noted
earlier, under the Ninth Circuit's approach, the killing of fish by the
facility's turbines would be considered to be generation or creation
of pollutants, but under the Consumers Power Co. approach the fa-
cility's turbines are not considered to generate or create pollutants
when the turbines kill fish.
For purposes of Miccosukee Tribe's second holding, the pumped
storage facility's operation must be considered to involve two sepa-
rate transfers of water- first, the pumping of water to the reservoir
(which Consumers Power Co. held to be a navigable body of water
under the Clean Water Act 403) and second, the transfer of water from
the reservoir into Lake Michigan after passing through the facility's
turbines.4°4 The transfer of water would not be considered to be ex-
empt from the NPDES permit requirement under Miccosukee Tribe's
second holding as a transfer of water from one part of Lake Michi-
gan to another part of Lake Michigan, both because the water in
Lake Michigan is first transferred to a reservoir that is itself a navi-
gable body of water under the Clean Water Act and because Micco-
sukee Tribe's second holding probably is inapplicable when there is
an intervening commercial or industrial use of transferred water.
40 5
Consequently, the transfer of water from the facility's reservoir
into Lake Michigan would not be exempt from the NPDES permit
requirement unless the reservoir is considered part of Lake Michigan
402. See supra notes 206-07 and 249-53 and accompanying text
(discussing this limitation on Miccosukee Tribe's second holding
and on the "unitary waters' approach).
403. 862 F.2d 580, 589 (6th Cir. 1988).
404. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text (discussing
this analytical approach).
405. Supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text discuss these pos-
sible limitations of Miccosukee Tribe's second holding. The second
holding also might not be applicable under the Ninth Circuit position
that fish that have been killed by humans are "pollutants," because
under that position the killing of fish by the facility's turbines is con-
sidered to generate or create pollutants that are added to the water
withdrawn from Lake Michigan and then returned to Lake Michigan
after flowing through the facility's turbines. Miccosukee Tribe's
second holding does not apply when the point source transferring
water adds pollutants to the transferred water. Supra notes 206-07
and accompanying text.
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and the killing of fish by the facility's turbines is not considered the
"addition" of pollutants to the water flowing through the turbines.
The reservoir would be considered a part of Lake Michigan under
the hydrologic connection test only if the flow of water from the res-
ervoir into Lake Michigan through the facility's turbines is consid-
ered to satisfy the test despite the fact that the hydrologic connection
between the reservoir and dam is a human-made connection, not a
natural, hydrologic connection. The reservoir and Lake Michigan,
however, should not be considered part of the same navigable body
of water either under the biological/ecosystem test (because the man-
made reservoir probably has different ecological and biological
characteristics than Lake Michigan) or under the "but for/causation"
test (because water in Lake Michigan would not flow naturally uphill
into the pump storage facility's reservoir and then back into Lake
Michigan through the facility's turbines).4 °6
As an additional ground for its judgment, the Court of Appeals in
the Consumers Power Co. case based its decision upon EPA's policy
that an NPDES permit is not required for dam-induced water quality
changes, on the grounds a pumped storage facility is a dam for pur-
poses of the CWA 407 and this EPA policy is a reasonable interpreta-
408tion of the CWA. The court, however, did not support this alter-
native holding with any evidence that EPA intended pumped storage
facilities to be covered by its policy on NPDES permits for dams or
that EPA considered fish killings by either dams or pumped storage
facilities when it adopted this policy, although the court did note that
EPA "has never required an NPDES permit for turbine generating
water releases at thirty-four other pumped storage facilities" or for
hydroelectric storage dams "whose 'turbine generating water re-
leases also may contain both dead and live aquatic organisms' . . .
,,409 The court in Consumers Power Co. agreed with Judge Wald's
view in Gorsuch "that generally water quality changes caused by the
existence of dams and other similar structures were intended by
406. See supra notes 214, 246-47 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the biological/ecosystem test); supra notes 163-66, 217-21 and
242-45 and accompanying text (discussing the but for/causation
test).
407. 862 F.2d at 589-90.
408. Id. at 585.
409. Id. at 587.
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Congress to be regulated under the 'nonpoint source' category of
pollution."
410
As discussed earlier, however, EPA's "outside world" position,
which is the basis for EPA's position that an NPDES permit is not
required for releases of water into a river downstream of a storage
dam from the reservoir behind the dam and the holding in Gorsuch
that dam-induced water quality changes do not require an NPDES
permit, have been overruled by the first holding in Miccosukee
Tribe. Consumers Power Co., therefore, is subject to similar modi-
fications under Miccosukee Tribe. Consequently, an NPDES permit
is required for a pumped storage facility to release dead fish from a
point source turbine into a navigable body of water.411
EPA and the states have authority, however, under the Supreme
Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision to issue general section 402
NPDES permits to categories of point sources for specified regions
or geographical areas, and EPA and the states, therefore, have the
authority to establish separate general section 402 NPDES permits
for different categories of dams, including general NPDES permits
for the category of hydroelectric storage dams and separate general
NPDES permits for the category of pumped storage electricity-
generating facilities. These general NPDES permits can require
compliance with best management practices effluent limitation re-
quirements rather than with numerical effluent limitations.
410. Id. at 588.
411. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is re-
quired to impose fish protection requirements upon a hydroelectric
power storage dam or pump storage facility when building and oper-
ating licenses are issued by the FERC to such a facility under the
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(j); see also Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n
v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 590 (6th Cir. 1988). In ac-
cordance with 33 U.S.C. § 1369(a)(1), EPA therefore needs to coor-
dinate with the FERC the NPDES permit provisions for such a facil-
ity that are designed to protect fish in the facility's intake water, to
avoid duplicative or contradictory requirements.
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V. "RE-DEPOSITS" INTO A WETLAND OR OTHER NAVIGABLE BODY
OF WATER OF SOIL AND VEGETATION REMOVED OR EXCAVATED
FROM THE BorroM OF THAT SAME WETLAND OR BODY OF WATER
The Supreme Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision has not modified
court of appeals' decisions holding that an "addition" of pollutants
into a navigable body of water occurs for purposes of section 301(a)
of the CWA both where soil or vegetation on the bottom of a navi-
gable body of water are dug up and "re-deposited" back into "adja-
cent" areas of that same body of water4 12 and where soil or vegeta-
tion on a wetland (that is a navigable body of water under the
CWA413) are dug up or excavated and "re-deposited" back into that
same wetland. Under this approach, an "addition" of pollutants
412. United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1506
(11 th Cir. 1985) (addition of pollutants into a navigable body of wa-
ter held to occur when propellers of a tug boat, a point source, cut
into the bottom of that body of water, uprooting sea grass and dig-
ging up sediment on the bottom and depositing bottom sediment on
adjacent sea grasses), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 481
U.S. 1034 (1987), readopted in relevant part, 848 F.2d 1133 (11th
Cir. 1988); Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1285 (9th Cir. 1990)
(re-deposit into a stream of material excavated from the bed of that
stream during placer mining held to be an "addition" of pollutants
into stream under Clean Water Act); Greenfield Mills, Inc. v. Mack-
lin, 361 F.3d 934, 948-49 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Sinclair
Oil Co., 767 F. Supp. 200 (D.Mont. 1990).
413. As discussed supra note 70, certain wetlands are considered
navigable waters under the Clean Water Act under Corps of Engi-
neers regulations published at 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2004). Under this
regulation, a wetland can have saturated ground water without any
visible surface water. Land-clearing activities that occur on this type
of wetland that has no visible surface water may be considered to
"discharge" pollutants into that wetland (a navigable body of water)
when soil and vegetation in that wetland are dug up and re-deposited
back into wetland. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh,
772 F.2d 897, 912, 924 (5th Cir. 1983).
414. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc., 772 F.2d at 920-25 (re-
depositing into a wetland parts of trees and vegetation that were cut
in and removed from that same wetland held to be the addition of
pollutants into a navigable body of water, where more than de mini-
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may be considered to occur even though some period of time may
pass between the removal of the materials and their re-deposit,
15
and even though the "re-deposited" materials only remain on the
wetland or in the water body temorarily and are ultimately removed
from the wetland or water body.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision
should be interpreted as having overruled federal court decisions
41 7
that have held there is no "addition" of pollutants into a navigable
body of water when "incidental fallback" of soil or vegetation occurs
mis disturbances were involved); United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d
331, 337 (4th Cir. 2000) (piling excavated dirt, dug up from a ditch
in a protected wetland, alongside that ditch (a practice known as
sidecasting), held to be the addition of pollutants into a navigable
body of water), denial of mot. to reconsider aff'd, 332 F.3d 698 (4th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1874 (2004); Borden Ranch
P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 261 F.3d 810, 813
(9th Cir. 2001) (dragging long metal prongs pulled behind a tractor
or bulldozer through the soil of a protected wetland (a practice
known as "deep ripping"), resulting in soil that is ripped up being re-
deposited nearby in that same wetland, held to be the addition of
pollutants into a navigable body of water), aff'd per curiam by
equally divided Court, 537 U.S. 99 (2002); United States v. Bay-
Houston Towing Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 596 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (side-
casting and discing (having a disc cut into ground of a protected wet-
land, with some soil riding on the front of the disc being re-deposited
in other areas), held to be the "addition" of pollutants); United States
v. Hummel, 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 5656, *26 (N.D. 111. 2003) (inten-
tional re-deposit of dirt and vegetation, excavated from trenches dug
in a wetland and sidecast alongside the trenches, back into the
trenches to cover up sewer pipes laid in the trenches, held to be the
"addition" of pollutants to the wetland under the CWA).
415. Bay-Houston Towing Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
416. Id. at 607.
417. American Mining Cong. v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1997), aff'd sub nom., Nat'l Min-
ing Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399
(D.C. Cir. 1998), mot. to compel compliance with court's injunction
denied, 120 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2000); Nat'l Ass'n of Home
Builders v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 311 F. Supp. 2d 91
(D.D.C. 2004).
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into a protected wetland during mechanized land-clearing, ditch-
digging, channelization, excavation, or dredging activity (with "inci-
dental fallback" defined as a small amount of material that falls back
to substantially the same part of that wetland from which it was ini-
tially removed from the wetland during such activity, where the fall-
back is incidental to the removal activity and not a purposeful re-
deposit4 18).
"Re-deposits" of soil or vegetation have been found to be the "ad-
dition" of pollutants into a navigable body of water in a number of
circumstances, including where parts of trees and vegetation, that
were cut near the surface of a protected wetland, were raked (by
bulldozers (point sources) outfitted with rake blades) into low areas
or buried in holes (leveling the surface of the wetland, and involving
more than de minimis disturbances).419 In addition, an "addition" of
pollutants has been found under section 301(a) where dirt excavated
from a ditch dug in a protected wetland (by a backhoe, front-end
track loader and a bulldozer) is piled up along the sides of the ditch
(a practice know as "sidecasting"),42 ° where soil in a wetland is
ripped up by long metal prongs pulled behind a tractor or bulldozer
(point sources), resulting in the ripped-up soil being moved and re-
deposited in some other part of the wetland (a practice called "deep-
ripping"),42' and where propellers of a tugboat (a point source) cut
into the bottom of a navigable body of water, uprooting sea grass
and dislodging sediment on the bottom and depositing the uprooted
vegetation and dislodged sediment on adjacent sea grass beds on the
bottom of that same water body.422
418. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 102. See
infra notes 439-511 and accompanying text.
419. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc., 772 F.2d at 920-25.
420. United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 2000),
denial of mot. to reconsider aff'd, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1874 (2004).
421. Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
261 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd per curiam by equally di-
vided court, 537 U.S. 99 (2002).
422. United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d 1501, 1506
(11 th Cir. 1985), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 481 U.S.
1034 (1987), readopted in relevant part, 848 F.2d 1133 (11th Cir.
1988).
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The principle that an "addition" of pollutants occurs when there is
a "re-deposit" into a navigable body of water or a protected wetland
of soil or vegetation removed from the bottom of that same naviga-
ble body of water or from that wetland (the "re-deposit" principle)
has been supported by one court on the ground that under the
CWA's definition of a "discharge of a pollutant," an "addition of a
pollutant" does "not [have to] involve the introduction of material
brought in from somewhere else., 4 23 This reasoning essentially is
one relying upon the plain text or meaning of the CWA's definition
of a "discharge of a pollutant."
United States v. Deaton424 supported the "re-deposit" principle in
part upon the ground that re-deposited material can have adverse
impacts upon protected wetlands:
In deciding to classify dredged spoil as a pollutant, Con-
gress determined that plain dirt, once excavated from wa-
ters of the United States, could not be re-deposited into
those waters without causing harm to the environment.
Indeed, several seemingly benign substances like rock,
sand cellar dirt, and biological materials are specifically
designated as pollutants under the Clean Water Act ....
Congress had good reason to be concerned about the rein-
troduction of these materials into the waters of the United
States, including wetlands that are a part of those waters.
When a wetland is dredged . . . and the dredged spoil is re-
deposited in the water or wetland, pollutants that had been trapped
may be suddenly released. Even in a pristine wetland or body of
water, the discharge of dredged spoil, rock, sand, and biological ma-
terial threatens to increase the amount of suspended sediments,
harming aquatic life.
These effects are no less harmful when the dredged spoil is re-
deposited in the same wetland from which it was excavated. The
effects on hydrology and the environment are the same. Surely
Congress would not have used the word "addition" (in "addition of
any pollutants") to prohibit the discharge of dredged spoil in a wet-
423. Borden Ranch P'ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
261 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd per curiam by equally di-
vided court, 537 U.S. 99 (2002).
424. 209 F.3d at 331.
90 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
land, while intending to prohibit such pollution only when the
dredged material comes from outside the wetland.425
Some of the other courts that have recognized this "re-deposit"
principle also have emphasized this principle's application to re-
deposits in a wetland is consistent with Congress' recognition that
protecting wetlands is an important means of reaching the goal under
section 101(a) of the CWA4 26 to "'restore and maintain the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters.' 427 The re-
deposit into a wetland of plain dirt dug up from that wetland can
"destroy the ecology of a wetland '428 and "significantly alter the
character of the wetlands and limit the vital ecological functions
served by the [wetlands]."429
In United States v. Deaton,430 a case involving the re-deposit of
soil excavated from a wetland back into that same wetland during
the process of digging a ditch through that wetland ("sidecasting"),
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the arguments by the
Deatons (the owners of that wetland) that an "addition" of pollutants
within the meaning of CWA section 502(12) requires "an 'introduc-
tion of new material into the area, or an increase in the amount of a
type of material which is already present,' ' '43' and that a re-deposit
of excavated dirt cannot be an addition of a pollutant because it "re-
sults in no net increase in the amount of material present in the wet-
land. 432 The Fourth Circuit rejected these arguments in Deaton on
the grounds that:
425. Id. at 336 (citation omitted).
426. 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2000).
427. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc., 715 F.2d at 923 (5th Cir.
1983) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a)).
428. Borden Ranch P'ship., 261 F.3d at 814.
429. Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc., 715 F.2d at 923.
430. 209 F.3d at 331.
431. Id. at 335 (quoting United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 259
(4th Cir. 1997) (Niemeyer, J.)).
432. Id. at 335. This argument was supported by the statement by
Judge Stephen F. Williams, in Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1998), that
"... we fail to see how there can be an addition of dredged material
when there is no addition of material." See also infra notes 487-90
and accompanying text for analysis of this statement by Judge Wil-
liams.
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Contrary to what the Deatons suggest, the statute does
not prohibit the addition of material; it prohibits "the ad-
dition of any pollutant." The idea that there could be an
addition of a pollutant without an addition of material
seems to us entirely unremarkable, at least when an activ-
ity transforms some material from a nonpollutant into a
pollutant, as occurred here. In the course of digging a
ditch across the Deaton property, the contractor removed
earth and vegetable matter from the wetland. Once it was
removed, that material became "dredged spoil," a statu-
tory pollutant and a type of material that up until then
was not present on the Deaton property. It is of no conse-
quence that what is now dredged spoil was previously
present on the same property in the less threatening form
of dirt and vegetation in an undisturbed state. What is
important is that once that material was excavated from
the wetland, its re-deposit in that same wetland added a
pollutant where none had been before. (See 33 U.S.C. §
1362(6), (12)). Thus, even under the definition of "addi-
tion" (that is, "something added") offered by the
Deatons, sidecasting adds a pollutant that was not present
before.433
This reasoning, based upon the principle that a re-deposit of mate-
rials can involve an activity that changes a nonpollutant into a pol-
lutant, is consistent with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' recog-
nition that human activity can transform fish and shell fish (which
when alive in a navigable body of water are not considered by the
Ninth Circuit to be "pollutants" under the CWA) into "pollutants' (as
"biological materials") under the Act when the shellfish or fish are
killed and transformed into carcasses, heads, tails or internal resi-
dues.4 3 4
433. 209 F.3d at 335-36.
434. Ass'n to Protect Hammersley, Eld & Totten Inlets (APHETI)
v. Taylor Res. Inc., 299 F.3d 1007, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2002); N.
Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Explor. & Dev. Co., 325 F.2d 1155,
1162-63 (9th Cir. 2003); see supra notes 395-96 and accompanying
text (this principle that an "addition" of pollutants to a navigable
body of water occurs, when live fish or shellfish in a body of water
are removed and killed and then dead fish are re-deposited back into
that body of water is discussed); see supra notes 392-94 and accom-
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The "re-deposit" principle, which considers the "re-deposit" into a
navigable body of water or wetland of soil or vegetation removed
from the bottom of that navigable body of water or from that wetland
to be an "addition" of pollutants into that body of water or wetland,
is not inconsistent with the holding by the Supreme Court in Micco-
sukee Tribe, that "pumping water from one [part of a water body]
into ... [an]other [part of the same water body] cannot constitute an
'addition' of pollutants." 435 There is no inconsistency between this
holding in Miccosukee Tribe and the "re-deposit principle" because
the Supreme Court's holding in Miccosukee Tribe only addressed the
pumping of water (containing suspended or dissolved pollutants)
from one part of a navigable water body to another part of that same
water body, not the transfer back into a navigable water body or wet-
land of soil and vegetation dug up from the bottom of that water
body or from that wetland (as is the case in situations involving the
436re-deposit principle).4!
As discussed earlief, the "re-deposit" principle, in addition to not
conflicting with the Supreme Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision,
also is supported by the plain text and meaning of the definition of a
"discharge of a pollutant" in section 502(12) of the CWA 4 37 and by
the CWA's goals of protecting wetland ecosystems and the chemi-
cal, physical and biological integrity of the nation's waters. Conse-
quently, federal courts should continue to follow the "re-deposit"
principle, requiring a section 404 permit for a point source's "re-
deposit" back into a protected wetland or other navigable body of
water of soil, vegetation, or other dredged or fill material removed
from that same wetland or water body. These courts also should
require a section 404 permit for the "incidental fallback" of soil,
vegetation or other dredged or fill material into a navigable body of
water or protected wetland that occurs during land-clearing activi-
panying text (the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Nat'l Wild-
life Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 585 (6th Cir.
1988), that both live fish and dead fish are "biological materials" and
"pollutants" under the Clean Water Act's definition of "pollutant" in
section 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6) (2000), of the Act).
435. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians,
124 S. Ct. 1537, 1545 (2004); see also supra notes 201-47 and ac-
companying text.
436. See also supra notes 203, 211-13 and accompanying text.
437. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).
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ties, digging of ditches, channelization, dredging or excavation, al-
though the Corps and states (with approved section 404 permit pro-
grams) may exercise their authority under section 404 to issue gen-
eral permits for certain categories of point source "re-deposits" and
"incidental fallback. '4 38 As is the case with individual section 404
permits, such section 404 permits should require the permitted dis-
charges to minimize harm to aquatic ecosystems.
VI. INCIDENTAL FALLBACK OF SOIL AND VEGETATION
Prior to the Supreme Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision, several
lower federal courts439 held that "incidental fallback" of material
back into a navigable body of water or protected wetland, during the
course of mechanized land-clearing activities, digging of ditches,
channelization, excavation or dredging, is not the "addition of pol-
lutants" under section 301(a) of the CWA. These cases based this
holding primarily on the ground that Congress intended section
301(a) only to regulate a point source's addition of pollutants into a
navigable body of water, and not to also regulate land-clearing ac-
tivities, digging of ditches, channelization, excavating, and dredging
in wetlands or other navigable bodies of water that only incidentally
result in small amounts of soil or vegetation falling back to essen-
tially the same place from which the material was removed.440
These courts reasoned that if "incidental fallback" from such activi-
ties is not excluded from the CWA's definition of a "discharge of a
pollutant," the permit and effluent limitation requirements of section
301(a) of the CWA would be extended, contrary to the intent of
Congress, to all land-clearing activities, channelization, digging of
ditches, excavation, and dredging in protected wetlands and other
navigable bodies of water, because these land-clearing and excava-
438. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text (discussing the
authority of the Corps and the states to issue general section 404
permits).
439. American Mining Cong. v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267 (D.D.C. 1997), aff'd sub nom., Nat'l Min-
ing Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399
(D.C. Cir. 1998), motion to compel compliance with court's injunc-
tion denied, 120 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2000).
440. American Mining Cong., 951 F. Supp. at 272-78.
94 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
tion activities almost always result in small amounts of soil or vege-
tation falling back into the same wetland or navigable body of water
from which they were removed.44 1
Other lower federal courts, however, have held that the addition of
even the smallest amount of pollutants into a navigable body of wa-
ter is subject to the requirements of section 301(a) 4 2 and that neither
the courts, EPA, nor the Corps can exempt from section 301(a) re-
quirements a discharge of pollutants subject to section 301(a).4 3
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision did
not exempt, from the CWA's definition of "discharge of a pollutant,"
"additions" back into a wetland or other navigable body of water of
small amounts of soil, vegetation, or other pollutants removed from a
nearby part or same general area of that same wetland or navigable
body of water.444
Consequently, the Miccosukee Tribe decision should be interpreted
as requiring a section 404 permit for "incidental fallback" of soil,
vegetation, or other dredged or fill material from a point source en-
gaged in land-clearing, ditch digging, channelization, excavation, or
dredging - although the Corps or a state (with an approved section
404 permit program) may exercise its discretion under section 404 to
issue general section 404 permits for categories of point source ac-
tivities discharging "incidental fallback" into protected wetlands or
other navigable bodies of water, which require the permitted dis-
charge to minimize harm to aquatic ecosystems.
The issue of "incidental fallback" has been almost continuously
addressed since at least 1986 by the Corps (which has authority un-
der section 404 of the CWA4 to issue permits for the addition of
dredged or fill materials into navigable waters from a point source)
and by federal courts. In 1986, the Corps issued a regulation 44 6 that
defined, for purposes of section 404 of the CWA, the term "dis-
charge of dredged material" to mean "any addition of dredged mate-
rial into the waters of the United States," but not including "de
441. Id. at 270 (dredging and excavation of navigable waters is
regulated under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. § 403, by the Corps).
442. Supra note 28-29, 46 and accompanying text.
443. Supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
444. Supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
445. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
446. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,232 (Nov. 13, 1986).
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minimis incidental soil movement occurring during normal dredging
operations. ' 447 This regulation did not define "normal dredging op-
erations." The Corps' preamble to this regulation noted section 404
only directs the Corps to regulate the discharge of dredged materials,
not dredging activity itself, but pointed out dredging operations can-
not be performed without some fallback of dredged materials. The
Corps therefore would be regulating dredging under section 404,
contrary to the intent of Congress, if fallback was included within
the definition of "discharge of dredged materials." 448 This 1986 rule,
however, stated "sidecasting" (the placing of material excavated
from a ditch along the side of the ditch) is considered to be a regu-
lated "discharge of dredged material." 449
In the 1990's however, the Corps changed direction, taking the po-
sition that the Corps had authority under section 404 of the CWA to
regulate any re-deposits of materials resulting from land-clearing
activity or excavation. First, in 1990, the Corps issued a guidance
letter450 "stating its 'position that mechanized land clearing activities
in jurisdictional wetlands result in a re-deposition of soil that is sub-
ject to regulation under section 404. ' '' 451 Then, in response to litiga-
45245tion, the Corps in 1993 adopted a new rule453 (referred to as the
Tulloch Rule) that revised the Corps' 1986 definition of "discharge
447. A regulation, 42 Fed. Reg. 37, 145 (July 19, 1977), issued in
1977 by the Corps, had defined "discharge of dredged material" as
"any addition of dredged material into the water of the United
States," with a few limited exceptions.
448. 51 Fed. Reg. 41, 210 (1986).
449. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
145 F.3d 1399, 1402 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
450. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs Regulatory Guidance
Letter 90-5 (July 18, 1990).
451. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 311 F. Supp.2d 91, 94 (D.D.C. 2004).
452. N.C. Wildlife Fed'n v. Tulloch, Civil No. C-90-713-CIV-5-
BO (E.D.N.C.) (settled, with the Corps and EPA agreeing to revise
the definition of the term "discharge of dredged material" to include
re-deposit of dredged material, but to exclude de minimis soil
movement that does not destroy or degrade any area of waters of the
United States); see American Mining Cong. v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 269-70 (D.D.C. 1997).
453. 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,035 (Aug. 25, 1993).
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of dredged material." The new Tulloch Rule removed the de mini-
mis exception from the Corps' definition of "discharge of dredged
material" and expanded the definition to include "any addition, in-
cluding any re-deposit, of dredged material, including excavated
material, into waters of the United States which is incidental to any
activity, including mechanized land clearing, ditching, channeliza-
tion, or other excavation."
454
The Tulloch Rule, however, included a limited exception from the
definition of "discharge of dredged material" for "any incidental ad-
dition, including re-deposit, of dredged material associated with any
activity" that the Corps finds would not have the effect of destroying
or degrading (adversely affecting in more than a de minimis or in-
consequential manner) an area of waters of the United States.455
This exemption focuses "on the environmental effects of the activity
resulting in the discharge, rather than on the discharge itself. '456 In
support of their authority to promulgate the Tulloch Rule, the Corps
454. The Corps at the same time in 1993 also promulgated a rule,
now codified at 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(3)(ii) (2003), that states that
"discharge of dredged materials" does not include "[a]ctivities that
involve only the cutting or removing of vegetation above the ground
(e.g., mowing, rotary cutting, and chainsawing) where the activity
neither substantially disturbs the root system nor involves mecha-
nized pushing, dragging, or other similar activities that re-deposit
excavated soil material." This rule is in accord with the holding in
Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634, 647 (5th Cir. 1983),
that a section 404 permit is not required for the cutting of trees and
vegetation on a wetland.
455. This exemption provision, originally codified in 1999 at 33
C.F.R. § 328.3(d)(3)(I) (2003), now is codified at 33 C.F.R. §
323.2(d)(4)(I) (2004). EPA, which under 33 U.S.C. §§ 1344(b)(1),
(c) (2000), also is involved in administering the section 404 permit
program, issued a similar regulation. 40 C.F.R. § 232.2(l)(iii) (2003).
Although the Corps does not issue section 404 permits for its
own civil works projects and navigation maintenance and improve-
ment activities, 33 C.F.R. § 336.1(a), the Tulloch Rule "effectively
exempts" the Corps' own dredging projects, to maintain or improve
the navigability of waters of the United States, from the section 404
permit requirements. American Mining Cong., 951 F. Supp. at 270
n.3 (D.D.C. 1997).
456. American Mining Cong., at 275 n.18.
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and EPA contended they always have had authority to regulate inci-
dental fallback under section 301(a) of the Clean Water Act, but
prior to adoption of the Tulloch Rule they had simply chosen not to
exercise that authority for de minimis discharges, pursuant to the de
minimis doctrine (a judicially-recognized doctrine which gives an
administrative agency "the authority to provide exemptions from
regulation when the burdens of regulation yield, at most, a trivial
value," provided the agency would not "exceed the scope of their
authority when regulation would be beneficial. ' 457)
But, because federal courts have held Congress' intent under sec-
tion 301(a) is "to require permits in any situation of pollution from
point sources ' 458 and because section 301(a) establishes a "zero dis-
charge" standard in the absence of a required permit,459 exemptions
from section 301(a) only can be created by Congress 460 and cannot
be created by the Corps, EPA, a state, or a federal court.461 Further-
more, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Miccosukee Tribe does not in-
dicate de minimis discharges or additions of pollutants into navigable
waters are exempt (or can be exempted) from the regulatory re-
quirements of section 301(a) of the CWA.462 Consequently, neither
the Corps nor the federal courts have the authority to exempt de
minimis discharges or additions of dredged or fill material or other
pollutants from section 301(a)'s permit and other regulatory re-
quirements.
The 1993 Tulloch Rule included small volume incidental fallback
associated with excavation and land-clearing within the definition of
"discharge of dredged material" unless the person engaging in the
activity convinced the Corps the activity would have only minimal
457. Id. at 271 n.5 (D.D.C. 1997).
458. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1383
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
459. Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp. 78 F.3d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir.
1996); See supra notes 28-29, 46 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of these principles.
460. N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Explor. & Dev. Co., 325
F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003).
461. Id.; Costle, 568 F.2d at 1374, 1377, 1382; see also supra notes
115-17 and accompanying text.
462. Supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
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463
adverse effects on wetlands and other navigable waters. Because
incidental fallback "is a practically inescapable byproduct" of
mechanized land clearing, digging ditches, channelization, dredging
and other excavation activities, the Tulloch Rule effectively required
a section 404 permit for almost all of these activities when per-
formed in wetlands or another navigable body of water.464
In 1997, a District Court, in American Mining Congress v. United
465States Army Corps of Engineers, held the Tulloch Rule's inclusion
of incidental fallback within the definition of "discharge of dredged
material" was facially invalid and enjoined the Corps and EPA na-
tionwide from applying or enforcing that part of the rule. The Tul-
loch Rule was held to be invalid on the grounds that the Corps ex-
ceeded its statutory authority under the CWA in promulgating the
Tulloch Rule because Congress did not intend "incidental fallback"
(defined as fallback of small volumes of soil and other material to
substantially the same place where the initial removal of soil oc-
curred, during land-clearing, ditching, channelization, excavation or
dredging, which is incidental to excavation activity466) to be consid-
ered an "addition of pollutants" to navigable waters that can be regu-
lated under sections 301(a) and 404 of the CWA.467 Such incidental
fallback was held to be distinguishable from a "re-deposit" of exca-
vated material that can constitute an "addition of pollutants" to navi-
gable waters,468 although the Court of Appeals, affirming the District
Court, observed the CWA "sets out no bright line between incidental
fallback on the one hand and regulable re-deposits on the other
hand. 469
Although the District Court stated in American Mining Congress
that the Tulloch Rule's exemption of de minimis incidental additions
and re-deposits associated with an activity that will not destroy or
463. American Mining Cong. v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 951 F. Supp. 267, 270 (D.D.C. 1997), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l
Mining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d
1399, 1403 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
464. Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 145 F.3d at 1403.
465. 951 F. Supp. at 278.
466. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 311 F. Supp. 2d 91, 102 (D.D.C. 2004).
467. American Mining Cong., 951 F. Supp. at 272-78.
468. Nat'l Mining Ass'n, 145 F.3d at 1405-06.
469. Id. at 1405.
[VOL. XVI
2004] S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST. v. MICCOSUKEE TRIBE 99
degrade an area of a water body was impermissibly based upon the
adverse effects of the entire activity resulting in the discharge, 470 that
exemption provision has not been either repealed or amended by the
Corps.471
This exemption provision probably is invalid because only Con-
gress can exempt from section 301(a) a discharge of pollutants sub-
ject to section 301(a) requirements.472 Furthermore, the Supreme
Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision applies the requirements of sec-
tion 301(a) to all point source conveyances of pollutants, no matter
how small the discharge and regardless of how close the discharge is
to the place the pollutants in the discharge were removed from a wa-
ter body.473 Congress intended to require permits "in any situation
of pollution from point sources' 474 and neither EPA nor the Corps
can exempt from section 301(a) point source discharges of pollutants
subject to the requirements of that section.475 Although such non-
harmful de minimis additions and re-deposits cannot be exempted
from section 301(a) requirements, the Corps of Engineers and the
states can regulate such de minimis discharges under general section
404 permits issued under section 404(e) of the CWA 76 (these gen-
eral permits must require a permitted discharge to minimize adverse
impacts to the aquatic environment).
One of the reasons in support of the District Court's holding in
American Mining Congress that "Congress did not intend to cover
incidental fallback under section 404" is that "section 404 refers to
'discharges' but does not refer to the regulation of excavation or
dredging activities; the fact that Congress has specifically referred to
excavation activities elsewhere [section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
470. American Mining Cong., 951 F. Supp. at 275 n.18.
471. The exemption provision, originally codified in 1999 at 33
C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(3)(i) (2003), now is codified at 33 C.F.R. §
323.2(d)(4)(i). This provision is discussed supra notes 455-56 and
accompanying text.
472. N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Explor. & Dev. Co., 325
F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003).
473. Supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
474. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1381
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
475. Id. at 1374, 1377; N. Plains Res. Council, 325 F.3d at 1164.
476. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2000).
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Appropriation Act of 1899 [RHAA]477] is evidence that Congress
did not intend to regulate these activities under section 404., 4 71 This
reasoning mistakenly is based, however, upon analysis of section
404 (which authorizes the Corps to "issue permits .. .for the dis-
charge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at speci-
fied disposal sites," 479 that otherwise would be unlawful discharges
in violation of section 301(a)), rather than upon a determination of
whether "incidental fallback" is an "addition" of pollutants from a
point source into navigable waters subject to the requirements of
section 301(a) (which include a section 404 permit). The fact that
the Corps' permit-issuing authority under section 404 only extends
to the "discharge of dredged or fill material," and not to drainage,
digging of ditches, excavating, dredging, and channelization, does
not mean that "incidental fallback" is not an "addition" of pollutants
into navigable waters from a point source under section 301(a) of the
CWA.
The District Court's invalidation of the Tulloch Rule in American
Mining Congress also was premised upon the proposition that both
the CWA and section 10 of the RHAA would concurrently regulate
dredging/excavating activities if "incidental fallback" resulting from
dredging activities was subject to regulation under section 301(a) of
the CWA (as the point source "addition" of pollutants into navigable
waters). 480 This reasoning, however, fails to recognize there is no
concurrent regulation if the CWA, in addition to regulating the dis-
posal of dredged spoil, regulates only "incidental fallback" resulting
from dredging or excavating, while the RHAA regulates the dredg-
477. Id. § 403.
478. Am. Mining Cong. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
951 F. Supp. 267, 272 (D.D.C. 1997), aff'd sub nom., Nat'l Mining
Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399 (D.C.
Cir. 1998).
479. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
480. Section 404 of the CWA and section 10 of the RHAA would
not exactly duplicate each other's regulatory coverage, because
"navigable waters" is defined more broadly under the Clean Water
Act than under section 10 of the RHAA, Nat'l Mining Ass'n v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir.
1998); see supra note 70 for discussion of the definition of "naviga-
ble waters" under the Clean Water Act.
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ing and excavating itself. As one other court481 has recognized, un-
der this dual regulatory approach, the Corps under the CWA would
regulate only the discharge involved in the "incidental fallback," but
not the dredging or excavating activity itself. The fact that this ap-
proach would mean most dredging, excavating, ditch-digging, chan-
nelization and land-clearing activities could not take place without a
section 404 permit for "incidental fallback" does not mean incidental
fallback should therefore be exempted from the requirements of sec-
tion 301(a) and 404. Any harshness from this approach could be
alleviated through the use of general section 404 permits as an alter-
native to a requirement of individual section 404 permits for "inci-
dental fallback."
A second reason in support of the District Court's holding in
American Mining Congress is that legislative history of the CWA in
1972 and 1977 indicates "Congress understood 'discharge of
dredged material' to mean open water disposal of material removed
during the digging or deepening of navigable waterways .... at an-
other location, [thus] . . . involv[ing] the moving of material from
one place to another [as an] understanding of 'discharge' [that] ex-
cludes the small-volume incidental discharge that accompanies ex-
cavation and land-clearing activities. ' 482 None of this cited legisla-
tive history, however, refers either specifically or even implicitly to
"incidental fallback." This second reason was further supported by
the reference in section 404(a) to the discharge of dredged or fill
material at "specific disposal sites," which was viewed as "con-
vey[ing] Congress' understanding that discharges would result in the
relocation of material from one site to another."
483
This reasoning, however, like the first reasoning for the invalida-
tion of the Tulloch Rule, is incorrectly premised upon analysis of
section 404 (which authorizes the Corps to issue permits for dredged
481. Reid v. Marsh, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 1342, 1984
WL 178396 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
482. American Mining Cong., 951 F. Supp. at 273. The District
Court in this case further explained that "[i]ncidental fallback asso-
ciated with excavation or landclearing does not add material or move
it from one location to another; some material simply falls back at
the same general location from which it was removed." Id.
483. Id. at 273-74 (footnote omitted). The District Court later in its
opinion essentially repeated this argument, albeit in a different man-
ner. Id. at 278.
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or fill materials) rather than upon analysis of section 301(a). This
second reason asserts that a section 404 permit authorizing a dis-
charge of dredged material must "result in the relocation of material
from one site to another," 484 but the Tulloch Rule results in there
being two "specified disposal sites" for excavation sites: the site of
excavation where the "incidental fallback" occurs and the place
where the dredged material is disposed.485 This reasoning, however,
mistakenly assumes that under the Tulloch Rule all pollutant dis-
charges resulting from "incidental fallback" will be authorized by
the Corps under permits issued under section 404. In fact, the oppo-
site is the case under the Tulloch Rule, which prohibited the dis-
charge of "incidental fallback" unless the Corps issued a permit un-
der section 404 authorizing the "incidental fallback."
Furthermore, although a section 404 permit authorizing "incidental
fallback" to be discharged near an excavation site and requiring
dredged or excavated material (other than incidental fallback) to be
disposed of at another location would specify two different disposal
sites, such a permit is not prohibited by section 404. The Corps in
certain situations can issue an individual section 404 permit requir-
ing both "incidental fallback" and dredged spoil to be removed from
an excavation site and disposed of at a location different than the
excavation site. In other situations, however, the Corps can issue an
individual section 404 permit requiring the disposal of dredged spoil
at a location different from the excavation site and also issue either
an individual or general section 404 permit that authorizes "inciden-
tal fallback" to be discharged at the excavation site. Alternatively,
of course, the Corps can deny either an individual or a general sec-
tion 404 permit for "incidental fallback" resulting from certain types
of dredging, excavating, channelization, land-clearing or ditch-
digging activity (which would mean that such activity could not law-
fully be conducted unless the "incidental fallback" can be prevented
from occurring).
A third reason in support of the District Court invalidating the Tul-
loch Rule in American Mining Congress, and holding that "inciden-
tal fallback" is excluded from regulation under sections 301(a) and
404 of the Clean Water Act, was that "Congress, through its lack of
an amendment, ratified 18 years of agency and judicial interpretation
484. Id. at 273-74.
485. Id.
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that excluded incidental fallback from section 404. ,,486 This argu-
ment, however, was premised upon the Corps' and EPA's interpreta-
tion of the CWA up until the agencies' adoption of the Tulloch Rule,
which amended the agencies' regulations under sections 301(a) and
404 to regulate "incidental fallback."
A fourth reason for invalidating the Tulloch Rule, provided by the
Court of Appeals is "[b]ecause incidental fallback represents a net
withdrawal, not an addition of material, it cannot be a discharge.
4 87
486. Id. at 274. The District Court noted that the Corps' 1986 regu-
lation defining "discharge of dredged material" (discussed supra
notes 446-49 and accompanying text) excluded "de minimis, inci-
dental soil movement occurring during normal dredging operations"
and did not regulate dredging itself. Id. at 274. The District Court
also cited, American Mining Cong., 951 F. Supp. at 274-75, the
holding in Salt Pond Assocs. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
815 F. Supp. 766, 778 (D. Del. 1993), that landclearing, excavation
and dredging activities are not subject to regulation under section
404 of the Clean Water Act, and the court cited the holding in United
States v. Lambert, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1294, 1296, 1981 WL
14886 (M.D. Fla. 1981), aff'd, 695 F.2d 536 (11th Cir. 1983), that
back-spill from excavation does not constitute the discharge or addi-
tion of a pollutant under the Act "when the dredged spoil simply
falls back into the area from which it has just been taken." The Dis-
trict Court in American Mining Cong., F. Supp. at 274 n.15, also
noted that the court in Salt Pond Assocs. subsequently found that the
landowner's activities were subject to regulation under section 404
because they "extended well beyond excavation resulting in only de
minimis, incidental fallback." Salt Pond Assocs., 1993 WL 738478
at 9. The District Court in Am. Mining Cong. discounted Reid v.
Marsh, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1337, 1342, 1984 WL 178396
(N.D. Ohio 1984), which it referred to as "the only case to consider
incidental fallback to be a regulated discharge," 951 F. Supp. at 275,
because the Corps and EPA "expressly rejected that interpretation in
the 1986 regulation," id. at 275 n.17, with the American Mining
Cong. court noting, id. at 275, 275 n. 18, that the court in Reid held
that the Corps under section 404 could only regulate the discharge
itself, not the entire dredging activity. 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at
1342.
487. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
145 F.3d 1399, 1404 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). The
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The court added, "we fail to see how there can be an addition of
dredged material when there is no addition of material. 488
This reasoning, however, erroneously focuses upon the type of dis-
charge for which the Corps can issue a permit under section 404 (a
discharge of dredged or fill material), rather than the term "discharge
of a pollutant" used in section 301(a) of the CWA, the section of the
Act that imposes regulatory requirements upon point source dis-
charges of pollutants (including dredged or fill materials) into navi-
gable waters. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States
489v. Deaton, convincingly has refuted this argument on the grounds
that a "discharge of a pollutant" within the meaning of section
301(a) does not require the addition of materials into a receiving
body of water not previously present in that water body, such as in
"re-deposit" situations where dredging or excavating changes non-
pollutant soil and vegetation in a wetland or on the bottom of another
navigable water body into pollutants when soil is dug up and vegeta-
tion is uprooted.49 °
The courts that invalidated the Tulloch Rule declined to defer to
the Corps' and EPA's re-interpretation of the Clean Water Act in the
Tulloch Rule. The District Court reasoned in American Mining
Congress that a court does "not defer to agency reinterpretations that
exceed the scope of the agency's authority; as with the Chevron doc-
trine generally, courts defer to agency interpretations [of a statute]
only when the statute is ambiguous.",49 1 In this reasoning the District
Court implied Congressional intent was clear (not ambiguous) with
respect to regulation of "incidental fallback" under the CWA, a
situation where under the Chevron doctrine a court follows clear
Congressional intent as to the meaning of the statute rather than the
Court of Appeals rejected, as "ingenious but unconvincing," the ar-
gument that "fallback constitutes an 'addition of any pollutant' be-
cause material becomes a pollutant only upon being dredged...." Id.
This argument was accepted, however, in United States v. Deaton,
209 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 2000), as discussed supra notes 430-34
and accompanying text.
488. Id.
489. 209 F.3d at 337, denial of mot. to reconsider aff'd, 332 F.3d
698 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1874 (2004).
490. See supra notes 430-34 and accompanying text for discussion
of the holding in Deaton.
491. 951 F. Supp. at 274 n.13.
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agency's interpretation of the statute. The District Court also
added that "an additional reasoning for rejecting the agencies' re-
quest for heightened deference is the inconsistency of positions they
have taken." The court commented that it was "not apparent" how
the two agencies' increased experience with harmful environmental
effects of excavating and land-clearing activities "would alter the
agencies' interpretation of congressional intent., 493 The Court of
Appeals, on the other hand, seemed to find that although Congress'
intent with respect to regulation of "incidental fallback" under the
CWA was ambiguous or unclear, the Corps' and EPA's interpreta-
tion of the ambiguous statute was unreasonable and that the Corps'
and EPA's positions therefore were not entitled to deference by the
courts under the Chevron doctrine.4 9 4 Nevertheless, the Court of
Appeals, although following a different approach than the District
Court as to the Chevron doctrine, affirmed both the District Court's
judgment that the Tulloch Rule's inclusion of incidental fallback
within the definition of "discharge of dredged material" was invalid
on its face and the District Court's order enjoining the Corps and
EPA from applying or enforcing that part of the rule against any per-
son anywhere in the United States.495
In response to the judicial invalidation of the Tulloch Rule's inclu-
sion of incidental fallback in the definition of "discharge of dredged
material," the Corps of Engineers, on May 10, 1999, in a final rule,
revised its regulations to define "discharge of dredged material" to
mean:
Any addition of dredged material into, including re-
deposit of dredged material other than incidental fallback
within, the waters of the United States. The term in-
cludes ... (iii) Any addition, including re-deposit other
than incidental fallback, of dredged material, including
excavated material, into waters of the United States
which is incidental to any activity, including mechanized
492. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984).
493. American Mining. Cong., 951 F. Supp. at 274 n. 13.
494. Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs,
145 F.3d 1399, 1404, 1404 n.5; 1410 (Silberman, J., concurring).
495. Id. at 1406-10.
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land clearing, ditching, channelization, or other excava-
496tion.
The preamble to this revised definition stated that the revision
"does not alter the well-settled doctrine ... that some re-deposits of
dredged material in waters of the United States constitute a discharge
of dredged material and therefore require a section 404 permit,"
497
and that the Corps and EPA would be undertaking notice and com-
ment rulemaking to adopt a final rule that would "more clearly de-
lineate the scope of CWA jurisdiction over re-deposits of dredged
material in waters of the U.S.''49' The preamble also indicated that
until such a final rule is promulgated, the Corps and EPA would de-
cide on a case-by-case basis whether a particular re-deposit is subject
to regulation under the CWA or whether a particular re-deposit is
incidental fallback not subject to regulation under section 404.
This 1999 revised definition of "discharge of dredged material"
was held not to violate the District Court's injunction against apply-
ing or enforcing the Tulloch Rule.50 0 The District Court held the
revised definition of "discharge of dredged material" "eliminates
section 404 jurisdiction over incidental fallback," explaining that the
court's earlier "order enjoining the agencies from applying or en-
forcing the Tulloch Rule must be understood to bar the agencies
from regulating incidental fallback. 5 °1
On January 17, 2001, the Corps and EPA adopted regulations
that defined "incidental fallback" as "the re-deposit of small volumes
of dredged material that is incidental to excavation activity in waters
of the United States when such material falls back to substantially
the same place as the initial removal." At the same time, both agen-
cies also issued final rules 50 3 that modified their definitions of "dis-
charge of dredged material" by adding the following provision:
496. 33 C.F.R. § 323.3(d)(1)(iii) (2000); 64 Fed. Reg. 25120 (May
10, 1999).
497. 64 Fed. Reg. 25121 (May 10, 1999).
498. Id.
499. Id.
500. American Mining Cong. v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 120 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2000).
501. Id. at 29.
502. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2)(ii); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2003).
503. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(2)(i) (2003); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2004);
66 Fed. Reg. 4550, 4575 (Jan. 17, 2001).
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The Corps and EPA regard the use of mechanized earth-
moving equipment to conduct land clearing, ditching,
channelization, in-stream mining or other earth-moving
activity in waters of the United States as resulting in a
discharge of dredged material unless project-specific evi-
dence shows that the activity results in only incidental
fallback. This paragraph (i) does not and is not intended
to shift any burden in any administrative or judicial pro-
ceeding under the CWA.
504
The agencies indicated that under this final definition of "discharge
of dredged material," a decision whether an activity involves a regu-
lated re-deposit/addition of pollutants or a non-regulated incidental
fallback would "be made on a case-by-case basis considering actual
evidence of the particular activity in question.' 50 5 According to case
law, a determination of whether a particular deposit is incidental
fallback is dependent "on whether it (1) is small in volume, (2) is
incidental to excavation activity, and (3) falls back to substantially
the same place as the initial removal.' 5 °6 A judicial challenge to this
new rule recently was dismissed on grounds it was not ripe for judi-
cial review.
50 7
The Corps and EPA should re-promulgate a modified version of
the Tulloch Rule to require a section 404 permit for any incidental
fallback, even de minimis fallback (fallback that would not destroy
or degrade wetlands or other navigable waters) presently exempted
from regulation as a "discharge of dredged material.,, 508 Any inci-
dental fallback of pollutants, even if it has de minimis adverse ef-
fects, is subject to CWA regulatory requirements, because Congress
504. 66 Fed. Reg. at 4575. The agencies' proposed final rules
would have established a rebuttable presumption that a discharge of
dredged material results from mechanized land clearing, ditching,
channelization, in-stream mining, or other mechanized excavation
activity in waters of the United States, with this presumption being
rebutted if "the party proposing such an activity demonstrates that
only incidental fallback will result from its activity." 65 Fed. Reg.
50108, 50117 (Aug. 16, 2000).
505. 66 Fed. Reg. at 4562.
506. Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 311 F. Supp. 2d 91, 102 (D.D.C. 2004).
507. Id.
508. 33 C.F.R. 323.2(d)(4)(i); 40 C.F.R. § 232.2 (2003).
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intended to require permits under the CWA "in any situation of pol-
lution from point sources" 50 9 and because neither EPA, the Corps,
nor the states have authority to exempt discharges subject to section
301(a) from the CWA's permit and effluent discharge limitation re-
quirements. 510 Furthermore, the definition of "discharge of a pollut-
ant" adopted by the Supreme Court in its Miccosukee Tribe decision
requires both "re-deposits" and "incidental fallback" be regulated as
required by section 301(a) of the CWA if they are an addition of pol-
lutants from a point source into a navigable body of water. The Su-
preme Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision holds that a point source
"discharge of a pollutant" subject to regulation under the CWA oc-
curs when a point source conveys pollutants which it generates, as
well as when a point source conveys pollutants which it does not
generate. No exceptions are permitted even where only small
amounts of pollutants are discharged, where a discharge causes no
substantial or even identifiable harm to the receiving body of water
or the environment, or where pollutants are re-deposited into a wet-
land or navigable body of water near where they were removed from
that same wetland or body of water. 5
11
However, although the Corps and EPA are not authorized by Mic-
cosukee Tribe to exclude "incidental fallback" from the definition of
a "discharge of a pollutant" for purposes of sections 301(a), 402 and
404 of the Act, the Corps and states (with approved section 404
permit programs) may issue general section 404 permits for dis-
charges of "incidental fallback" (or at least discharges of "incidental
fallback" in de minimis amounts or that are not harmful to the
aquatic ecosystem), from certain categories of point sources engaged
in land-clearing activities, digging of ditches, channelization, exca-
vation, or dredging.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision may
impose significant increased costs upon some water transfer pro-
509. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1383 (D.C.
Cir. 1977).
510. Id. at 1374, 1377; N. Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Explor.
and Dev. Co., 325 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003).
511. Supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
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grams that divert water from one body of water to a separate and
distinct body of water, if such programs are required to obtain an
individual NPDES permit and to comply with expensive technology-
based effluent limitation requirements, at least some of the costs at-
tributable to compliance with Clean Water Act requirements can be
reduced if the EPA and the states issue general NPDES permits to
water transfer programs. The EPA also may be able to keep the
costs of complying with effluent limitation requirements under such
general permits from being prohibitively expensive by adopting op-
erational control or best management practice effluent limitation
requirements rather than numerical effluent limitations.
Water transfer programs are not the only point source dischargers
of pollutants into waters of the United States that are affected by the
Supreme Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision. The decision also may
have wide-spread impacts upon discharges of dead fish from
pumped storage electricity generating facilities and upon land-
clearing, ditch digging and excavation activities that result in inci-
dental fallback of soil and vegetation, as well as upon other point
source dischargers of pollutants that convey into waters of the
United States water containing pollutants that were added by some
other persons' point source pollutant discharges or by runoff, non-
point source pollution. Such sources may need to obtain either a
section 402 NPDES permit or a section 404 dredged or fill material
permit, although EPA, the Corps of Engineers, and the states may
reduce the costs attributable to a required permit by issuing general
permits for certain categories of these point source dischargers. A
general section 402 NPDES permit may require compliance with
best management practices effluent limitation requirements rather
than with numerical effluent limitations. Some of these point source
dischargers, however, may be required to comply with expensive
technology-based numerical effluent limitation requirements that
require a point source to remove from its pollutant discharges pollut-
ants that were generated or created by other persons, although some
governmental point sources may be able to pass some or all of these
,,512
costs "back upstream to the generators of the pollution.
The Supreme Court's Miccosukee Tribe decision, however, does
not require a water transfer program to obtain either an individual
NPDES permit or a general NPDES permit in order to transfer water
from one part of a navigable body of water to another part of that
512. Davis and Doster, supra note 20, at 98.
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same water body. This principle may exempt hydroelectric storage
dams from the NPDES permit requirement for releases of water into
a downstream river or stream from the reservoir behind the dam,
through a dam's spillways or pipes. This exemption, however, will
not excuse storage dams and pump storage facilities from the
NPDES permit and effluent limitation requirements for discharges
from turbines of dead fish killed when passing through the turbines.
Federal courts, however, need to adopt an appropriate test for de-
termining when a body of water is a separate and distinct body of
water for purposes of Miccosukee Tribe's exemption from the
NPDES permit requirement of intra-water body transfers of water.
The appropriate test that federal courts should apply when this prin-
ciple is at issue should be either the "but for/cause in fact" test ap-
plied by the Eleventh Circuit in the Miccosukee Tribe case or a bio-
logical/ecosystem characteristic test, rather than a hydrological con-
nection test. The hydrological connection test should not be adopted
because it would exempt from regulation under the CWA those
transfers of water from polluted downstream bodies of water to less-
polluted upstream bodies of water that have a hydrological connec-
tion to the downstream body of water. The federal courts also
should reject the "unitary waters" approach when addressing water
transfer programs under the CWA. The "unitary waters" approach
would permit a body of water containing little or no amounts of pol-
lutants to become more polluted by a transfer of water from a more
polluted body of water, without the need for either a permit under
the CWA or compliance with CWA effluent limitation requirements.
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